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In his dialogues, Plato presents different ways in which to understand the relation 
between Forms and particulars. In the Symposium, we are presented with yet another, 
hitherto unidentified Form-particular relation: the relation is Love (Erôs), which binds 
together Form and particular in a generative manner, fulfilling all the metaphysical 
requirements of the individual’s qualification by participation. Love in relation to the 
beautiful motivates human action to desire for knowledge of the Form, resulting in the 
lover actively cultivating and bringing into being new beauty in the world, and in herself. 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis offer a survey of the arguments and examples Plato puts 
forward in the text of the corpus regarding the nature of Forms and the nature of 
participation, alongside a framework of the traditional interpretations of these two 
Platonic concepts in the literature. Chapter 3 turns to a close examination of Erôs in 
the Symposium, arguing that the love Plato presents in this dialogue is of a different sort 
than appetitive emotion. It is an aesthetic and intellectual attraction, capable of 
stimulating cognitive achievement. Erôs, however, does not stop there. The lover is led 
not only to contemplation of beauty, but to the generation of beauty, which is the 
subject of Chapter 4. The emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation of Erôs, I argue, is the 
clearest picture Plato paints of how possession of properties can be explained through 
participation in Forms. Erôs leads the lover to produce beauty in the world and in the 
soul, which explains how love in relation to the beautiful can lead to becoming 
beautiful. The object of love is the generation of beauty, the mortal mechanism of 
participation in the Form by which the lover herself becomes beautiful. Finally, Chapter 
5 focusses on beauty itself and its role in moral education. Beauty, for Plato, is required 













I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by me (the candidate); and that the 
work of which it is a record is entirely my own, except where otherwise indicated by 
means of quotation, reference, and acknowledgement. The work has not been accepted 
in any previous application for any other degree or professional qualification. 
 









































INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . 1 
 
I. Aims and methodology of the thesis     6 
II. Orientation to the subject      8 
III. Orientation to the thesis      12 
III.a. Statement of terminology     12 
III.b. Limitations       15 
IV. Overview of chapters      17 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE NATURE OF FORMS . . . . 19 
 
I. Meno         20 
II. Phaedo        21  
II.a. Deadly asceticism (65c-67a)     22  
II.b. The argument from recollection (72e-78b)   23 
II.c. The affinity argument (78b-84b)    26 
II.d. The argument from the Form of life (95a-107b)  27 
III. Republic        30 
III.a. 449a-480a       31  
III.b. 484a-511e       33 
III.c. 514a-541b       39 
IV. Cratylus        41 
V. Phaedrus        42 
VI. Parmenides        43 
VII. Theaetetus        44 
VIII. Timaeus        45 
IX. Philebus        46 
X. Symposium        47 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION . . . 53  
 
I. Review of participation in the Platonic corpus   54  
I.a. Phaedo        54 
I.b. Parmenides       56 
I.c. Phaedrus       57 
I.d. Timaeus       57 
I.e. Republic       58 
I.f. Sophist        59 
I.g. Protagoras       60 
I.h. Laws        61 
II. Review of participation in the literature    61  
II.a. Original to copy      64 
II.b. Contagion agent to phenomenon    66 
II.c. Source to similar image     68 
II.d. Binding causal power      69 
 
CHAPTER 3: ERÔS IN THE SYMPOSIUM  . . . 71 
   
I. The truth about Erôs      72  
I.a. Diotima and the origin of Love    72 
I.b. The ladder of love      78 
I.c. Who loves whom?      82 
I.c.1. Philosopher loves the Form of beauty,  
    beauty begets     83 
I.c.2. Philosopher loves a beautiful particular,  
     begets in the mind of the beloved   86 
I.c.3. Philosopher loves a beautiful beloved,  
     begets virtue in herself    92 
I.c.4. Philosopher inspired by beauty,  
      begets virtue in the world and in the soul  93 
II. Erôs is distinctly cognitive      95 
III. Objects and aims of Erôs      102 
III.a. Love is not of beauty, but of bringing to birth in beauty 102 
III.b. No shifting goalposts: Socrates presents a consistent  
object of Erôs      104 
III.c. Objects of love compared to objects of knowledge  108 
IV. In defence of love       111 
 IV.a. Possessive lovers      111 
 IV.b. Possession does not entail the exclusivist’s reading  114 
V. Chapter conclusion       128 
 
CHAPTER 4: PARTICIPATION IN THE SYMPOSIUM . . 130  
 
I. Knowledge leads to generation     132 
I.a. The explanatory power of an erotic education   132 
I.b. Education grounds generative activity    136 
II. Generation: Becoming beautiful by creating beauty   141 
II.a. What is generated mirrors its cause    142 
II.b. The beauty of virtue      147 
III. Participation by generation      150 
III.a. Love is a bond, uniting mortal and divine   150 
III.b. Love is a bond, uniting different ontological types  154 
III.c. The bond of love unites the two through generation  156  
IV. Objections        160  
V. Mortal immortality is achieved through indissolubility  163  
V.a. The rival theories: External immortalities   163 
V.b. The sameness of the Form     167  
VI. Influence in the tradition: Aristotle on predication, and the PM 171 
VII. Chapter conclusion       175 
CHAPTER 5: THE VIRTUE OF BEAUTY . . . . 177 
 
I. Beauty’s role in generation      178 
I.a. Beauty, Καλλονή, καλός, and κάλλος   178 
I.b. Why is generation only in the beautiful?   181  
II. Implications for moral education     183 
II.a. Engaging the emotions in education    184 
II.b. Moral education review     185 
II.c. Platonic virtue ethics      187 
II.d. Curriculum: Beauty in the classroom    189  
III. Chapter conclusion       198 
 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . 199 
  
APPENDIX  . . . . . . . 201 
 
“What good is love?” Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis  
 34:2 (2014), 57-73 . . . . . . 202 
     









My study of Plato’s philosophy is due chiefly to the passion and dedication of brilliant 
teachers. A profound debt is owed to Cal Townsend and John Dyck, whose instruction 
and great personal mentorship during my undergraduate honours thesis set the 
trajectory for this work. Jerry Santas has been incredibly kind to take on the role of 
external supervisor for my doctoral research; and Don Morrison and Andrew Mason 
enabled me to bring these ideas to life. I wish further to express my very deep 
appreciation to Dory Scaltsas, my primary supervisor. His peerless Socratic cross-
examinations allowed me to explore and organise my hypotheses under scrutiny, and his 
faith in me instilled a confidence to take risks in defending them. 
 
Material from this thesis has been presented in Ancient Olympia, Asilomar, Athens, 
Cambridge, Durham, Edmonton, Heraklion, Langley, London, Newcastle, Oxford, 
Pisa, San Francisco, and St Andrews; for BBC Scotland and educational media; and at 
numerous workshops and seminars in Edinburgh. I am grateful to the audiences and 
participants at all these events for invaluable questions and discussions. Special thanks 
are due to Sarah Broadie, Jamie Dow, Michael Griffin, Jay Kennedy, David Konstan, 
Alexander Nehamas, and Frisbee Sheffield. Catherine Rowett has been a continuous 
source of encouragement and inspiration. The Athens of the North lives up to its 
namesake in the much-loved reading groups of the Philosophy and Classics departments 
at Edinburgh. My fellow students have greatly challenged and cheered me, and I 
especially thank Jane Orton for countless hours of dialogue. I wish my own students 
could know how much they’ve changed my life. 
 
Sincere appreciation is due to the following organisations for supporting this project: 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, for a Doctoral 
Fellowship; the University of Edinburgh, for tuition; the School of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Language Sciences, for a Shaw Fellowship/Career Development 
Scholarship and generous research grants; and the Thomas Weidemann Memorial 
Fund, for funding my classical research travels.  
 
I should note that material from Chapter 5 has been published in Analytic Teaching and 
Philosophical Praxis, and is reproduced in the Appendix with permission from the 
publisher. 
 
I humbly thank my family and friends—who were continually expected to listen to 
thoughts on the True, the Just, and the Beautiful—for their encouragement, their 
humour, and their patience. I am beholden to my sister, Kim, and my parents, Craig 
and Lynda Hosty, whose unwavering love and support has enabled me to flourish. My 
enduring gratitude goes to Brandon Ware, my greatest champion. The “great sea of 
beauty” I’ve witnessed in this endeavour counts among it such love as even the most 








Only in beholding beauty is human life worth living. 
 
ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου…  
βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωμένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. 
 





































It was the dinner party that became legend. Decades afterwards, the eager curious 
desperately gossiped to get a taste of what brought together the beautiful and powerful 
in one night of intoxicating conversation: Love.  
 
Plato’s Symposium dialogue tells the story of that night, and this thesis is the work 
of but one more rapt lover listening at the door. In his dialogues, Plato uses all the 
philosophical, poetic, and rhetorical devices available to an author of peerless ingenuity 
in an attempt to articulate what was, for him, one of the most important concepts of 
moral reasoning: how the varied beauties we experience in life can all be said to be the 
same, can all be said to be ‘beautiful’. That is, he wanted to understand the precise 
nature of the relation between perfect, unqualified, absolute beauty itself, and the 
many, not-quite-so-beautiful mortal beauties. That relation has come to be called 
‘participation’.  
Of all the inspired flights of fancy, in all of Plato’s radical ontology, in all the 
dialogues, none has caused more consternation than the infamously “hoary problem of 
participation.”1 The reason for the controversy is that Plato never explicitly describes 
that relation, despite its critical role in his philosophy. Over the dialogues, Plato 
presents a variety of different ways to understand the relation between unqualified 
                                                
1 Charles P. Bigger, Participation: A Platonic Inquiry (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 
1968), vi, 7. 
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Forms and qualified particulars. In this thesis, I work closely with the Greek text of the 
dialogue to argue that the Symposium presents yet another, hitherto unidentified Form-
particular relation: the relation is Love (Erôs), which binds together Form and 
particular in a generative manner, fulfilling all the metaphysical requirements of the 
individual’s qualification by participation. Love in relation to the beautiful motivates 
human action to desire for knowledge of beauty, resulting in the lover actively creating 
and bringing into being new beauty in the world, and in herself. 
 
 Justification for this thesis 
 
The Theory of Forms is, arguably, Plato’s most enduring contribution to 
philosophy. The cornerstone of his metaphysics, it is absolutely indispensable to his 
epistemology, his ethics and political philosophy, and his aesthetics and value theory. 
Any serious study of Plato must come to grips with the Theory of Forms, and its 
attractiveness has made it a philosophic mainstay—as demonstrated by its pervasive 
influence in the broader Western cultural tradition. Yet, for all that, the theory has 
been haunted by a lingering concern even Plato himself acknowledged: a nagging 
shadow of uncertainty as to the mechanics of participation. That all and sundry 
beauties are beautiful simply because there is a corresponding absolute beauty to give 
them their name is an elegant solution to the penetrating questions of ‘what is this?’ 
and ‘why is this the way it is?’. But the problematic question that remains unsettled in 
the Theory of Forms is…how? How, precisely, do particulars come to be related to the 
Form of beauty? 
For a number of Plato’s interpreters, the sceptics, his reluctance to describe the 
relation in any detail satisfactory to answer this question demonstrates a damning chink 
in the theory’s metaphysical and epistemological armour. If participation is simply a 
hollow name for a hollow concept, the Theory of Forms appears to imply a 
fundamental chasm between Two Worlds: the world of Forms and the world of 
particulars, separated categorically because no employable relation exists between them 
to bridge them.  
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The justification for this thesis is its attempt to offer a possible solution to the claim 
of a hollow participation relation. In what follows, I argue that Plato had a fully 
consistent hypothesis of how those two worlds might be bridged. While Plato’s 
metaphysics is much discussed in the literature, hardly any work has focussed primarily 
on the metaphysics of the Symposium. This is surprising, since it is in the Symposium 
that Plato offers his longest and most detailed description of the nature of a Form, the 
Form of beauty.2 The focus on beauty is not unique to the Symposium, however. Beauty 
is the most discussed of all the Forms, being listed as an example by Plato even more 
than the Form of the good. My central finding is that the Symposium sets up a parallel 
between the eternal gods and mortal men on the one hand, and the eternal Forms and 
physical particulars on the other. Plato introduces a third entity into this parallel: Erôs, 
a divine daimon whose power and purpose is to bind each two together into a unity. I 
argue that this parallel is a novel way to understand how particulars can relate to 
Forms: they are bound by love, which motivates the creation of beauty and virtue.  
The account we are presented with in the Symposium is therefore a project that 
makes a metaphysical argument for the link between emotions and moral education, via 
aesthetics. Leave it to Plato to build such a widely interdisciplinary theory of causation, 
but that is, in part, what makes the theory a distinctly human one. The Symposium 
offers an emotive understanding of the participation relation as personified Love, the 
bond between a beautiful soul and the Form of beauty itself. Accordingly, this thesis 
sets out to defend a view of human motivation that is fundamentally creative: an 
aesthetics of the transformative power of beauty.  
 
 Intended readers 
 
As Socrates insists in the dialogue, love is the best co-worker with human nature to 
realise one’s potential. In the same way, I earnestly recommend to all those interested 
in the tragi-comedy of love, beauty’s uniquely powerful grip on the creative impulse, 
                                                
2 Symposium, 210e-212a; Allan Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 324, n. 39. 
WARE INTRODUCTION 4 
 
 
and an insightful perspective on ancient Attic religious and cultural practices to enjoy 
the Symposium’s inexhaustible fifty pages, rather than these two-hundred. 
As beauty inspires creation of beauty, however, I was compelled to craft this thesis. 
I hope it might be of interest to those curious about Plato’s theory of love. In 
particular, I hope the following readers might find specific aspects of this thesis helpful. 
Readers are also encouraged to consult the brief overview of chapter contents at the 
end of this introduction. 
 
Undergraduate and Postgraduate students: This thesis focusses on Plato’s metaphysics, 
aesthetics, and theory of love. Students working on related areas—including the 
role of emotions in moral activity and decision-making—may find my arguments 
concerning the nature of Platonic love, metaphysics in the Symposium, and the role 
of beauty in creativity in Chapters 3-5 of interest. Undergraduate students in 
philosophy, classics, and the history of political thought might also find useful the 
review surveys of the texts and literature in Chapters 1 (on the nature of Forms) and 
2 (on the nature of participation), which provide an overview of all the relevant 
passages in Plato’s dialogues where references to these Platonic concepts occur.  
 
Academics: This thesis provides a contemporary interpretation of the concept of 
participation in Plato’s metaphysics, a topic that has received increasing attention 
since its latest heyday in the mid-twentieth century. Accordingly, academics 
interested in the status of the literature up until 2013 may find the relevant 
chapters useful. In general, the thesis also offers a current status of the discipline on 
the topics of ancient emotions (see Chapter 3) and the Symposium dialogue. The 
occasion of the X Symposium Platonicum in Pisa, Italy in July 2013 on the topic of 
Plato’s Symposium—at which portions of this thesis were presented and discussed—
demonstrates that the Symposium is a flourishing topic of contemporary ancient 
philosophy research. 
 
Educators: Readers without any particular interest in philosophy as such may yet 
find the conclusions of this research project informative. One of the tangible 
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outcomes of this thesis, as set out in Chapter 5, §II, is its contribution to 
understanding the historical treatment of emotions and their relevance in 
contemporary education. This outcome has two applications: (1) to emphasise the 
role of emotions—especially love—in creative thinking and reasoning; and (2) to 
provide an analysis of the recent psychology and education scholarship on the 
ethical and pedagogical assumptions and challenges in understanding the process of 
engaging the emotions in moral education. This may be of interest to educators at 
any level of elementary through post-secondary school, but perhaps of particular 
relevance to K-12/secondary school levels, on which the majority of the literature 
on moral education focusses. 
 
Health Sciences / Social and Public Health educators and practitioners: The social, 
political, and cultural forces that bear upon the experience of health and care is a 
matter of immediate interest and importance. A number of recent programmes have 
sought to investigate the areas of human psychology that play a role in determining 
health and illness within a social context. A crucial element of this psychology is the 
emotions: what makes us tick, how to handle emotions in a social environment, and 
how emotional health manifests in a variety of circumstances, including legal and 
political decision-making. Of interest to educators in these aspects of the health 
sciences, as well as to practitioners interested in the role of compassion and 
empathy as critical to care, is the treatment and understanding of emotions over 
time. As Chapter 3 provides a study of the history of the desiderative and erotic 
emotions, it offers useful material for lectures, seminars, or background reading on 
‘the history of emotion’.  
 
 Outline of introduction 
 
In the remainder of this introduction, I will present: (1) the aims and methodology 
of the thesis; (2) an orientation to the subject, providing an overview of Plato’s 
Symposium dialogue within ancient philosophy; (3) an orientation to the thesis, 
providing a statement of its key terminology, and an explanation of its limitations; and 
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finally, (4) a map of the thesis’ chapters, with a summary of what the reader can expect 
to find in each.  
 
 I. AIMS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the Symposium dialogue offers 
a unique contribution to Plato’s metaphysics. In particular, I suggest that we can find in 
Socrates’ speech a hitherto unnoticed description of the participation relation: love 
(Erôs) as Plato’s bond between the Form of beauty, and the many beautiful particulars. 
Through a close look at the origin of love presented by Diotima and recounted by 
Socrates, we see that Erôs, love personified, is not the god Socrates’ interlocutors at the 
symposium believed him to be. Rather, love is a daimon, intermediary between gods 
and men, whose especial power is to “fill up the interval [between them] so that the 
whole itself is bound together by it”, thereby enabling conversation and communion 
between the two.3 As the implications of this portrayal of love are expounded upon in 
the ensuing ‘ascent passage’ of the dialogue, Plato presents, I assert, a naturalistic 
account of the motivational power of love and its ability to lead not only to knowledge, 
but to the generation and creation of beauty in the soul. This, I argue, is participation. 
A second aim of this thesis focusses on the object of love. A great deal of the 
literature on Plato’s moral psychology, and, in particular, the research focussing on 
Plato’s dialogues concerning erotic love—the Symposium and the Phaedrus—asserts 
that the object of love is beauty or goodness (taken to be either beautiful or good 
things, or their corresponding Forms). In this thesis, especially Chapter 3, §III, I 
provide evidence that the object of love, as described in the Symposium, is not beauty, 
but rather the creative generation of beauty. Here, I engage constructively with the work 
of David Halperin on aims of erôs compared with objects of erôs, and Gerasimos Santas 
on actual objects compared with intentional objects. My purpose is to understand the 
role of beauty in an emotional-cognitive context: when we love something, do we love 
it, its bundle of qualities (including beauty), some unique whole incorporating that 
                                                
3 Symposium, 202e-203a. 
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beauty, or something else entirely? In examining this question, I analyse both the 
existing literature on objects of emotions and the specific account we get in the 
Symposium. I conclude that, as the brand of love Diotima has in mind is not the 
appetitive emotion of the Phaedo, but rather an intellectual emotion that does not seek 
possession of its object, its object is not beauty. Love is attracted to beauty, but its 
object is bringing to birth in beauty, here interpreted as creating or generating beauty.  
A third aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the transformative power of beauty. To 
do this, I assess beauty both as what attracts and what is created in love’s activity. My 
result is that beauty can be understood as a virtue of soul. Beauty inspires the creation 
of beauty, and is therefore a self-generation principle whereby the lover designs and shapes 
herself. This is presented in my final chapter as a series of applications of my general 
Platonic theory of participation to the areas of moral education and aesthetic creativity. 
Accordingly, what I set out to discover in the overall objective of this project is the 
role of love in the creation of beauty, including the moral virtue of beauty. What I 
found, and what I hope to convince my readers of over the course of this thesis, is that 
love is a naturalistic interpretation of Plato’s participation relation: love is the 
mechanism by which the Form of beauty is instantiated in beautiful particulars.  
My methodology for this project is to examine the descriptions of participation 
elsewhere in the corpus, and compare it to what is presented in the Symposium. I focus 
in the main on Socrates’ speech. The reason for this is detailed in §III.b. of this 
introduction.  
I also refer to a number of Plato’s other dialogues, in particular the Republic. My 
interpretation tends toward a synchronic understanding of the dialogues, to the extent 
that the language or content of some passages provides readers with clues that might 
enhance our insight into other passages. This is not to say that the theories expressed in 
one dialogue are entirely the same as those in another dialogue. In fact, it is precisely 
because Plato chose to present, for example, the Theory of Forms slightly differently in 
different dialogues that we can understand its wide-ranging aspects and implications. I 
acknowledge that issues of chronology might render comparison between the dialogues 
suspect, but see §III.b. of this introduction as regards that debate. Furthermore, my use 
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of other dialogues does not aim to provide sole support for any argument made in this 
thesis: I believe it can stand alone within the Symposium. However, as the metaphysics 
of the Republic—in particular the Line and Sun Similes—are much discussed and 
assessed in the literature, when a comparable point can be found outwith the 
Symposium, I alert the reader to these connections in the hope that dialogue between 
interpretations might enrich the reading of both. My reference to later philosophers, 
including Aristotle, is largely to demonstrate influence in the tradition. 
The Greek text is cited according to Burnet’s 1903 edition. Translations of the 
Symposium follow Rowe’s 1998, and Benardete’s 1993, with some amendment. Where 
important to clarify the terms used—especially where the English translations vary 
between scholarship cited—I provide the Greek text as well as the English translation.  
 
 
 II. ORIENTATION TO THE SUBJECT 
 
The languages, literature, and cultures of the Ancient Græco-Roman world 
comprise classical studies, in which ancient philosophy holds one foot, the other 
planted in the discipline of philosophy as its Western cornerstone. The political 
thought (here understood traditionally as including all philosophy that speaks to how 
humans ought to live as social creatures) which shaped and stemmed from those 
cultures has had an enduring, founding influence on how our society is run. It is 
embedded in the language we speak, the laws we follow, the religions we practice, and 
the social norms we have come to take as given. Studying ancient philosophy is thus not 
only a way to understand our past, and the way our world works, but offers us the tools 
to shape it further. 
Fifth century B.C. Athens was the scientific and cultural centre of the ancient 
world. There, we find Plato, a noble young man who absorbed all that the learning of 
his day had to offer—and then enhanced it. His primary work was the composition of 
some two to three dozen books called dialogues, each of which follows a dramatic 
format—sometimes narrated—depicting conversations between a veritable who’s-who 
of ancient Athens, and almost always led by Plato’s teacher, the rogue street 
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philosopher, Socrates.4 The dialogues discuss an awesome range of ethical, pedagogical, 
political, theological, mathematical, and cosmological concepts. The profound, often 
humorous, and powerfully compelling treatment of philosophy’s most fundamental 
challenges have established Plato as, without doubt, the most influential thinker of 
Western civilisation. Accordingly, much better minds than mine have sought to 
introduce this great man and his intellect. I leave it to Emerson: 
Among secular books, Plato only is entitled to Omar’s fanatical 
compliment to the Koran, when he said, “Burn the libraries; for their 
value is in this book.” These sentences contain the culture of nations; 
these are the corner-stone of schools; these are the fountain-head of 
literatures. A discipline it is in logic, arithmetic, taste, symmetry, poetry, 
language, rhetoric, ontology, morals or practical wisdom. There was 
never such range of speculation. Out of Plato come all things that are 
still written and debated among men of thought. Great havoc makes he 
among our originalities. We have reached the mountain from which all 
these drift boulders were detached. The Bible of the learned for twenty-
two hundred years, every brisk young man who says in succession fine 
things to each reluctant generation—Boethius, Rabelais, Erasmus, 
Bruno, Locke, Rousseau, Alfieri, Coleridge—is some reader of Plato, 
translating into the vernacular, wittily, his good things. Even the men of 
grander proportion suffer some deduction from the misfortune (shall I 
say?) of coming after this exhausting generalizer. St. Augustine, 
Copernicus, Newton, Behmen, Swedenborg, Goethe, are likewise his 
debtors and must say after him. For it is fair to credit the broadest 
generalizer with all the particulars deducible from his thesis. Plato is 
philosophy, and philosophy, Plato… [A]s our Jewish Bible has 
implanted itself in the tabletalk and household life of every man and 
woman in the European and American nations, so the writings of Plato 
have preoccupied every school of learning, every lover of thought, every 
church, every poet—making it impossible to think, on certain levels, 
except through him.5  
 
Even in his praise of Plato does Emerson employ the Platonic relation of broad to 
particular, source to manifestation.  
                                                
4 Thirty-six dialogues and a collection of thirteen letters have been attributed to Plato, although the 
authenticity of between fifteen and nineteen of these has been contested, with varying degrees of consensus 
between scholars. On the extent of this debate, see John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, eds., Plato: 
Complete Works (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), v-vi. 
5 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Plato, or The Philosopher,” in Representative Men (Philadelphia, PA: David McKay 
Publisher, 1892), 41-42, 47. 
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The Symposium takes as its subject the question of love. After a layered opening 
frame, we hear an account of the tragic poet Agathon’s dinner party celebrating his first 
poetic victory the night before. His friends have all gathered, and they decide to take 
turns giving speeches in praise of Erôs. The dialogue is unique within the Platonic 
corpus in that, by the time we reach Diotima’s myth regarding the origin of love, it is a 
story (Diotima’s)-within-a-story (Socrates’)-within-a-story (Aristodemus’)-within-a-
story (Apollodorus’). The reader learns “the truth about love” at a fifth remove.6 Plato 
has employed stories-within-stories before, but never to this degree: in the Parmenides, 
Cephalus tells how Antiphon recited Pythodorus’ story about the meeting between 
Socrates, Parmenides, and Zeno; and in the Phaedo, Echecrates hears from Phaedo the 
story of Socrates’ death, though in that case Phaedo had himself been present at the 
event. In the Symposium, the narrator is just as an outsider as the reader. In fact, the 
entire dialogue is recited to an unnamed companion. The dialogue thus draws in the 
reader, initiating her into love’s mysteries. 
The Symposium draws on a wealth of socio-cultural themes and material both to set 
the stage for and contribute to Plato’s philosophy.7 Symposia such as the one held at 
Agathon’s house that night were a staple amongst Plato’s aristocratic company.8 They 
were a time for indulging the senses with good food, copious wine, performed music, 
and the beautiful bodies of bright young things.9 Symposia were also the place for 
                                                
6 Symposium, 199b. That this layered dialogue similarly reflects the difficulty in grasping the truth through 
images at such a remove from the original is perhaps foreshadowed in Apollodorus’ admission at 178a that he 
does not remember everything from that night but only the “noteworthy points of those speeches that most 
particularly deserved remembering.” 
7 Though on the difficulties presented by these features of the dialogue, see A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and 
His Work (London: Meuthen, 1926), 209; Michael C. Stokes, Plato’s Socratic Conversations (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 115; Dorothea Frede, “Out of the Cave: What Socrates Learnt 
from Diotima,” in Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in honor of Martin Ostwald, eds. R. Rosen and J. Farrell (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 399-400; Christopher Rowe, Plato: Symposium [Plato] 
(Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1998), 239; Robert Wardy, “The Unity of Opposites in Plato’s 
Symposium,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 23 (2002): 1-2; and Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-
Corrigan, Plato’s Dialectic at Play: Structure, Argument and Myth in Plato’s Symposium (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004); and n. 148 in Chapter 1, §X of this thesis. 
8 For an account of symposia, see Oswyn Murray, Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposium (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 3-11; Aristophanes, Wasps, 1208-1217; as well as Books I-II of Plato’s Laws. 
9 Which, of course, include both female and male youths. On the homosexuality that was, as is clear from the 
art, myths, literature, and poetry of the time, a well-established feature of classical Athenian society by at least 
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educating young men in the social standards of the day, including how to regulate one’s 
erotic desires in the face of such enticements.10   
An important religious practice that has a significant presence in the Symposium 
dialogue is the Eleusinian Mysteries—the initiation ceremonies into the cult of 
Demeter and Persephone. The mysteries represent Persephone’s abduction into Hades’ 
underworld and her ‘ascent’ journey back to her mother, which is celebrated as a 
symbol of agrarian cycles and the ‘re-birth’ manifested in the passing of one generation 
to another.11  Diotima, who is introduced as a priestess and almost certainly as one who 
would have been involved in leading the initiates in such ceremonies, constructs her 
‘ascent passage’ using the language of the mysteries.12  The language of procreation and 
birth can also be seen to underlie each of the dialogues’ speeches in interesting and 
complementary ways.13  
The Symposium has enjoyed a long tenure as one of Plato’s most beloved dialogues, 
not least because the accounts of love presented in the seven speeches at times so 
                                                                                                                                     
the sixth century B.C., see Sir Kenneth Dover’s enormously influential Greek Homosexuality (London: 
Duckworth, 1978); Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, vol. II (London: Penguin 
Books, 1985); and Claude Calame, The Poetics of Eros in Ancient Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 89-110. 
10  On the educational purposes of symposia, see Frisbee Sheffield’s recent survey in Plato’s Symposium: The 
Ethics of Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5 ns. 10 and 11. 
11  On the Eleusinian Mysteries, see George E. Mylonas, Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1961); and Barbara Sattler, “The Eleusinian Mysteries in Pre-Platonic Thought: 
Metaphor, Practise and Imagery for Plato’s Symposium,” in Greek Religion, Philosophy and Salvation, ed. 
Vishwa Adluri (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), 151-190. On Greek mystery culture generally, see Walter Burkert, 
Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical, trans. John Raffan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). On the 
relation of the mysteries to erotic desire, see Reinhold Merkelbach, Roman und Mysterium in der Antike 
(Munich: Beck, 1962); and H.H.O. Chalk, “Mystery Cults and Romance,” Classical Review 13 (1963): 161-
163. Cf. the mystic language attributed of Erôs in Phaedrus, 248b, 249c-d, and 250b-c, where the 
philosopher is described as an initiate; and Chariton, De Chaerea et Callirhoe, 4.4.9, when Callirhoe describes 
her wedding night with Chaereas as a mystery night. 
12  A point that has not gone unnoticed in the literature. See Michael J. O’ Brien, “Becoming Immortal in 
Plato’s Symposium,” in Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in honour of Leonard Woodbury, ed. D.E. Gerber 
(Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984), 203-205 and his survey at 203, n. 49; as well as F.C. Cornford, “The 
Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” in The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1950), 77; Dover, Plato: Symposium [Symposium] (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), 155; Luc Brisson, Platon: Le Banquet (Paris: Flammarion, 1998), 65-71; and, more 
recently, Rowe [Plato], 192-194. 
13  Rowe, “Socrates and Diotima: Eros, Immortality, and Creativity” [“Socrates and Diotima”], Proceedings 
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy XIV, eds. John J. Cleary and Gary M. Gurtler (Leiden, 
The Netherlands: Brill, 1998), 225. 
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acutely resonate with and poetically represent the human experience. I have in mind 
here, of course, Aristophanes’ speech (189c-193e), which, among other contributions, 
is the source of that captivating portrayal of the beloved as one’s ‘other half.’ In 
Socrates’ speech, Plato crafts an image of love that includes but also goes beyond sexual 
or appetitive desire to a motivating force that draws the lover outside herself to realise 
her potential and shape a life most worth living. The seductiveness of this idea has 
projected the influence of Plato’s theory of love and desire well beyond the boundaries 




 III. ORIENTATION TO THE THESIS 
 
I will now summarise some of the main terminology that will be used throughout 
this thesis, before going on to outline the thesis’ limitations.  
 
 III.a. Statement of terminology 
 
The lower mysteries: Following the traditional reading of the dialogue, the lower 
mysteries refers to lines 208c-210e, Diotima’s description of those who have as 
their beloved a beautiful body and who give birth to human children (208c-209e), 
and those who “are pregnant in soul more than in body” and who give birth to 
beautiful speeches, laws, poems, and actions (209a-210e). 
 
The higher mysteries: The higher mysteries refers to lines 210a-212a, and this is 
Diotima’s term for the path taken in the lover’s ascent from beautiful bodies to the 
Form of beauty and to the final creative generation. 
 
                                                
14  On which, see María Angélica Fierro, “Plato’s theory of desire in the Symposium and Republic” (PhD diss., 
University of Durham, 2003), 17; and “Introduction,” Plato’s Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and 
Reception, eds. James H. Lesher, Debra Nails, and Frisbee Sheffield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 1. 
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The ascent passage: By this, I refer as well to Diotima’s summary of the lover’s ascent  
from particular beauties to the Form of beauty and to the final creative generation 
(210a-212a).  
Metaphysical: I have used the term to highlight simply those aspects of Plato’s theory 
which speak to, demonstrate, or otherwise indicate an hypothesis made about the 
nature of reality and the ways its various pieces fit together. I will suggest that 
certain concepts (e.g., the Forms, the participation relation, the Two Worlds) are 
‘metaphysical’ concepts, and arguments made about those concepts are 
‘metaphysical’ arguments. As I have mentioned above, the Symposium provides some 
of Plato’s most explicit references to the Forms, which alone affords this dialogue 
the bona fides to offer a contribution to our understanding of Plato’s metaphysics.  
 
Erôs: I have translated the Greek Ἔρως as ‘love’, with which I hope to get away 
without raising too many concerns. I gather many commentators follow Rowe in 
settling for ‘love’ as translation simply for lack of a more appropriate alternative.15  
The Greek term is inextricable from sexual desire, but carries with it a broader 
semantic range than solely sexual desire.16  I have resisted in translating it as desire, 
which Sheffield has done,17  however, for two reasons: (1) ἐπιθυμία holds that place, 
and even within Socrates’ speech does Plato use that term to describe desire in 
                                                
15 Rowe [Plato], 12. Beyond ἐπιθυμία, which I discuss below and which is widely considered to refer to 
desire in general, and τὰ ἀφροδίσια, which refers primarily to sex, there are five other words that can be 
translated ‘love’ in Classical Greek: ἵμερος, πόθος, φιλία, στοργή, and ἀγάπη. Ἵμερος is a kind of longing 
for a the company of an absent friend; πόθος is a similar but distinctly erotic desire for one who is absent. 
Φιλία can be said of a peaceful relation between states, friendliness towards friends or even colleagues, and the 
love one may feel towards parents, children, best friends, or a spouse (though this last would be combined 
with sexual desire). Στοργή is typically reserved for love between parents and children, but see David 
Konstan, “Στοργή in Greek amatory epigrams,” in DIC MIHI, MVSA, VIRVM: Homenaje al profesor Antonio 
López Eire, Acta Salmanticensia: Estudios filológicos 326, eds. Francisco Cortés Gabaudin and Julián Víctor 
Méndez Dosuna (Salamanca, Spain: Universidad de Salamanca, 2010), 363-369, for notable exceptions. 
Ἀγάπη, as a type of love, is postclassical, making its entrance in the Christian texts and referring to the love 
God has for his creation and which we ought have towards fellow-man. In Classical Greek, the term can refer 
as well to relationships with a sexual component. Dover [Symposium], 1, notes “on an early Attic red-figure 
vase a woman lolling ‘topless’ on a bed and drinking wine is named Ἀγάπη.” 
16  Rowe [Plato], 5; Paul W. Ludwig, Eros and Polis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8-13; 
Dover [Symposium], 1-2.  
17  Sheffield, 2. 
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general and as different to Ἔρως;18  (2) if the transformative, whole-life-altering, 
consuming relation Plato presents in Socrates’ speech is something different to love, 
then the English term love will, I fear, have been hollowed out entirely. Just as 
Socrates appropriated the symposium topic of Ἔρως to advance a philosophic 
theory of the best human life, as I argue in more detail in Chapter 3, so too perhaps 
did Plato widen the Greek term to embrace the complex of human emotion we 
attempt to impart by the word ‘love’. 
 
The lover: Much of Socrates’ speech in the Symposium revolves around an imagined 
lover. In the first instance, any lover generally; and as we get into the ascent passage, 
of a particular philosophic lover pregnant in soul with the beauty of virtue she will 
generate. I have made any imagined lover female, and will refer to her in those 
terms. My primary reason to do this is ease of identification: by making the example 
lover female, I aim to reduce any confusion between the lover and Socrates, Plato, 
personified Erôs the daimon, or any of the dialogue’s other male characters. As I 
refer more to Socrates than Diotima during the former’s speech, this lover should 
not be confused with Diotima. Making the lover female, when Ἔρως is male, is 
supported by the fact that Plato does draw a distinction between love (the 
daimon/emotion) and lovers.19   
 
The beloved: As a critical part of my argument encompasses defending the object of 
love as not beauty, but the creative process of generating beauty, I run into some 
difficulty in identifying the other person involved with our lover. Engaging in a bit 
of an etymological indulgence, I commandeer the accusative Greek ἀμφι- element 
of the word-forming English be- stem to christen our beloved as not the genitive 
object of the lover’s aim, but rather that around which she flutters and in relation 
to which she expresses her love. That will not convince everyone, but it is the name 
for the lover’s intimate in this little story. 
                                                
18 On the distinction between ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία in Plato, see, generally, David M. Halperin, “Platonic Erôs 
and What Men Call Love,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985): 170-174. 
19  E.g., at Symposium, 206b. 
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Generation: By generation, I refer to the activity of “bringing to birth in beauty” 
(τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ) which Diotima insists at 206e is the 
object of love. As I argue, this can be interpreted as the creative activity of bringing 
about new beauty in the physical world, and in the human soul. 
 
A note on the speaker: The ‘Socratic Problem’ arises out of the fact that, to our 
knowledge, Socrates never wrote anything, and Plato always put his words into the 
mouths of his characters. In this thesis, I will refer to Plato when I discuss those 
aspects of the dialogues that are clearly of the author’s construction: the order of 
the speeches, their language and rhetorical or literary devices, and the overall work 
of the dialogue or of any individual speech. I will ascribe to each speaker his or her 
words. As Diotima’s contribution to the dialogue is entirely recited by Socrates, I 
will mainly present those ideas as within Socrates’ speech to the other symposiasts, 
except where it is relevant to draw attention to the conversation between Diotima 
and Socrates. I follow most commentators in assuming that Diotima speaks for 
Plato.20  
 
 III.b. Limitations 
 
I shall want to bring to the reader’s attention that while this thesis makes passing 
reference to the Symposium’s frame dialogue and its other speakers—especially Agathon, 
with whose speech Socrates engages more than any other of the speeches—it will focus 
fairly consistently on Socrates’ speech. The reason for this is because it is in Socrates’ 
speech that the three following indicators are offered that suggest Plato was using 
Socrates as the mouthpiece for his philosophy, as is widely considered to be the case in 
the dialogues. (1) At 199b, Socrates responds to his interlocutors by saying his speech 
sets out to tell the truth about love (and, by implication, that the other speeches do 
not). Plato was often wont to challenge the moral and political assumptions of his day, 
                                                
20  See F.C. White, “Virtue in Plato’s Symposium,” Classical Quarterly 54:2 (2004): 366, n. 1, for a list of those 
who agree. But cf. Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 56-57. 
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and therefore a place in the dialogue where he says a character is engaging in something 
new and different is worth considering as being of Plato’s own. (2) It is in Socrates’ 
speech that Plato chooses to introduce Diotima, a priestess Socrates reveals has taught 
him everything he knows. (3) As noted above, Socrates’ speech contains the longest and 
most detailed description of a Form in the Platonic corpus. Whether or not Socrates’ 
speech can be taken to be reporting Plato’s own opinion, it is nevertheless a crucial 
contribution to Plato’s metaphysics and therefore deserves being taken seriously. 
This thesis also avoids entirely any argument regarding developmentalism in Plato’s 
intellectual career, or chronology of the dialogue’s composition date, beyond what can 
be inferred from the several references to historical events at various points in the 
dialogue. Issues of space and focus aside, my reason for avoiding such discussions at this 
stage is based on a fundamental scepticism regarding stylometry: if we learn anything 
from the Symposium, it is that Plato had enormous ability to mimic different voices in 
his writing, and to employ those voices at will. I dare not date.21  
Third, I do focus more on the metaphysics of the dialogue, than on its 
epistemology. I refer to cognition of the beautiful in the lover’s educational ascent to 
the Form, but without making commitments to any particular epistemological reading 
of Plato. I will go so far as to say that we do have evidence in the Symposium that the 
many particular instances can point the philosopher in the direction of what is essential 
to all those particulars, that is, the specific nature of that Form as a one over the 
                                                
21  On the difficulties of stylometric analysis of the Symposium, see Charles H. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic 
Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 42-48; 
Rowe, “Interpreting Plato,” in A Companion to Plato, ed. Hugh H. Benson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2006), 17-20; and, on a positive note, Harold Tarrant, “Stylistic Difference in the Speeches of the 
Symposium,” Proceedings of the X Symposium Platonicum (The International Plato Society, 2013), 69-74. For 
an overview of the state of the literature on the problem of chronology, to the 1990s, see Gerald A. Press, “The 
State of the Question in the Study of Plato,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34:4 (1996): 507-532; and 
on its continued struggles, Holger Thesleff, Studies in Platonic Chronology (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum 
Fennica, 1982); and “Platonic Chronology,” Phronesis 34:1 (1989): 1-26; and Jacob Howland, “Re-Reading 
Plato: The Problem of Platonic Chronology,” Phoenix 45:3 (1991): 189-214. For a recent, and ambitious, 
analysis of and contribution to the chronology and developmental debates, see Catherine Zuckert, Plato’s 
Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009).  
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many.22  On this point, I follow Lear’s assessment that the Phaedrus and the 
Symposium—while both concerned with love and beauty—present mirrored foci: whilst 
the former offers more as to the intelligible nature of the Form, the latter grants greater 
insight into its being.23  
 
 
 IV. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 
Chapter 1 is a systematic survey of the arguments and metaphors presented in the text 
of the Platonic corpus that reveal various aspects of the nature of Forms. This 
framework aims to provide valuable insight into what sort of entities the Forms might 
be. The account of the Form of beauty offered in the Symposium will be seen to clarify a 
number of the inconsistencies that arise in attempts to synthesise the descriptions 
encountered elsewhere in the dialogues. 
 
Chapter 2 takes a similar format to the first, this time focussing on the different 
explanations Plato puts forward in the dialogues regarding the nature of the 
participation relation. It follows with a framework of the existing interpretations of this 
relation in the literature.  
 
Chapter 3 turns to a close examination of Erôs in the Symposium, arguing that the love 
Plato presents in this dialogue is of a different sort than appetitive emotion. It is an 
aesthetic and intellectual attraction, capable of stimulating cognitive achievement. Erôs, 
however, does not stop there. The lover is led not only to contemplation of beauty, but 
to the generation of beauty, which is the subject of Chapter 4.  
 
In Chapter 4, I argue that the emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation of Erôs is the clearest 
picture Plato paints of how possession of properties can be explained through 
                                                
22  I take this to be an important feature of the initiate lover’s ascent in 210a-212a, a point that I examine in 
more detail in Chapter 4, §I.a. 
23  Gabriel Richardson Lear, “Permanent Beauty and Becoming Happy in Plato’s Symposium,” in Plato’s 
Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception, eds. James H. Lesher, Debra Nails, and Frisbee Sheffield 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 115-116. 
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participation in Forms. Erôs leads the lover to produce beauty in the world and in the 
soul, which explains how love in relation to the beautiful can lead to becoming 
beautiful. The object of love is the generation of beauty, the mortal mechanism of 
participation in the Form by which the lover herself becomes beautiful.  
 
Chapter 5 closes this study by focussing on beauty itself. Beauty, for Plato, is required 
for creative generation and can be understood as a uniquely powerful virtue of soul. 
That the world is a world of the good and beautiful—that it is this world—must be the 
reason why, on Diotima’s account, generation and the beautiful are so fundamentally 
connected. I then detail two implications of this thesis. First, I connect this argument 
with recent developments regarding the role of the emotions—in particular, love—in 
moral education. Second, I consider the particular role of beauty in a creative 
educational environment capable of motivating the excellence to which Socrates’ 
speech in the Symposium exhorts its readers.  





 CHAPTER I: 
 




Aim: To provide a survey of the descriptions, arguments, and metaphors presented in the text of 
the Platonic corpus that reveal various aspects of the nature of Forms. The account offered in 
the Symposium can be seen to clarify a number of the inconsistencies that arise in attempts to 
synthesise the descriptions encountered elsewhere in the dialogues. 
 
The Theory of Forms is one of Plato’s most enduring contributions to philosophy. 
The precise nature of the Forms, however, has been the subject of extensive debate. 
The trouble lies in the fact that, despite their presence—direct or indirect—in so many 
of his dialogues, Plato appears never to offer a comprehensive and final account of what 
exactly these entities are. Bigger remarks that, when considered seriously, Forms 
appear to be little more than sublimed versions of images, rescued by 
virtue of their presumed eternity from the ravages of time and 
incompleteness, the fate of the world of images which Becomes and 
never wholly is. […Forms reside in] a sort of etherealized Noah’s ark 
possessing the exemplary form of every natural type and kind.1 
 
Throughout the dialogues, Plato presents different ways in which to understand the 
Forms: a catalogue of similes, analogies, descriptions of characteristics, miscellaneous 
figures of speech, myths, and metaphors which hint at—with varying degrees of 
consistency—these most important and enigmatic of his characters. A review of these 
attempts to explain what type of entities the Forms might be will aim to draw out and 
organise what can be considered the nature of the Forms.  
                                                
1 Charles P. Bigger, Participation: A Platonic Inquiry (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 
1968), ix. 




Accordingly, this chapter will first survey the most critical passages in the Platonic 
corpus that discuss the Forms—a prefatory step to any possible insight into 
understanding the relationship between Forms and particulars, which is a further goal of 
this thesis. Second, this chapter will argue that the account of the Form of beauty 
offered in the Symposium can be read to clarify a number of the inconsistencies that 
arise in attempts to synthesise the descriptions encountered elsewhere in the dialogues. 
Often overlooked in the contemporary literature when considering those dialogues 
which contribute much to the understanding of Platonic metaphysics, the Symposium in 
fact boasts the Forms’ longest continuous and uniquely detailed description, and is 




 I. MENO 
 
The Meno is widely held to contain a preliminary Platonic use of the term εἶδος 
(idea or Form).3 The root of εἶδος is ‘to see’, and while this thesis will analyse, in 
subsequent chapters, the relation of Forms to aesthetic creativity, it must be 
uncontroversial to note that, throughout the dialogues, the most powerful and 
important analogies Plato uses to discuss his metaphysics are similarly accounts of the 
visual experience.4 It should then come as no surprise that the Form to which Plato 
refers most often is the Form of beauty. 
In the dialogue to hand, following a comparison to “the nature (οὐσία) of bees” at 
72a, Socrates suggests that the same is true of the various virtues: “Even if they are 
many and various, all of them have one and the same form (εἶδος) which makes them 
virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked to make clear what virtue is.”5 
                                                
2 Symposium, 210e-212a. 
3 See Bigger, 18-19, and Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato’s Meno (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1965), 36-45, esp. 44-45, for discussion of a possible connection between the dialogue’s 
titular character and its content.  
4 Republic 507a-509d being the example par excellence. 
5 Meno, 72c. Cf., perhaps, the opening lines to Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina. 




Health, he goes on to say, “has the same form everywhere”, and this concept of 
sameness is repeated in subsequent descriptions of the Form.6  
Related to the quality of sameness is the fixed, secure nature of Forms, which 
provides a basis for knowledge. “True opinions,” Socrates claims, “are not willing to 
remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that they are not worth much until 
one ties them down by [giving] an account of the reason why.”7 Forms have the 
function of providing a reason for particular phenomena. The dialogue ends with 
Socrates comparing Forms and particulars to Tiresias living among the dead, a “true 
reality compared, as it were, with shadows.”8 In the Meno, Forms are the particulars’ 
nature, the same for all variety, fixed and stable, and the true reality. 
 
 
 II. PHAEDO 
 
Arguments regarding chronology and the intellectual development of Plato’s 
philosophy will be left aside for now,9 but as it is in the Phaedo that Socrates expresses a 
degree of tentativeness as to the specific details of his claim,10  our survey of the nature 
of Forms will continue with this dialogue. The discussion of the immortality of the soul 
in the Phaedo adds to the theory of Forms the idea that Forms are not only different to 
particulars, but separate from them. The analysis of the descriptions offered in the 
Phaedo will follow along the dialogue’s sequence of arguments for the soul’s 
immortality. As each argument is put forward by Socrates, the reader is presented with 
additional perspectives on Plato’s other immortal entities—the Forms—although a 
perspective by no means complete nor rid of controversy. An important factor to bear 
in mind is that the Forms are introduced, at least at the dramatic level, as part of the 
                                                
6 Meno, 72d, 72e, 73c. 
7 Ibid., 97e-98a. 
8 Ibid., 100a-b. Symposium 212a draws the same distinction between true reality and shadows. 
9 On which, see §III.b. of the Introduction. 
10 Phaedo, 100d. 




aim to prove the immortality of the soul.11  How much this affects the advancement of a 
specific ‘theory’ of the Forms will require attention at each step of the argument as a 
whole.  
 II.a. Deadly asceticism (65c-67a) 
 
In the preliminary discussion, Socrates makes his famous statement concerning the 
philosopher’s practice of death—that is, that the philosopher should pay as little 
attention to the body as possible since it is the nurture of the soul that is most 
important. One of the primary activities of the soul, according to Socrates, is its 
“acquirement of pure knowledge”.12  As the senses are described as inaccurate,13  
Socrates and his interlocutors agree that it is “in thought or reasoning (λογίζεσθαι), 
then, if at all, that something of the realities becomes clear to it.”14  Socrates goes on to 
detail the objects of this reasoning: 
Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice…and absolute 
beauty and goodness?  
Of course. 
Well, did you ever see anything of the kind with your eyes?  
Certainly not. 
Or did you ever reach (ἐφήψω) them with any of the bodily senses? I 
am speaking of all such things, as size, heath, strength, and in short the 
essence or underlying quality (οὐσίας) of everything. Is their true nature 
(ἀληθέστατον) contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the 
case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true 
essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the 
knowledge of it?…To search out the pure (εἰλικρινὲς), absolute 
essence of things…?  
That is as true as true can be, Socrates.15  
 
The inaccuracy of the bodily organs hinders one from knowing such things absolutely, 
for which purpose one must “be free from the body and must behold the actual realities 
                                                
11 Allan Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), 49. 
12 Phaedo, 65c. 
13 Ibid., 65b. 
14 Ibid., 65c. 
15 Ibid., 65d-66a. 




with the eye of the soul alone (αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα).”16  This 
freedom from the body requires that “we avoid, as far as possible, intercourse and 
communion (ὁμιλῶμεν…μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν) with the body, except what is necessary, 
and are not filled (ἀναπιμπλώμεθα) with its nature”.17  The terms used to describe this 
contamination reveal it is the same predicament against which the desired outcome is 
compared in the Republic, Symposium, Theaetetus, Apology, and elsewhere in the 
Phaedo.18   
What can be ascertained from this introductory discussion is that the object of 
knowledge—which will turn out to be the Forms—has something to do with the true, 
pure essence of the matter under investigation. One approaches these true essences 
with her mind, freed as much as possible from the distractions, desires, demands, and 
discrepancies of the flesh and the material world, and comes into a manner of contact 
with them. The verbs indicating the nature of this contact vary throughout these 
preliminary remarks, but most telling is ἐφήψω, “reach, grasp, or possess”.19  With this 
discussion of the soul and its need to become unentangled from the body asserted, 
Socrates moves into his arguments for the immortality of the soul. Divorcing knowledge 
from desire runs counter to the latter’s role in the Symposium and Phaedrus, of course. 
This distinction between what Plato presents in those dialogues and what is in the 
Phaedo functions perhaps to emphasise the ontological bifurcation that will go on to be 
a crucial premise of his metaphysics. 
 
 II.b. The argument from recollection (72e-78b) 
 
The second argument of the Phaedo, the argument from recollection, is the first to 
offer specific insight into the nature of the Forms. As the Forms are introduced here 
with an express relation to knowledge, and as this argument details the theory of 
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recollection, we can identify the thread comprising the inherent connection between 
Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics. Socrates introduces the Forms in this argument 
as follows: 
We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean the instance of 
one piece of wood being equal to another, or one stone to another, or 
anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the 
abstract (παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον).20  
 
The knowledge one is able to gain of these abstract entities is different to the 
knowledge of their particular instances.21  This difference manifests itself both in the 
means of attaining that knowledge and in its object. Socrates first asserts that one 
attains knowledge of equality in the abstract: 
from the things we were just speaking of…by seeing equal pieces of 
wood or stones or other things, [we] derive from them a knowledge of 
abstract equality, which is another thing. […] It is impossible to gain 
this knowledge [that equal stones are not the equal itself] except by 
sight or touch or some other of the senses…Then it is through the 
senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute 
equality and fall short of it.22  
 
What can Socrates mean that the knowledge of Forms and the knowledge of particulars 
“is not the same, but different”?23  Discussing the difference between knowledge of 
particulars and knowledge of Forms, Socrates uses the following example: “Knowledge 
of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre”.24  The intention of the distinction is that 
knowledge of one has a different content than knowledge of the other. Although 
knowledge of both may be possible, one is not to confuse knowledge of one for 
knowledge of the other. Knowledge of particulars is gained, perhaps exclusively, in 
perceiving through the senses precisely that they are not absolute essences. One knows 
these particulars are not the Form, in her consideration of “whether or not this 
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recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected”.25  The knower can 
recollect what the abstract essence of equality is, from the fallings short of the particular 
sticks and stones,26  and know the particulars in that they do so fall short. She knows 
what it is they strive towards, and in such, knows their good.  
The most significant insight into the nature of the Forms gained in the argument 
from recollection is that equality in the abstract is different to particular instances of 
equality, in that the former never appears unequal, nor appears to be inequality. The 
equal never “appear[s] equal in one respect and unequal in another”.27  A Form will 
never appear to be to be the opposite of what it is. A second view to the nature of the 
Forms concerns their range. Introduced to the list of Forms are: 
the equal and the greater and the less and all such abstractions. For our 
present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with 
absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in 
short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of ‘absolute’ in 
our dialectic process of questions and answers.28  
 
Third, following the course of Socrates’ argument for the immortality of the soul, it is 
put forward that the Forms exist in a place where the soul exists prior to birth, in order 
for the soul to come to know them. Fourth, Simmias offers an additional attribute of 
these abstractions relating to the nature of their existence. He asserts, “all such things, 
the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a 
most real existence (εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα)”.29  In some sense, they are, to a high 
degree. Finally, the “other thing which had been forgotten” is “associated with the thing 
perceived (ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν) whether like it or unlike it (ἀνόμοιον ὂν ἢ ᾧ 
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 II.c. The affinity argument (78b-84b) 
 
The affinity argument builds upon the descriptions offered in the previous 
argument, and intimates further information regarding the Forms’ identity. In 
comparing the nature of the body with the nature of the soul, Socrates describes how 
“things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and 
the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things”.31  He asks, 
Is the absolute essence, which we in our dialectic process of question 
and answer call true being, always the same or it is liable to change? 
Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being—
do they ever admit of any change (μεταβολὴν) whatsoever? Or does 
each absolute essence, since it is uniform (μονοειδὲς) and exists by 
itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change 
(ἀλλοίωσιν)?  
It must necessarily remain the same, Socrates.32  
 
This new statement that the Forms are uniform (μονοειδὲς) clarifies some of the 
comments made in the previous argument. The Forms do not only not admit their 
opposites, but they do not admit of any change or alteration “in any way at any time” 
or from any perspective.33  They are always the same; their existence holds. The reason 
given for the fact that particulars perceived by the senses do change, is their essential 
complexity.34  Compound things can be decomposed into their component parts, and 
thus lose the existence they have as a specific compound. Socrates goes on to assert that 
“the things which are always the same can be grasped (ἐπιλάβοιο) only by reason, and 
are invisible and not to be seen”.35   
Socrates also refers to the fact that these entities are “intelligible and tangible to 
philosophy (νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν)” as well.36  It is not explained whether 
their ability to be grasped only by reason is a result, cause, or coincidence of their being 
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always the same. Silverman identifies a connection between this activity of the mind 
and the nature of the Forms: “the repeated emphasis on the capacity of reason to 
concentrate on the single, selfsame, unchanging, and perspectiveless object intimates 
that the nature of the Forms will have to be integrated with the needs of the knowing 
soul.”37  Socrates concludes the part of the affinity argument that deals with the Forms 
by stating that such beings as these belong to “the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the 
immortal, and the changeless”.38  What is truly uniform in this way cannot be dissolved 
and would indeed be everlasting in its indissolubility.39  
 
 II.d. The argument from the Form of life (95a-107b) 
 
The final argument of the Phaedo, the argument from the Form of life, and its 
preliminaries, is often considered “the locus classicus for the middle period Theory of 
Forms”.40  Given its place in the dialogue, and the remarks made by Socrates and his 
interlocutors during this argument, commentators tend to infer that Socrates found this 
final argument to be conclusive.41  His long pause at 95e marks the beginning of an 
interlude during which he asserts that any argument claiming that the soul is immortal 
rather than merely existing for a long time—perhaps before birth, and perhaps gaining 
knowledge of the abstract essences but ultimately perishing eventually—“is no small 
thing”42  and that “the task now before them is the cause of reason for generation and 
destruction as a whole”.43  This linking of the individual soul’s immortality with the 
overall reasons for the entirety of generation and decay is an intriguing step, and offers a 
new level of importance to the role of Forms in Plato. In the intellectual biography he 
offers during this interlude, Socrates includes an account of his belief that “if anyone 
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wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular 
thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity, is 
best for it”.44  If this is to be believed, and Socrates is establishing a new aspect of the 
role of Forms in generation (and decay) one must pay attention to “the good, which 
must embrace and hold together all things”.45  Socrates states he does not have all the 
answers for the cause of how all things originate, but rather resorts to his “safe 
answer”,46  a method of hypothesis: the Forms’ capacity to explain why particulars are 
the way they are. He asserts: 
if anything else is beautiful besides beauty itself, it is beautiful on 
account of nothing else than because it partakes of beauty itself. And I 
speak in the same way about everything else. Do you accept this sort of 
cause?…Nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or 
communion (call it what you please) of absolute beauty. […There is] no 
other way by which anything can come into existence than by 
participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it 
participates.47  
 
The explanations offered in this part of the argument reveal a startling new aspect of the 
nature of the Forms. Not only are they uniform, unchangeable, and immortal, and in 
some way existing separately from the particulars that strive to be like them, but now 
Plato “assign[s] to Forms responsibility for the properties of particulars”.48  The study of 
what it is, according to Plato, to exist as a particular will be discussed in Chapter 2. For 
now, at least, the role of Forms as a whole has gained an immense function: being the 
cause of all the attributes of the perceptible world.  
After Socrates concludes the first part of this argument there is a brief aside between 
the frame characters Phaedo and Echecrates, in which Plato first uses the phrase τῶν 
εἰδῶν to refer to the Forms in this dialogue: “As I remember it, after all this had been 
said, they had agreed that each of the abstract qualities (τῶν εἰδῶν) existed and that 
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other things which participate in these get their names from them”.49  It can be seen at 
this point, that, in the respect of introducing the Forms as part of the dialogue’s final 
and, following the received view, strongest argument, each of the previous discussions 
and arguments have built up to this one, enabling Socrates’ interlocutors (and readers) 
to become more and more “familiar”50  with these abstract entities.  
In the following sentence of Phaedo’s, utilised for the transition between the aside 
and the resumption of the account, Plato introduces yet another new expression: that 
the abstract entities are in their respective particulars: “Socrates asked, ‘Now if you 
assent to this, do you not, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and 
smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in Simmias (ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ) both greatness and 
smallness?’”51  The use of the dative to locate the qualities discussed is maintained, 
along with possessives, from this point in the dialogue onward. The second interruption 
in the flow of this argument, made by the unnamed interlocutor fearful Socrates was 
completely dismissing his first argument regarding opposites, has attracted much 
attention as to its significance. Frede asserts the interruption is to give Plato an 
opportunity to clarify the lexical ambiguity between the formal property of a particular 
and that particular.52  Silverman asserts that it “indicates that Socrates is forging new 
metaphysical machinery in this section”.53  
What follows is the introduction to Socrates’ second, “sophisticated”54  answer. As 
Socrates had earlier expressed unabashed uncertainty regarding the details as to how 
one comes to participate in or be in communion with a Form,55  the Form-copies in the 
sophisticated answer could be seen as one possible description of how this participation 
can be said to take place. The sophisticated answer commences with the assertion that 
“Not only the abstract idea itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) has a right to the same name through 
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all time, but also something else, which is not the Form, but which always, whenever it 
exists, has its form or shape (μορφὴν).”56  A particular is P if “it is possessed by 
something which has P as its essential property”.57   
The list of Forms discussed in the Phaedo is expanded in the last section of this final 
argument: the hot, the cold, the odd, the even, and the immortal are all established as 
Forms.58  A slightly more unusual addition to the list is the musical, offered alongside 
the just.59  Given that justice is discussed by Plato in the Republic as having parallels to 
harmony, perhaps this addition ought not raise too many concerns. On such a musical 
note, this assessment of the descriptions given of the Forms in Plato’s dialogues now 
turns to the Republic. 
 
 
 III. REPUBLIC 
 
In the course of his discussion regarding justice, in the city and in the soul, Socrates 
and his interlocutors find themselves requiring a metaphysical groundwork upon which 
to base their judgements of the beautiful city. The investigations of Books V through 
VII seek out the “first principles…in order to make our ground secure”, in contrast 
with the miry bog of uncertainty.60  In particular, “the central books of the Republic are 
designed to illustrate the education which will produce a philosopher-ruler in order 
that she might best rule an ideal polis. She will rule on the basis of her knowledge of 
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 III.a. 449a-480a 
 
Book V aims to show that the objects of knowledge, belief, and ignorance are 
distinct entities.62  The Forms are initially explained as the ones that correspond to the 
many instances which appear in the material and sensible world, the famous ‘one over 
many’: 
 Since beautiful is the opposite of ugly, they are two. 
  Of course. 
 Since they are two, isn’t each also one? 
  That is so as well. 
The same argument also applies then to justice and injustice, good and bad, and 
all the Forms; each is itself one, but, by showing up everywhere in a community 
with actions, bodies, and one another, each is an apparitional many.63  
 
In the discussion at the end of Book V, the main distinction between the lovers of 
sights and the lover of wisdom is that the sightlovers “surely delight in the beautiful 
sounds and colours and shapes…but their thought is unable to see and delight in the 
nature of the beautiful itself” whereas the philosopher is one who is “able to approach 
the beautiful itself and see it by itself…[She] believes that there is beauty itself and is 
able to catch sight both of it and of what participates in it, and doesn’t believe that 
what participates is it itself.”64  Plato asserts the knowable to be those things that are 
“always the same in all respects.”65  The problem with the sightlovers’ conception of 
beautiful things is not that particular objects cannot be beautiful, but that, because they 
can also be ugly in some respect, time, location, or relation, they are not always 
unqualifiedly beautiful.66  Objects of belief, therefore, are mistaken as objects of 
knowledge when one takes “resemblances of F for the real F.”67  Vlastos gives an 
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account of this confusion in terms of degrees of reality, according to which “the 
intended contrast is between the Form, F, and instances of it which are reckoned less 
‘pure’ F’s than it, because they are not exclusively F, but are F and not-F: their F nature 
is adulterated by contrary characters, so that we could only get a confused and 
uncertain idea of what it is to be F.”68  
The ability for the philosopher to have knowledge of the Forms is explained in 
terms of their ontological security. Socrates asserts, “What completely is, is completely 
knowable.”69  An additional insight into the nature of Forms is thus gained with the 
statement that they παντελῶς ὂν: the Forms are completely, entirely, or in all the 
possible ways it is for one to be. A particular, on the other hand, is “what participates in 
both—to be and not to be—and could not correctly be addressed as either purely and 
simply…we can justly address it as the object of opinion.”70  This complete being is 
perhaps explained a little further when Socrates argues that the lovers of sights deny 
that there is any such thing as the “beautiful in itself…an idea of the beautiful itself, 
which always stays the same in all respects.”71  Whether or not this is the entirety of 
what Plato had in mind by παντελῶς ὂν, it can nevertheless be gathered that a Form is 
forever the same in every way: it is perpetually what it is.  
Now Socrates had just explained that rather than defining things by their shape or 
colour, “[w]ith a power I look only to this—on what it depends and what it 
accomplishes.”72  The fact that Forms are completely grounds knowledge, and enables 
the “power” that is knowledge to accomplish its ends. The statement that “knowledge 
is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is”,73  then, 
offers two further insights. First, that the complete being of the Forms is what enables 
knowledge to be possible. The second insight gained from the description of knowledge 
as being dependent on what is, is that by extension, knowledge of Forms enables 
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knowledge as a power to accomplish (ἀπεργάζεται) an end. This latter point is not 
expanded on any further in Book V, and it remains to be seen what can be 
accomplished with knowledge and what relation this “bringing to perfection”74  bears to 
the Form. 
 
 III.b. 484a-511e 
 
Book VI offers a number of further descriptions of the Forms, maintains the idea 
that a Form is what is, and establishes much new content in the famous Sun Simile. The 
discussions in this Book also elaborate upon the differences between the lovers of sights 
and sounds and the true lover of wisdom. In an important step, “the foundation of the 
philosopher’s knowledge and character is the Form of the Good. It is the greatest 
object of study and in virtue of their relation to it just actions and everything else 
become useful and beneficial.”75  An examination of the ways the Forms are described by 
Socrates in Book VI will provide insight into the way in which having a certain relation 
to the Form makes particulars become good or beneficial. 
Reinforcing the descriptions of the Forms made earlier in the Republic and also in 
the Phaedo, Plato makes ample use of “that which is” throughout Book VI.76  New to 
the discussion is the suggestion that the Form fits with, and can be coupled with, the 
part of the human soul which grasps it, and that the two are akin. Socrates asserts: 
It is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what is; and he 
does not tarry by each of the many things opined to be but goes forward 
and does not lose the keenness of his passionate love nor cease from it 
before he grasps the nature itself of each thing which is with the part of the 
soul fit to grasp a thing of that sort; and it is the part akin to it that is fit. And 
once near it and coupled with what really is, having begotten 
intelligence and truth, he knows and lives truly, is nourished and so 
ceases from his labour pains, but not before.77   
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Plato does not explain in any satisfying detail here what this part of the soul is, or in 
what way it is “akin” to the Form. The intellect is assumed, which fits with the 
comparable passage of Phaedo 65e: the true nature of everything is contemplated “most 
perfectly [by he] who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason 
alone”.78     
At the very outset of the Book, Socrates asserts that the philosophers “are those 
who are able to grasp what is always the same in all respects (οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι), while those who are not able to do so but 
wander among what is many and varies in all ways are not philosophers.”79  This quality 
of being always the same in all respects is by now a stock phrase for Plato, a reiteration 
of the description given in Republic 479a, and Phaedo 78c.80  The Forms always hold. 
The phrase is taken up again in Book VI, that the philosopher “sees and contemplates 
the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and, [sees] that they neither wrong nor 
are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony (κόσμῳ) as reason bids.”81  The 
fact that the Forms are secure in their being unchanging provides a suitable anchor for 
their truth, as well as their use in serving as patterns or standards of evaluation. Socrates 
states that “after looking off, as painters do, towards what is truest, and ever referring to 
it and contemplating it as precisely as possible [the philosopher will be able] to give 
laws about what is beautiful, just, and good.”82  It is a short step from unchanging (κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα) to most true (ἀληθέστατον) when one considers the truth as 
unerring, always only reporting what is the case and never anything else.  
The statement here that the contemplation of what is true, absolutely, enables one 
to draw up suitable laws for the city as regards not only what is true, but what is 
beautiful, just, and good, is Plato’s first explicit endorsement of the “political value of 
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the philosopher’s knowledge” of the Forms.83  This knowledge can be said to contribute 
to certain types of actions, and the formation of a certain types of character. Employing 
the same language to the simile at 484c-d, Socrates mentions how the philosopher-
educator would aim to shape the city by using “the divine pattern”:84  
I suppose that in filling out their work, they would look away frequently 
in both directions, toward the just, beautiful, and moderate by nature 
and everything of the sort, and, again, toward what is in human beings; 
and thus, mixing and blending the practices as ingredients, they would 
produce the image of man, taking hints from exactly that phenomenon 
in human beings which Homer too called god-like and the image of 
god…And I suppose they would rub out one thing and draw in another 
again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as they 
admit of being. […] The drawing would at any rate be the most 
beautiful that way.85  
 
In both passages (484c-d and 501b-c), Socrates describes how looking to, knowledge 
of, or contemplation of the Forms of beauty, justice, goodness, and moderation enables 
the philosopher-king to create at least similarly beautiful, just, good, and moderate 
instantiations—the former “painter of regimes”,86  in the laws of the city; and the latter 
painter of men, in the souls and characters of men. The Forms can function as patterns 
for instruction and assimilation, through the knowledge gained of them in “ever” and 
“frequently”87  contemplating them as closely as possible. 
The Sun Simile of 507b-509e offers much to the examination of the nature of 
Forms. Socrates begins,  
We both assert that there are, and distinguish in speech, many beautiful 
things, many good things, and so on for each kind of thing…And we 
also assert that there is a beautiful itself, a good itself, and so on for all 
the things that we then set down as many. Now, again, we refer to each 
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as a single idea, assuming it to be a unity and calling it that which each 
really is.88  
 
It is here again asserted that there is a Form for all things of which there are many. 
Forms can be seen as the name of the ‘kind’, or, more generally, the one for each many. 
Socrates continues that these Forms are neither seen nor visible, but known by the 
intellect; and the reverse holds for particulars.89  Drawing out the simile of sight and 
light to knowing and the intellect, Socrates asks Glaucon, 
Which of the gods in heaven can you point to as the lord responsible for 
this, whose light makes our sight see in the most beautiful way, and 
makes the seen things seen?  
The sun. 
…Sight, then, [is] naturally related to this god in the following 
way…Neither sight itself, nor that in which it comes to be—what we 
call the eye—is the sun.  
Surely not.  
But I suppose it is the most sunlike of the organs of the senses.  
Yes, by far. 
Does it not get the power it has as a sort of overflow from the sun’s 
treasury?  
Most certainly. 
And the sun isn’t sight either, is it, but as being the cause thereof is 
beheld by vision?  
That’s so. 
Well then, say that the sun is the offspring of the good, an offspring the 
good begot in a proportion with itself: as the good is in the intelligible 
region with respect to intelligence and what is intellected, so the sun is 
in the visible region with respect to sight and what is seen.90  
 
Socrates is here setting up the argument with which he will claim two of the Forms’ 
most essential roles in the teleological structure of the universe: their relation to truth, 
and their relation to being. The outcome of the simile is expressed clearly and precisely: 
the Form of the good is the source of intellectual light (truth) by which humans can 
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know and by which the objects of knowledge are known. This second role is as essential 
to Plato’s purpose in the Sun Simile as the first. The Form of the good offers not only 
the human intellect the exercise of intellectual sight, but it also offers “the power of 
being seen”91  to particulars, providing “the truth to the things known”.92  There is thus 
a crucial role for particulars in the simile: it is the particular that is “illumed by truth”93 . 
The Form, therefore, is the cause of both knowledge (in the knower) and truth (in the 
particular known). As such, Socrates explains, the Form of the good can itself be 
known, “but, as beautiful as these two—knowledge and truth—are, it is something 
different from them and still more beautiful than they.”94   
Following the simile through, Socrates leads Glaucon to see that plants get not only 
their visibility from the sun, but their sustained existence as well. For 
the sun not only provides what is seen with the power of being seen, but 
also with generation, growth, and nourishment…Therefore, not only 
being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the 
good, but also existence and being are in the things known as a result of 
the good, although the good isn’t being—it is still beyond being, 
exceeding it in dignity and power.95  
 
In the same way that a plant gets its generation and continued existence from the sun 
by means of nourishment for growth, so the Form of the good provides nourishment for 
growth in the particulars that participate in it by providing what they need to exist, to 
be. The Form is thus “the author of their being and essence.”96  As Adam comments, 
“The Good has been shown to be the cause of Knowledge. Socrates now proceeds to 
show that it is also the cause of Being. In the philosophy of Plato, Knowledge is the 
epistemological counterpart of Being, Being the ontological counterpart of 
Knowledge.”97  Accordingly, the beauty present in a beautiful particular, as a thing 
known, gets its essence and existence from the Form. This passage in the Republic builds 
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on what is presented in the Phaedo, in providing one way to understand how particulars 
are what they are by or through the Form. It further explains how the Forms, in 
particular the Form of the good, have more than a regulative role in the cosmos, but 
rather a generative role. I shall focus on this latter role in my interpretation of 
participation. 
The final section of Book VI comprises the Divided Line example, from which 
several further features of the Forms can be gleaned. Socrates reiterates that the Forms 
can be seen, known, and grasped only by the mind (διανοίᾳ) and not the senses.98  
More specifically, the mind grasps the Forms “with the power of dialectic”, “the 
instrument by which the mind (νοῦς) works”.99  The exact role dialectic takes in 
mentally grasping the Forms is not explained in detail, however Socrates does mention 
that such a process will use the hypotheses, foundations, or assumptions (ὑποθέσεις) as 
“steppingstones and springboards (ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς) in order to reach that 
which requires no assumption and is at the starting point of all”.100  Socrates concludes 
with the summation that as the segments of the metaphysical side of the line, being 
dimensions of reality, participate in truth, so do the ascending segments of the 
epistemological side of the line participate in clarity (σαφηνείας).101  The Forms, then, 
are not only more true (in a related sense that they are more real) than their respective 
particulars and images, but are grasped with a more clear cognitive faculty. Earlier, 
Socrates described those who have merely opinion and not knowledge as having eyes 
which are “dimmed”102 —in this understanding of the visual-cognitive faculty, it is the 
eyes that are said to be dimmed, rather than the light, as would be a more modern 
understanding of vision. Nevertheless, as it is the Form which provides that which 
illumes the object of knowledge, a more dim understanding can be said to reflect on the 
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object. Rather than being “mixed with darkness”,103  the Forms higher up on the line are 
brighter in light, due to their proximity of the source of all light. 
 
 III.c. 514a-541b 
 
Book VII of the Republic reinforces this notion of Forms being “brighter” and 
“clearer”104  than their corresponding particulars. Socrates reiterates the description of a 
Form as “what is”105  (further, the Form of the good is called “the brightest part of what 
is” and “the best in the things that are”106 ), “what is always”,107  “the things 
themselves”,108  and “the idea of”.109  There is also additional description of the cognitive 
study of the Forms as the study of “being”.110  Included as examples are the Forms of the 
good, thin, soft, hard, large, small, thick, fast, slow, beautiful, and true, and also of the 
finger—the first non-qualitative Form mentioned in this way.111  New in Book VII is the 
account of a Form as being not only by itself, but “by itself in its own region”,112  just as 
the sun is in a different region than the earthly objects it illuminates. Socrates asserts 
that it is the intellect by which the philosopher may access this region: the Forms are to 
be “grasped by dialectic alone”.113  The Forms can thus be said to exist “in logical 
space”,114  and are accessible through that kind of contemplation which is “an imitation 
of the faculty of vision”.115  The power of dialectic reasoning enables the philosopher to 
see—with the eye of the mind—the true, good, and beautiful themselves.116  
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Of particular interest in Book VII is the explanation of the Form of the good as a 
cause and as “the reason for the being of each thing”,117  providing truth and stability to 
what exists. Socrates asserts,  
In the knowable [realm], the final thing to be seen, and that with 
considerable effort, is the idea of the good; but once seen, it must be 
concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and beautiful in 
everything—giving birth in the visible world to light and being 
sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, being the authentic source 
of truth and reason—and that the man who is going to act prudently in 
private or in public must see it.118  
 
Following the Sun Simile, it is established in Book VII that the Form of the good’s 
being responsible for truth and reason is also what causes rightness and beauty in the 
world. Plato is here offering a teleological account of metaphysics. In the Phaedo, the 
reader is witness to the young Socrates frustrated by Anaxagoras’ unfulfilled promise to 
provide a reason for the being of the world, and in the Republic, Socrates attempts to 
offer just such an account. The Form of the good is the end after which the world is 
shaped. The account is an unusual one—why the Form of the good? One answer is that 
while the Form of being could provide merely for existence—for a world of things 
which exist—it does not specify the contents of what exists: it could be this world or 
any other possible world, including a world of complete disarray, lacking any regularity 
or order whatsoever. The Form of the good enables it to be this particular world, a 
world of goodness, which exists. Two responsibilities can therefore be identified in 
Socrates’ claim that the Form is the cause of everything: besides simply giving 
particulars their existence, it is also the cause of their nature, the specific way in which 
they exist.  
The training in dialectic advocated for the philosopher-kings involves a turning of 
the soul towards truth, which will illuminate the nature of earthly particulars as well. 
Socrates states of such an education,  
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All this activity of the arts, which we went through, has the power to 
release and leads what is best in the soul up to the contemplation of 
what is best in the things that are. […] And, lifting up the brilliant 
beams of their souls, they must be compelled to look toward that which 
provides light for everything. Once they see the good itself, they must be 
compelled, each in his turn, to use it as a pattern for ordering city, 
private men, and themselves for the rest of their lives.119  
 
This discussion repeats the conception of a Form as being able to be used as a pattern 
found in Book VI.120  Forms qua patterns are mentioned again in Book VII, following 
the consideration of astronomy as a course of study, in which the arrangement of 
heavenly bodies is to be used as a pattern for understanding parallel arrangements.121  
The intriguing aspect of Forms functioning as patterns is that the specific purpose of a 
pattern is to create or bring into being something at least similar or analogous to that 
entity from which the pattern was constructed. Knowledge of the Forms, therefore, 
offers two distinct benefits to the philosopher-king being discussed at this stage in the 
dialogue. First, from knowledge of the Forms qua patterns it follows that one will have 
an understanding of their corresponding particulars. As Silverman asserts, “The fact that 
all the elements below the Forms are logically and explanatorily dependent on them 
ensures that she will have greater awareness of their behaviour and nature than the 
nonphilosopher.”122  This elucidates why the philosophers trained in this way are best 
suited to rule. Second, the philosopher who can not only understand the Forms as 
patterns but use them as patterns as well, will actually be able to bring about further 
justice, goodness, and beauty in the city, in its laws, and in its citizens.  
  
 
 IV. CRATYLUS 
 
The Cratylus emphasises the Forms’ status as independent entities, untouched by 
the world of changing particulars. Socrates states that the Forms “have some fixed 
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reality of their own, not in relation to us nor caused by us; they do not vary, swaying 
one way and another in accordance with our fancy, but exist of themselves in relation to 
their own reality imposed by nature.”123  This independence does not, however, keep 
them entirely inaccessible to humans: they can be looked to as patterns for creative 
output. Socrates gives as example the carpenters who look to “the absolute or real 
shuttle” when crafting one, and “so long as they reproduce the same ideal (ἰδέαν), 
though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be.”124  Of note in this 
dialogue’s contribution to understanding the nature of Forms is its explicit reference to 
their accounting for particulars’ good. The carpenter looks to the Form in order to 
secure that “in each of his products he must embody what is naturally best for each…in 
accordance with its nature.”125  
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates twice lists various Forms, tagging onto the lists 
a concluding expression that indicates something of their nature. In 439c-d, he lists 
“…absolute beauty, or good, or any other absolute existence (καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν 
ὄντων οὕτω)”, and in 440b “…the beautiful, the good, and all the other verities (ἔστι 
δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων).” Forms are independent absolutes, indicative of their 
particulars’ naturally best state. 
 
 
 V. PHAEDRUS 
 
The most explicit reference to the Forms in the Phaedrus comes when Socrates 
describes the soul’s journey to the “vault of heaven”, where it can catch a glimpse of the 
immortals.126  He states, “For the colourless, formless, and intangible truly existing 
essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible 
only to the mind, the pilot of the soul.”127  Only in Symposium 211e are Forms also 
referred to as colourless. The specific Forms mentioned in the Phaedrus include justice, 
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moderation, beauty, and—interestingly—knowledge. Of this last example, Socrates 
clarifies that he means to refer to “not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as 
it is associated with one or another of the things we call realities, but that which abides 
in the real eternal absolute”.128   
The Form of beauty is afforded especial status in this dialogue, being that which 
“shines most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the 
physical senses…beauty alone has this privilege”.129  That beauty is a Form accessible 
through the senses appears in contrast with what Socrates has just said at 247d, yet it 
would be a stretch to read the passage at 250c-e as referring to anything other than the 
Form: sweetness is surely experienced through the senses, yet it is not the Form of 
sweetness that is tasted; beauty, however, is apparently actually perceived. The 
“exceptional position” of the Form of beauty is defended strongly by Hackforth, who 
even amends the text at 250b to “but with beauty it is otherwise.”130  
 
 
 VI. PARMENIDES 
 
The Parmenides’ most important contribution to understanding the Forms comes in 
its extensive consideration of the participation relation between Forms and particulars. 
This discussion will be reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, §II.b., but the dialogue does 
offer further material regarding the nature of Forms. First, several ‘new’ Forms can be 
added to the list of possible Forms: likeness and unlikeness, unity and multitude, rest 
and motion, greatness and smallness, and equality,131  all of which are called qualities or 
states (πάθη)132  and “intellectual conceptions”,133  alongside the familiar Forms of the 
good, the beautiful, and the just. The young Socrates expresses his being very much 
troubled about Forms for such entities as man, fire, and water, and dismisses Forms of 
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mud, dirt, and hair, although Parmenides says he will get over such scruples when he is 
older.134  Furthermore, the idea is floated by Parmenides about whether Forms exist “in” 
their respective particulars, and soundly rejected on the basis of the Form’s essential 
unity.135  In this consideration, Forms for slavery and mastership, along with the slave 
and the master, are mentioned and presumably accepted as Forms. 
 
 
 VII. THEAETETUS 
 
Scholars are divided as to whether there is any explicit reference to the Forms in the 
Theaetetus. Robinson argues that not only is the Theory of Forms “not conspicuous” in 
the dialogue, but that they are irrelevant to its subject.136  He writes contra Cornford, 
who, in addition to Cherniss, proposes that the absence of traditional Form-language 
such as that found in the Phaedo and Republic is meant to show how any project on 
knowledge cannot get on without the Forms.137  More recently, Chappell acknowledges 
that while Plato does make reference to “species, such as the colour white (156e), ‘hot, 
hard, light, sweet’ (184e), the ugly and the beautiful (190d), and the number eleven 
(196aff.)”, it is conceivable that the theory of Forms as defended elsewhere in Plato may 
be “in question” in the Theaetetus.138  If the Forms do make an appearance in this 
dialogue, the above list can be taken in conjunction with the range of concepts that 
Socrates claims are common to the senses, including colours, sounds, and tastes, and 
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those accessible directly by the soul or intellect, such as “being and not-being, and 
likeness and unlikeness, and identity and difference, and also unity and plurality”.139  
 
 
 VIII. TIMAEUS 
 
One of the most explicit and longest-running descriptions of the Forms can be 
found in the Timaeus. The passage in which it occurs is occupied by Plato introducing 
the concept of the Receptacle of Becoming, and to do this he must describe how the 
Receptacle relates to and differs from the entities he has already mentioned briefly—
that is, the Forms and the Form-copies. It is in this differentiation, however, that we get 
an even clearer picture of the Forms than when he discussed them earlier in the 
dialogue. For in 29a, he notes that if the Creator is to create good in the world, he 
would have fixed his gaze on “that which is self-identical and uniform (πρὸς τὸ κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως).”140  In the Receptacle passage, however, Socrates speaks of: 
the self-identical Form, ungenerated and indestructible, neither 
receiving into itself any other from any quarter nor itself passing 
anywhither into another, invisible and in all ways imperceptible by 
sense, it being the object which it is the province of reason to 
contemplate; [this compared to] a second kind which is named after the 
former and similar thereto, an object perceptible by sense, generated, 
ever carried about, becoming in a place and out of it again, perishing, 
apprehensible by opinion with the aid of sensation…141  
 
Beyond reiterating the aspects of the Forms’ nature discussed in the other dialogues, 
this passage offers an interesting insight into what the Forms cannot do: they cannot 
pass into another place; which means they cannot of themselves generate instances of 
themselves in the perceptible world. An intermediary is needed, which, in the Timaeus, 
is the Receptacle: Mother of the generated world.142  
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 IX. PHILEBUS 
 
A significant contribution of the Philebus is a discussion of the essential unity of a 
Form. Socrates details that “man is one, or ox is one, or beauty is one, or the good is 
one”.143  He acknowledges that this invites disagreement and controversy, but insists 
that the kind of unity he has in mind here is different to any kind of unity one might 
ascribe to physical particulars. The Forms’ unity is a “unity which is not the unity of 
one of the things which come into being and perish…[but rather] these unities, each of 
which is one, always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, can 
nevertheless be permanently this one unity.”144  
The Forms’ unity is said to provide the basis for their being the object of 
knowledge. The truest kind of knowledge, Socrates claims, is “the knowledge which has 
to do with being, reality, and eternal immutability”.145  This is contrasted with the study 
of the sensible world, whose students “toil to discover, not eternal verities, but 
transient productions of the present, the future, or the past […] spending their lives in 
the study of the things of this world, how it came to be, how it does things, and how it 
has things done to it”.146  Lack of fixedness makes this study inferior.  
The final piece of evidence we gain in this dialogue about the Forms is that they are 
not only one and eternal, but “eternally the same without change or mixture”.147  
Mixture accounts for the change relegating particulars to a ‘secondary’ status as objects 
of study; it is thus implied that the oneness of a Form is an elemental oneness: Forms 
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 X. SYMPOSIUM 
 
The Symposium has enjoyed a reputation as one of Plato’s most beloved dialogues. 
Its dramatic form, delightful imagery, and empathetic depiction of the human 
experience of love—both in relation to beautiful individuals and to wisdom—
contribute to its prominence. These same features, however, have also brought about 
some measure of trivialisation, and its philosophic merits, especially the philosophic 
merits of the non-Socratic speeches, have at times been questioned.148  Nevertheless, it 
is in the Symposium that Plato delivers his longest and most detailed description of a 
Form, the Form of beauty. An examination of the metaphysical contributions of the 
ascent passage in the Symposium will provide valuable insight into the nature of Forms, 
and indeed clarify some of the omissions and inconsistencies found in the descriptions 
of Forms offered in other dialogues.  
At the end of Socrates’ speech on love, he recounts Diotima’s description of the 
intellectual-erotic development of the lover of beauty. The ascent passage depicts a 
progression of love and knowledge, in which “the contemplation of the whole is simply 
a perfection of the original erotic attraction to a single person.”149  This lover, if 
successful, will be led by love to see that “the beauty that is in any body whatsoever is 
related (ἀδελφός) to that in another body.”150  From two she sees the beauty in many 
and indeed in all beautiful particulars as one and the same, and with further pursuit her 
eyes are eventually opened to the “vast open sea of the beautiful”,151  which she pursues 
with the initial, youthful passion.  
                                                
148 Notably, Sir Kenneth Dover, Plato: Symposium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 6; 
Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Symposium (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), xxxvi; and, less harshly, 
Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, vol. I, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892), 488-490. On 
the issue of the dialogue being taken seriously philosophically, see Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-
Corrigan, Plato’s Dialectic at Play: Structure, Argument and Myth in Plato’s Symposium (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), esp. 10, 20 with n. 35, 41-42, 47, 54, 142; and Frisbee Sheffield, 
Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3, 30-32. 
149 Allan Bloom, “The Ladder of Love,” in Plato’s Symposium, ed. Seth Benardete (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), 151. My italics. 
150 Symposium, 210a-b. 
151 Ibid., 210d. 




At this point, in reaching the source of the beauty she has previously come to know, 
the lover will be able to identify one particular beauty, the contemplation of which is 
the ultimate aim of the earlier study. This Form of beauty is thus the object of “the 
philosophic science”,152  and the knowledge gained from its study reveals the following 
about the Form: 
Whoever has been educated up to this point in erotics, beholding 
successively and correctly the beautiful things, in now going to the 
perfect end of erotics shall suddenly glimpse something wonderfully 
beautiful in its nature—that very thing, Socrates, for whose sake alone 
all the prior labours were undertaken—something that is, first of all, 
always being and neither coming to be nor perishing, nor increasing nor 
passing away; and secondly, not beautiful in one respect and ugly in 
another, nor at one time so, and at another time not—either with 
respect to the beautiful or the ugly—not here beautiful and there ugly, 
as being beautiful to some and ugly to others; nor, in turn, will the 
beautiful be imagined by him as a kind of face or hands or anything else 
in which body shares, nor as any kind of speech nor any science, and not 
as being somewhere in something else (for example, in an animal, or in 
earth, or in heaven, or in anything else), but as it is alone by itself and 
with itself, always being of a single form. While all other beautiful things 
that share in it do so in such a way that while it neither becomes 
anything more or less, nor is affected at all, the rest do come to be and 
perish.153  
 
This passage sets out, with great clarity, that the Form is: not only the object of 
knowledge, but the overarching object of knowledge of the many particulars that bear a 
relation to it; eternal; unchanging; unqualifiedly what it is, ontologically, temporally, 
geographically, and interpersonally; an entity without physical or any other kind of 
shape; not in its corresponding participants; nor in anything at all; of an autonomous 
existence; always unalloyed and completely one; and always immutable.  
The progression of knowledge based on experience with particulars but clarified 
through contemplation of the Form, echoes what is described in the Phaedo.154  
Similarly, as in the Republic, the training in the beautiful that the beginning of the 
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ascent passage depicts, is based on a series of cognitive engagements with both the 
object of love and the degree of love. Accordingly, “[t]he key to the successive stages of 
the Line and Cave is not just that there is a series of objects and corresponding mental 
faculties, but that each is connected to the one below it by further reflection upon 
objects and their attendant faculties.”155  The ascent to contemplation of the Form of 
beauty in the Symposium involves a remarkably similar process to the moves to the 
higher parts of the Line in the end of Line Simile in Book VI of the Republic: 
“prompted by further reflection and looking at objects in a different light or way.”156   
The Form’s “always being and neither coming to be nor perishing, nor increasing 
nor passing away”157  is without much controversy in comparison to the accounts of 
Forms given elsewhere in the corpus. The notion of being “unqualifiedly” what it is, 
however, has been subject to debate. The four clarifications given in lines 211a3-6 offer 
an elaboration of the exposition put forth in the argument from recollection in the 
Phaedo. Diotima’s insistence that the Form is beautiful in all respects, at all times, in all 
locations, and to all who behold it reinforces and expands upon the notion that Forms 
are unqualifiedly what they are and are in no way not what they are. One of the 
differences between the objects of knowledge and the objects of opinion in Book V of 
the Republic is that the latter appear “as what is and as what is not at the same time.”158  
The fact that this temporal qualification is only mentioned once in the seven 
descriptions of the in-between nature of particulars leads Silverman to surmise that 
“talk of respects and times is something we add to the text…Typically either there is no 
qualification, or Plato is very hesitant to say how something can be and not be, just as 
he was guarded in speaking precisely about participation in the Phaedo.”159  This 
qualification, however, is clearly not unique to this one part of the Republic, but is also 
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given in the elaborate description of the Form of beauty in the Symposium’s ascent 
passage.160  
Socrates’ question to Cebes in the Phaedo regarding whether, “when you say that 
Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, [do you mean to] say that 
there is in Simmias (ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ) both greatness and smallness?”161  has prompted 
much controversy regarding the use of the dative “in” with reference to some aspect of 
the Form. This controversy has been fanned particularly with reference to ethics and 
the reasons of love. Vlastos’ seminal essay on the individual as an object of love 
continues to prompt debate as to whether or not Plato’s theory of love in the 
Symposium advocates a cold, cruel, and calculating emotion according to which true 
love is really only love of an abstract philosophical concept and nothing to do with 
what is “in” and a part of the individual.162  Soble discusses problems to be had with the 
reverse reading: are we to love our dearest friends only for the bundle of qualities found 
in them?163  Diotima’s description of the Form here makes it clear that Forms are not to 
be thought of as being “somewhere in something”;164  it is not the Form of beauty that is 
in a beautiful particular. What is, however, is not quite so clear—varying accounts of 
beautiful particulars’ precise relation to the Form will be evaluated in the following 
chapter. 
The description of Forms being αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν, 
draws a potential controversy with the final argument in the Phaedo. In the concluding, 
and complicated, pages of the argument from the Form of life, Socrates presents the 
difficult notion of Forms bearing a manner of dual-relation to certain other Forms.  
“Consider three: do you not think that it must always be called both by its own name 
and by that of the Odd, which is not the same as three? That is the nature of three, and 
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of five, and of half of all the numbers: each of them is odd, but it is not the Odd.”165  
The account of the Form of beauty being “all alone by itself…always being of a single 
form”166  can be read to challenge the idea of Forms having qualities of other, different 
Forms. This reading would interpret μονοειδὲς as maintaining ‘always beautiful and 
never not beautiful (that is, never other than beautiful)’ because it is nothing other than 
itself: by itself and in itself. 
One of the most interesting insights gained in the Republic’s description of 
knowledge as being dependent on what is, is that, by extension, knowledge of Forms 
enables knowledge as a power to accomplish (ἀπεργάζεται) an end. This “bringing to 
perfection” as a proper aim of the power of knowledge167  is not expanded on any 
further in Book V. Socrates states in the following Book, however: 
It is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what is; and he 
does not tarry by each of the many things opined to be but goes forward 
and does not lose the keenness of his passionate love nor cease from it 
before he grasps the nature itself of each thing which is with the part of the 
soul fit to grasp a thing of that sort; and it is the part akin to it that is fit. And 
once near it and coupled with what really is, having begotten 
intelligence and truth, he knows and lives truly, is nourished and so 
ceases from his labour pains, but not before.168  
 
While Socrates does not explain in any satisfying detail what this part of the soul is in 
the Republic, a reading of the climax of the ascent passage of the Symposium makes clear 
its nature and activity. Diotima concludes: 
What then, do we believe happens to one, if he gets to see the beautiful 
itself, pure, clean, unmixed, and not infected with darkness, colours, or 
a lot of mortal foolishness, and can glimpse the divine beautiful itself as 
being of a single shape? Do you believe that life would prove to be a 
sorry sort of thing, when a human being gazes in the direction of the 
beautiful and beholds it with the instrument with which he must and is 
together with it? Don’t you realise that only here, in seeing in the way the 
beautiful is seeable, will he get to engender not phantom images of 
virtue—because he does not lay hold of a phantom—but true, because 
                                                
165 Phaedo, 104a-b. 
166 Symposium, 211b. 
167 Republic, 477d. 
168 Ibid., 490b. My italics.  




he lays hold of the true; and that once he has given birth to and 
cherished true virtue, it lies within him to become dear to god and, as 
much as possible for a human being, to become immortal as well?169  
 
The similarity between these two passages is striking. What can be understood is that 
the contemplative process involved in seeing the Forms with the eye of the mind is not 
simply and solely a cognitive endeavour: the love of the beautiful is as erotic as it is 
rational, maintaining the ties to erôs depicted earlier in the dialogue. The achievement 
of knowledge can therefore be argued to have a distinctly generative, creative, or 
nurturing aspect, in the production of true beauty and true virtue in the soul, as well as 
in the wider world. The following chapters will examine the possibility of just such an 
account in the Symposium, according to which the Form of beauty can indeed be said to 
be the cause and reason for the being of all particular beauty, through an emotive, 
cognitive, and creative interpretation of participation. It is to the relation of 








                                                
169 Symposium, 211d-212a. My italics. 





 CHAPTER II: 
 




Aim: To offer a review of the various ways Plato describes the nature of the relation between 
Forms and particulars, as presented in the dialogues; followed by a survey analysis of the state 
of understanding of the term in the literature. 
 
 
Plato was the first to use the term ‘participation’ philosophically: building up a 
simple concept into the binding mechanism of his epistemology and metaphysics.1 In 
light of the fact that this concept is, for him, an attempt to explain how Forms and 
particulars may have any relation to each other, and appears to comprise Plato’s 
understanding of causation, any attempt to characterise this relation must be directed 
to those dialogues that provide the clearest statements of that causation. Articulating 
the nature of participation is difficult, because in no dialogue do we get an explicit 
answer from Plato. In fact, the various discussions in the corpus at times appear to give 
conflicting accounts. We need to exercise caution, however, in order not to extrapolate 
beyond what is given in the dialogues: we must not ‘Platonise’ Plato. 
The first task of this chapter, set out in Section I, is therefore to present, as 
objectively as possible, the different ways of describing the relation(s) between Forms 
and particulars Plato employs in the corpus. Following this, Section II will provide an 
over-arching review of the state of understanding of the term in the literature. The aim 
of this chapter is thusly to create a background framework for understanding the role 
participation is given in the dialogues, which can then be taken to ascertain where the 
Symposium’s contribution may be placed within that framework. 
                                                
1 M. Annice, “Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation,” New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 51. 
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 I. REVIEW OF PARTICIPATION IN THE PLATONIC CORPUS 
 
 I.a. Phaedo 
 
The Phaedo offers the most oft-cited and well-known passages on the participation 
relation. Nevertheless, each of these four passages within the single dialogue speaks to a 
slightly different way of understanding that relation. First, at 74d-e, Socrates and 
Simmias are discussing how it might be possible for us to have any idea what absolute 
equality is, given that nothing in the physical world is absolutely equal. Using “equal” 
sticks as an example, Socrates asks,   
Do they seem to us to be equal in the same sense as what is equal itself? 
Is there some deficiency in their being such as the equal, or is there not? 
[…] [S]omeone, on seeing something, realises that that which he now 
sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be 
like that other since it is inferior…2 
 
This description of the particulars in relation to Forms is based on deficiency and lack: 
what we might call two ‘equal’ sticks lack true equality. The same could be said, 
however, for any inaccurate identification. Dogs lack what it takes to be a cat, yet it 
would be incorrect to call dogs ‘deficient cats’. This is because there is no causal or 
explanatory relation between ‘being a dog’ and ‘being a cat’; however, on Plato’s 
account, there is such a relation between being equal and the Form of equality itself. As 
he considers this relation of deficient likeness over the next Stephanus page, it becomes 
clear that it is not because of the likeness or similarity to the equal itself that an equal 
stick is equal. Rather, the likeness follows from the ontological relation. Socrates 
recognises that this relation is manifested in the equal object’s wanting (βούλεται), 
striving for (ὀρέγεται), or yearning (προθυμεῖται) to be like the equal itself.3 
Second, at 76a, the objects of perception in the world are said to “consort with” or 
be “associated with by similarity or difference” the absolute objects of knowledge. 
Grube and Cooper here translate ἐπλησίαζεν as “related to”, but the term is perhaps 
                                                
2 Phaedo, 74d-e. 
3 Ibid., 74d, 75b1, 75b7. 
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closer to sexual intimacy than familial relation.4  
A third passage, 100c-101c, is the longest and most explicit in the Phaedo. Here, 
Socrates asserts, 
[I]f there is anything beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it is beautiful 
for no other reason than that it shares in (μετέχει) that beautiful. […] I 
simply, naïvely, and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else 
makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in (εἴτε 
παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε), or however you may describe its 
relationship to that beautiful we mention, for I will not insist on the 
precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are 
beautiful by the beautiful (ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται 
καλά). That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone 
else. And if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error. This is the 
safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is through 
beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful (ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ 
γίγνεται καλά). […] [B]y sharing in the particular reality in which it 
shares (μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ)…5 
 
The particular beauty is beautiful by or through the Form of the beautiful, and the 
manner in which this is accomplished is the presence of the Form, or—to take the term 
Socrates uses more frequently—the particulars’ sharing in the Form. This is Socrates’ 
‘safe’ answer, and he is very clear he does not intend this to be anything more than the 
as-yet best way he can describe the relation.  
Socrates, of course, even says that this manner of explanation is only a “second 
best”.6 The actually best explanation can be read as a distinct fourth way of 
understanding participation—albeit one Socrates in this dialogue cannot describe in as 
much detail as he can the other three. The best explanation, he surmises, is an account 
of that “power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be 
placed…the good and ‘binding’ bind which holds together all things (δέον συνδεῖν καὶ 
συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται).”7 He admits he has not yet met a teacher who could teach 
him the workings of that kind of cause, and so resorts to the safer answer that 
participation is somehow by or through the Form. 
                                                
4 Phaedo, 76a; LSJ, s.v. ἐπλησίαζεν.  
5 Phaedo, 100c-101c. 
6 Ibid., 99c-d.  
7 Ibid., 99c. 
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 I.b. Parmenides 
 
The Parmenides uses two terms—the μετέχω of the Phaedo and μεταλαμβάνω—
presumably interchangeably to discuss the relation of participation. Parmenides and 
Socrates are trying to understand what the relation could possibly be. Whilst a number 
of scholars come to the conclusion that Parmenides and Socrates never reach a 
consensus,8 the language of the participation passages is still useful to our aim. Lines 
130e-131e take for granted that particulars do in one way or another partake 
(μεταλαμβάνοντα) of Forms, and the relation of participation is also given the name 
μετάληψις here. However, Parmenides puts forward objections to a variety of 
suggested ways this relation might be achieved in practice.  
The most famous of these hypotheses is that participation is a kind of resemblance. 
Socrates suggests that Forms  
exist in nature as patterns (παραδείγματα), and the other things 
resemble (ἐοικέναι) them and are imitations (ὁμοιώματα) of them; 
their participation (μέθεξις) in ideas is assimilation (γίγνεσθαι) to 
them, and nothing else.9  
 
Parmenides, however, holds that a resemblance relation is either unfathomable or 
unacceptable, as resemblance implies—and, indeed, necessitates—a likeness which 
would lead to an infinite regress. He concludes that “it is then not by likeness 
(ὁμοιότητι) that other things partake of ideas [and so] we must seek some other 
method of participation (μεταλαμβάνει).”10  The idea of Forms standing to particulars 
as pattern to imitation nevertheless occurs in several other dialogues, detailed below 
and in §II of this chapter. 
By the latter half of the dialogue, Plato appears to have opted in favour of μετέχω 
                                                
8 R.E. Allen, Plato’s Parmenides: Translation and Analysis (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1983), 289 with rev. ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), esp. 111-113; Mitchell H. Miller, Jr., 
Plato’s Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 8; and Kevin 
Corrigan, “The Place of the Parmenides in Plato’s Thought and in the Subsequent Tradition,” in Plato’s 
Parmenides and Its Heritage Volume 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and 
Gnosticism, eds. John D. Turner and Kevin Corrigan (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), 23; 
but see Constance Meinwald, Plato’s Parmenides (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), 172. 
9 Parmenides, 132d. 
10 Ibid., 133a. My italics. 
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over μεταλαμβάνω as verb of choice to describe the relation. Parmenides refers to 
participation in time, existence, and being as coextensive, noting that “to be” is nothing 
else than “participation in existence together with present time, just as ‘was’ denotes 
participation in existence together with past time, and ‘will be’ similar participation 
together with future time.”11  
 
 I.c. Phaedrus 
 
The Phaedrus also employs the idea of particular beauties being an image (ὁμοίωμα 
as in 250a, or ἐναργὲς as in 250d) or a likeness (εἰκασθέντος as in 250b) of the Form. 
In these passages, the ‘original’ of such images is in all examples something ‘seen’, a 
visual-cognitive experience by the soul in its mythical pre- and post-mordial journeys 
through the heavens. This language is echoed at 251a-b: “one who has seen much in 
heaven—when he sees a godlike face or bodily form that has captured (μεμιμημένον) 
beauty well…if he weren’t afraid people would think him completely mad, would even 
sacrifice to his boy as if he were the image of a god.” 
Of note also in the Phaedrus is a singling out of the Form of beauty as distinct from 
other Forms. Beauty is asserted to be the only Form one can experience with the senses. 
For “[j]ustice and moderation do not shine out through their images down here, and 
neither do the other objects of the soul’s admiration… [But beauty] we grasp it 
sparkling through the clearest of our senses. […] [B]eauty alone has this privilege, to be 
the most clearly visible and the loveliest.”12  In this dialogue, the relation of 
participation is not spelled out in any detail. The descriptions of how the Form of 
beauty literally shines out through the particular beauty, however, indicates a possible 
visual likeness of Form to particular—at least in the case of the Form of beauty. 
 
 I.d. Timaeus 
 
The Timaeus offers a unique cosmological account of Forms, particulars, and their 
relation. Plato writes in this dialogue that particulars are similar in likeness to the 
                                                
11 Parmenides, 151e-152a. 
12 Phaedrus, 250b, 250d-e. 
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Form, using the example of paradigm model to copy of that model. At 39e, he states 
that the particular world had “been wrought in the similitude (ὁμοιότητα) of that 
whereunto it was being likened…He completed by moulding it after the nature of the 
Model (παραδείγματος ἀποτυπούμενος φύσιν).”13  Later, Plato writes of two kinds of 
entity, the “Model Form (παραδείγματος εἶδος), intelligible and ever uniformly 
existent, and the second as the model’s copy (μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος), subject to 
becoming and visible.”14  At 51e-52a, we learn that the Forms and particulars are not 
only of different kinds, and that the latter are “similar to” the Forms, but that they are 
also “named after the Former”.15  Μέθεξις is mentioned only briefly, in an explanatory 
capacity when he claims, “For everything, in fact, which partakes (μετάσχῃ) of life may 
justly and with perfect truth be termed a living creature.”16  
 
 I.e. Republic 
 
Over the length of the Republic, the relation of participation is hinted at 
sporadically. Of note is the suggestion—in line with how the relation between the two 
is presented in the Phaedo and Sophist—that particulars do not merely share in the 
Forms, but that the whole system of Forms and particulars together is itself a 
communion. Socrates asserts, “In respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the 
bad, and all the ideas or Forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but 
that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another, each 
is an apparitional many.”17  The suggestion that Forms may commune with particulars, 
or other Forms, is an attempt to explain the apparent recurrence of the Forms, the 
relation of ‘one over many’. 
Μέθεξις is again referred to in passing at 486a. Regarding a soul’s nature being 
                                                
13 Timaeus, 39e.  
14 Ibid., 48e-49a. He follows with a third, the Receptacle: “A third kind we did not at that time distinguish, 
considering that those two were sufficient; but now the argument seems to compel us to try to reveal by 
words a Form that is baffling and obscure. What essential property, then, are we to conceive it to possess? 
This in particular—that it should be the receptacle, and, as it were, the nurse of all Becoming.” 
15 Ibid., 51e-52a. 
16 Ibid., 77b. 
17 Republic, 476a. See n. 30 in §II, in this chapter, and n. 106 in Chapter 4, §III.b., for the controversial 
suggestion that Forms may participate in one another. 
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philosophic or not, Socrates notes, “[Y]ou mustn’t let its partaking (μετέχουσα) in 
illiberality get by you unnoticed.”18   
The Republic is another dialogue that makes use of the terminology of likeness and 
imitation in describing the relation between Forms and particulars. The Line Simile in 
Book VI places the images of particulars such as animals and artefacts in an analogous 
parallel to Forms such that as images are to particulars, so are those particulars to 
Forms. Images are said to be a likeness (ἔοικεν) of particulars and when Socrates then 
moves to the intelligible realm, he describes how the soul “uses as images (εἰκόσιν) 
those things that were previously imitated (μιμηθεῖσιν).”19  In Book X, speaking of 
painters and artists as imitators of reality, Plato writes, “In my opinion he would most 
sensibly be addressed as an imitator (μιμητὴς) of that of which these others are 
craftsmen. Now tell me this about the painter. In your opinion, does he in each case 
attempt to imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) the thing itself in nature…?”20  The complex ontological 
relationship of images to realities will be analysed in more detail in §II.c., below. 
 
 I.f. Sophist 
 
The Sophist presents ways of understanding how certain Forms might be related to 
certain other Forms, occasionally using as examples the relation between particulars 
and Forms. The metaphysical argument of the Sophist cannot be discussed in detail 
during this review, but what can be taken from this dialogue is the terminology Plato 
uses when describing these various relations. From this can be gleaned contributing 
ideas of what the key terms refer to in general for Plato in this and other dialogues. The 
description the Stranger offers at 255e-256b regarding how ideas such as sameness, 
other, and being interrelate sheds light on the nature of the relation of participation:  
[F]or each of them is other than the rest, not by reason of its own 
nature, but because it partakes (μετέχειν) of the idea of the other […] 
[I]t exists by reason of its participation (μετέχειν) in being. […] But yet 
we found it was the same, because all things partake (μετέχειν) of the 
                                                
18 Republic, 486a. 
19 Ibid., 510a. 
20 Ibid., 597e-598a. 
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same. […] When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes 
(μέθεξιν) of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the 
same, we do so on account of its participation (κοινωνίαν) in the 
other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but 
other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.21  
 
It can be understood from this and similar passages in the Sophist22  that participation 
may carry with it or enable properties’ inherence, or an equivalent ontological 
condition that is satisfied through participation.  
Participation is also described in the Sophist as a kind of mingling and permeation 
between two or more entities, for “the classes mingle (συμμείγνυταί) with one 
another, and being and the other permeate all things (διὰ πάντων καὶ δι᾽ ἀλλήλων 
διεληλυθότε), including each other; and the other, since it participates (μέθεξιν) in 
being, is, by reason of this participation (μετέσχεν), yet is not that in which it 
participates (μετειληφὸς), but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably 
be not-being.”23  The details of being and otherness left aside, the text is clear that 
μετέχειν is the word of choice to describe a property-bringing relation of participation. 
 
 I.g. Protagoras 
 
In Protagoras’ speech, he tells a tale of Prometheus’ entering the temple shared by 
Athena and Hephaestus in order to acquire their arts for man. He describes this feat as 
enabling man to be a “partaker (μετέσχε) of a divine portion, [such that] he, in the first 
place, by his nearness of kin (συγγένειαν) to deity, was the only creature that 
worshipped gods”.24  Slightly different to the second account of participation in the 
Phaedo, this line suggests that the term ‘participation’ can encompass a notion of 
proximity or possibly familial relation. Partaking of a divine portion yields nearness to 
the divine, resulting in the worship of that divinity—perhaps due to the knowledge of 
the gods gained in that close encounter? 
 
                                                
21 Sophist, 255e-256b. 
22 E.g., ibid., 253d5-e2. 
23 Ibid., 259a-b. 
24 Protagoras, 321e-322a. 
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 I.h. Laws 
 
Book IX of the Laws offers an interesting connection between terms of 
participation. The Athenian Stranger asserts, “Every just action, in so far as it shares in 
(κοινωνῇ) justice, practically in the same degree partakes (μετέχον) of beauty. […] It 
is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent—that a passion which shares in 
(κοινωνῇ) justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.”25  It is generally assumed that κοινωνεῖν 
and μετέχειν are to be understood interchangeably as, respectively, ‘to share in’ and ‘to 
participate in’. If this is the case, it is startling—in light of the Phaedrus’ claim to 
beauty’s uniqueness with regard to its manner of perceptibility, discussed above—to 
find that all just actions are also beautiful.  
 
 
 II. REVIEW OF PARTICIPATION IN THE LITERATURE 
 
A number of verbal trends can be identified in the above texts, and three broad 
clusters of interpretation have emerged in the scholarly literature within attempts to 
flesh out the nature of the participation relation. In this section, I will first review the 
descriptive principles of the relation as described in the texts, and then analyse these 
interpretation clusters in order to provide a background framework for the 
understanding of participation which I argue Plato offers in the Symposium.  
The language of the Phaedo, especially in 100a-102e, takes up two Greek terms—
μέθεχις and μετέχειν—to refer to a specific type of partaking. These two related terms 
are the most frequent Plato uses to indicate the relation, and are what some scholars 
assert is Plato’s favoured terminology for the name of the relation between Forms and 
particulars.26  The terms derive from the μετά- stem, often translated “in common 
with” or “in the midst of”, and, in compositional words, the more dynamic “in pursuit 
of”.27  A suitable translation for the verb form would therefore be ‘to have in common 
                                                
25 Laws, 859e. 
26 Leo Sweeney, “Participation in Plato’s dialogues: Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist and Timaeus,” New 
Scholasticism 62:2 (1988): 125-149. 
27 As, e.g., μέθοδος, “following after or pursuing the path”; David C. Schindler, “What’s the Difference? On 
the Metaphysics of Participation in a Christian Context,” The Saint Anselm Journal 3:1 (2005): 1. 
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with’ or ‘to be in relationship with’; and for the noun form, ‘a state of having in 
common with, or of being related to’, and, possibly by inference, ‘of dependence upon’. 
It is therefore a slightly different connotation to ‘partaking’ in the sense of owning a 
portion of a larger whole—such as, for example, taking up a part of a bench by sitting 
on it. This would not only indicate a limited quantity to be taken up, but also, as 
Parmenides explains in the eponymous dialogue at 131b-c, that the Form would be 
divided into those parts taken up by each participant, thereby losing its essential 
oneness. The temptation to think of μέθεχις as ownership ought perhaps be avoided. 
The other common term employed in describing the relation is the community or 
communion (κοινωνία) of Forms and particulars, and between Forms. The possibility 
of Forms participating in each other will not be discussed in any great detail here. I will 
say that if Plato does admit of Forms communing with each other, it is almost certainly 
a substantially different mechanism than what must go on between Forms and 
particulars.28  When, in the Republic, Socrates speaks of the ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ of 
Forms with each other, I read this as at least referring to such statements we find 
throughout the corpus as “the Good is beautiful”,29  though whether Forms are or have 
qualities such as beauty is a topic for a different time. Attempts to avoid this possibility, 
however, are rife and at times controversial.30  It is nevertheless clear from the Republic 
and Phaedo that a community or communion exists between Forms and particulars. 
The term can refer to partnerships and associations of varying kinds between 
individuals—including marital and sexual, as between lovers in the Symposium—and, 
also in the Symposium, between gods and men.31  Of note here is that communion 
implies that the Form is, at least initially, external to the particular with which it is in 
communion. 
                                                
28 See also n. 106 in Chapter 4, §III.b.  
29 James Adam, The Republic of Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902), ad loc. 476a. See also, 
e.g., Laws, 859e; Meno, 98e. 
30 Take, e.g., the above ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ at 476a: Charles Badham emends it to ἀλλῃ ἄλλων (see H.H. 
Berger, Ousia in de Dialogen van Plato: een terminologisch onderzoek (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 88, n. 1; and Ingram 
Bywater, “Two Passages in Plato’s Republic,” The Journal of Philology 5 (1874): 122, to ἀλλ’ ἄλλων; but cf. 
Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato’s Thought (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1903), 162, n. 244, who 
argues against this trend with reference to the philosophic implications of such emendations.  
31 LSJ, s.v. κοινωνία, A.I., A.II.; Symposium, 209c, 188c. 
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Plato also speaks of particulars being named after the Form.32  Allen acknowledges 
that sharing a name alone need not point to any actual connection (one can call any 
number of objects by the same name and be wrong about their having any such 
connection), but rather the repetition and specification of this phrasing in the Phaedo 
indicates Plato has an especially intimate connection in mind: a “derivative 
designation” underscoring the particular’s dependence upon the Form for its individual 
existence.33   
Another noteworthy phrase from the above review is the presence of the Form in a 
given particular.34  This must be distinguished from the Form itself being in the 
particular, which Plato has Parmenides reject at 131a4-e7, and Diotima at Symposium 
211a, although Fine defends that Forms are, in fact, taken to be in particulars in the 
Phaedo.35   
While not terms for the relation itself, these latter two descriptions do reveal the 
close association between Forms and particulars: close enough for the two to be 
epistemologically associated in name, and even ontologically associated. However, none 
of these terms and phrases—participation or sharing in, community, being named after, 
nor having the presence of—specify how or why the two are so related. As Brann, 
speaking of the terminology of the Parmenides and Phaedo, laments, they “do not reveal 
what the appearances can have in common with beings, or why they merit being named 
after beings, or how the beings can be present in them.”36  Accordingly, a number of 
interpretive solutions have been offered in the literature, in attempts to explain the 
nature of the participation relation. The following three interpretations represent the 




                                                
32 Phaedo, 78e2, 103b, 103e; cf. Republic, 596a7; Sophist, 240a; Cratylus, 439a. 
33 Allen, “Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues,” The Philosophical Review 69:2 (1960): 
149-150. 
34 Phaedo, 100c-d. 
35 Gail Fine, “Immanence,” in Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 301. 
36 Eva Brann, “Plato’s Theory of Ideas,” The St. John’s Review 32:1 (1980): 35. 
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 II.a. Original to copy 
 
The vast majority of views in the literature depict participation as that relation by 
which an image, imitation, or copy gains its existence through an original model or 
standard that serves as cause. Within this interpretive cluster arise two—in some 
respects overlapping—variations of this interpretation. Forms can be understood as (1) 
paradigm cases to standard instances.37  Patterson here employs as example the ancient 
architectural practice of paradigm columns built by a master architect to be copied as 
perfectly as possible by his masons. Plato uses a similar example in the Cratylus: “What 
has the carpenter in view when he makes a shuttle? Is it not something the nature of 
which is to weave?”38  This example captures well what Socrates appeared to hold as an 
important use of a Form: to employ the Form as a standard in judgements of 
approximation.39  While particular instances of beauty are only qualifiedly beautiful—
that is, beautiful from one respect, or in one time, but not another—the Form of 
beauty is always unqualifiedly so. The closer or more accurate or correct (ὀρθός) the 
image copy is to the paradigm, the more excellent (or beautiful, or just, or courageous) 
the particular.40  The notion of proximity is conducive to the echelons of erôs in the 
Symposium, and accordingly functions well in moral and ethical approximations of 
human individual particulars to Forms. When considering artefacts, and inanimate 
natural objects, the received view is to ascribe the causal power—now read as an 
intentional power—to the creator of the artefact, who more or less succeeds in bringing 
about a close degree of approximation in the object. 
The problem of “perfect particulars” arises in simple subjects such as weights and 
measures as quantities, where there appears to be no difference between Form and 
                                                
37 Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms [On Ideas] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 211-212. 
38 Cratylus, 389a. See also Timaeus, 28b. 
39 Richard Patterson, Image and Reality in Plato’s Metaphysics (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1985), 12-13, 15. 
40 Ibid., 14-15, 160. See Chapter 3, §IV.b., for the significance of ὀρθός in the Symposium. 
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particular.41  Take, for example, the geometrical forms (circles, triangles) or the measure 
of one metre. On some readings, the solution which helps save the paradigm case 
interpretation from this problem—that the original Form conceived of prior to the 
existence of the perfect particular is of a different kind, variously construed, than the 
particulars—throws it into the path of self-exemplification or self-predication 
predicaments.42  So even if the space of the distance measured by one metre is of a 
different kind to the Form of one metre, on this reading, the latter must nevertheless be 
itself one metre in regress-inducing fashion. However, I would argue, it is far from clear 
that quantities such as these are explained through participation or that they are even 
objects at all.   
A second branch of the Original to Copy interpretation understands Forms as (2) 
patterns towards which the particular strives.43  This view originates in the Parmenides, 
when the young Socrates suggests as a way of explaining the Forms that they “are, as it 
were, patterns fixed in the nature of things (παραδείγματα  ἑστάναι ὲν τῇ φύσει). The 
other things are made in their image and are likenesses (ὁμοιώματα).”44  The language 
of striving to be like this pattern can be found most clearly in the Phaedo.45  On this 
reading, Forms can be taken as blueprint structures, laws of nature, formal aspects, or 
guiding forces.46  The major source of contention with this interpretation, however, is 
that it must provide a satisfactory account of how these internal directors contend with 
the soul as a guide for self-motion, an account absent from the dialogues in question. 
                                                
41 On which, see D.M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism: Volume 1: Universals and Scientific Realism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 78-79; Sarah Broadie, Nature and Divinity in Plato’s 
Timaeus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 69-70, 74-75. 
42 Patterson, 14-15.  
43 Advocates of this branch include Patterson; Bruce Thomas Lidsten, “Plato on Participation: An 
Examination of the Relation between Forms and Particulars” (MA diss., McMaster University, 1979), 82. Cf. 
Allan Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2002), 52; and David Sedley, “Form-Particular Resemblance in Plato’s Phaedo,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 106:1 (2006): 324-326, 366, who argue against this view precisely because they take any such striving 
to be purely metaphorical. I address this objection in Chapter 4, §IV.  
44 Parmenides, trans. F.M. Cornford, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 132d. 
45 Phaedo, 74d, 75b1, 75b7. 
46 Baron Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, “Platonic Natural Science in the Course of History,” Main Currents 
in Modern Thought 29 (1972): 8, who explains the Forms as laws of nature “which describe the optimal 
functions” of the particular. For guiding forces, see Patterson, 16. 
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The abstract structure or pattern that comprises a Form may delineate specifically the 
shape or blueprint of a thing in such a way that “a pattern or structure might be a 
separate, independent, abstract object embodied in or conformed to by things or 
motions in this world, but neither literally present to them nor guiding them in any 
sense from the inside.”47  Defended in the literature, this view enables the Forms to be 
of a different type of, for example, beauty than particular beautiful objects, while still 
being able to be a standard for evaluation and assimilation-production, as in the case of 
the craftsman. This interpretation may have the virtue of avoiding difficulties relating to 
self-predication regresses. Patterson asserts,  
Notice that their use as standards would not be based on similarity to 
their embodiments with respect to being F. Classification and 
evaluation of participants would turn not on similarity in respect F to a 
standard instance, but on the extent to which some structure is realized 
in a worldly participant.48  
 
When conceived as a blueprint—or, following Broadie, a recipe49—the Form would 
not have to be beautiful in the same way the many beautiful particulars are, and hence 
would not need to be categorised with them in lists of the Third Man Argument 
(TMA) sort.50  Participation on this branch would involve striving to realise this pattern 
in the sensible world. The difficulty, and the drawback, of this interpretation, however, 
is that it must yet explain what the similarity relation between the two types is. What 
does it mean other than similarity if it is the same structure that is realised in the many 
different instantiations?  
 
 II.b. Contagion agent to phenomenon 
 
A second interpretation of the participation relation is presented in the Phaedo and 
gains support in the Parmenides. Scaltsas considers the “contagion model of 
                                                
47 Patterson, 18. 
48 Ibid., 19. 
49 Broadie, “Response to Jay Kennedy and Thomas Johansen on Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus” 
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the Northern Association for Ancient Philosophy, University of 
Manchester, 11 April, 2013). 
50 For an explanation of this argument, see Gregory Vlastos, “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides,” 
Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 319-349, and ensuing debates. 
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explanation”, which gets its basis from the aim of answering the question: ‘Why are 
things F?’ This model illustrates the relationship between Forms and particulars as that 
between a contagion source and the phenomenon that contracts a condition from the 
source.51  Socrates asserts in the Phaedo: “Nothing else makes it [a beautiful sensible] 
beautiful except that beautiful itself, whether by its presence or communion or 
whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be…it is by the beautiful that all 
things are beautiful.”52  The answer to the question (that a thing gets its F-ness from the 
Form) expresses a similar relation to the previous models of explanation. Where it 
differs is in the question asked. The two Original to Copy explanations describe merely 
the way in which the two were related, whereas the contagion model describes how 
they came to be related as well.  
A virtue of this model is that it provides a possible answer to the TMA: as things 
cannot infect themselves, the Form does not become another entity of the same 
ontological type as a particular (an admission that begins the TMA’s infinite regress) 
even though both are beautiful and in some way share the property of being beautiful. 
Further, the contagion model is compatible with the useful features of the perfect 
exemplar or paradigm case. Scaltsas asserts, “As a perfect exemplar, the Form is the 
realisation of the necessary and sufficient condition for being f. Participation in a Form 
in this case is resembling the Form, which does secure that the thing possess what it 
takes to be f.”53  When this model is considered alongside the contagion model, it 
becomes clear that the latter can include the Form both as the origin of f-ness as well as 
its paradigm case. Scaltsas acknowledges that while both are clearly different, “the 
latitude is Plato’s, since he explicitly explores both…[when he] gives two versions of 
the TMA regress in the first part of the Parmenides (132a-b, 132d-133a)…”54 Where 
the contagion model comes into difficulty, however, is in presupposing identity to 
                                                
51 Theodore Scaltsas, “The Logic of the Dilemma of Participation and of the Third Man Argument,” 
Aperion 22:4 (1989): 69. 
52 Phaedo, 100c-d. 
53 Scaltsas, 73. 
54 Ibid., 73. 
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secure attribute predication, without grounding identity in the first place.55  Where f-
identity would have made the particular f subject to the TMA, it also is required as 
what follows from contracting a condition of f-ness from the Form.  
 
 II.c. Source to similar image 
 
Of importance to several aspects of the above interpretations is the idea that 
particulars are, in one way or another, similar to, images of, or imitative of the Forms.56  
But can we take Plato at his word here? As Socrates learns from Parmenides, if 
particulars are like the Forms, then the Forms ought be like the particulars—a 
concession which, as noted earlier, can be taken to lead to the various regresses of self-
predication, self-exemplification, and Third Men.57  Plato very clearly acknowledges this 
in Parmenides 132d, in which Parmenides says similarity is precisely not how Forms 
relate to particulars for the very reason that it would in fact shatter the essential unity 
of the Form in question. If Plato was aware of this difficulty, why then does the 
terminology of imitation and similarity crop up so frequently in the dialogues?  
I propose that we might mistake his intention behind drawing attention to a 
particular being an imitation. There are, of course, two ways to think about similarity. 
First, as an indication of likeness read as closeness to each other. When the avant-garde 
vexillographer remarks that the flags of Luxembourg and the Netherlands are ‘similar’, 
she does so to emphasise their small degree of difference (and perhaps express some 
disdain). A second view of similarity, however, expresses an acknowledgment of 
underlying difference. So when the geography student makes the same remark, he might 
be expressing his angst regarding confusing the two in the exam for the reason that they 
are so alike. The root point of his concern, however, is that they are, in fact, different. 
Confusing the two would be to get the question wrong because Luxembourg’s flag is 
not that of the Netherlands. On this second view, noting a similarity is, at least in part, 
always to emphasise the contrast between two. If the two flags were actually the 
                                                
55 Scaltsas, 89. 
56 This is evident most clearly in Phaedrus 250a, Phaedo 74e, Timaeus 39e, and, above all, Republic 510b. 
57 Parmenides, 132d; Republic, 597c, 597e. Fine [On Ideas], 214, argues that the resemblance regress and the 
TMA are “logically the same argument.” 
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same—as those of Chad and Romania are—he would not say they are similar, but 
rather identical. Whether Plato speaks of a similarity between Form and particular, he 
is abundantly clear that the two are not identical. This may be the latent truth of 
Theaetetus’ insistence in the Sophist that an image fashioned in the likeness of an 
original is “[n]ot a true one by any means, but only one like the true.”58  
 
 II.d. Binding causal power 
 
While each of these three descriptions above illuminates certain aspects of Plato’s 
theory of Forms and how they relate to their respective particulars, the question has 
endured largely on the basis of a lack of satisfaction: defendable interpretations might 
describe the relation but fall short of explaining how, precisely, the mechanism of 
participation works. As I argue in Chapter 4, a discussion in Book VI of the Republic 
offers a portrayal of the realm of the Forms that illuminates the relationship most 
compatibly with the Symposium. In the Sun Simile, Socrates demonstrates how plants 
get not only their visibility from the sun, but also their sustained existence. The Form 
functions as “the author of their being and essence”59  by providing what the particular 
needs in order to exist. Just as the original can be said to be the author and cause of 
being for a reflection mirrored, so does it bind the reflection to reality, to what is real, 
to what exists before it: the reflection cannot be without it. Similarly, the beauty of a 
beautiful particular obtains its essence and existence from the Form, and—crucially—
from the particular’s participation in that Form. Participation can thus be understood 
as a causal bond. But how is this bond forged? 
In his exhaustive treatment of participation, Bigger argues that participation names 
the relation “which accounts for the togetherness of elements of diverse ontological 
type in the essential unity of a single instance.”60  This interpretation takes into account 
the community alluded to in the Phaedo, Republic, and Symposium. While the second-
best solution in the Phaedo was to explain that a beautiful particular is beautiful 
                                                
58 Sophist, 240b. 
59 Republic, 509c. See also Adam, Republic, n. 8 ad loc. 
60 Charles P. Bigger, Participation: A Platonic Inquiry (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 
1968), 7. 
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because of the beautiful itself; and in the Sun Simile of the Republic, the Form of the 
good nurtures and sustains the sensible world; the Symposium takes as its sole focus a 
human togetherness that Plato turns into the motivating force of philosophy and the 
source of all generation. The “greatest problem” of participation is to explain “how the 
eidos drops down from the context of being to become entangled with non-being in a 
new and world-making way—how there can be an eidos incarnate (Phaedrus 251a).”61  







                                                
61 Brann, 36. 





 CHAPTER III: 
 




Argument: The love Plato presents in the Symposium is of a different sort than appetitive 




The Symposium is no exception to Guthrie’s apt resolution that Plato did not write 
“sober treatises”; rather, he chose to impart his philosophy through dramatic, 
interpersonal dialogues “with a consuming interest not only in ideas but in people.”1 It 
would be strange indeed, then, if his dialogue on erôs would prove an abandonment of 
the human elements of familial, interpersonal, and romantic love as normally construed. 
Plato has come under much scrutiny for the account of erôs he puts forward in the 
Symposium. In constructing a definition of love—a delineation of its ways and powers—
Plato is true to form regarding his view that definitions are “essential to successful 
investigation”.2 Keeping this focus will be imperative to being able to answer more 
complicated, second-order questions about love. Accordingly, this chapter sets out to 
“tell the truth about love”3 and unpack what Plato means by erôs.4  
This chapter will first offer a textual analysis of Socrates’ speech, which will detail 
the nature of Platonic erôs in the Symposium. Second, the motivating force of erôs will 
be examined and found to have a distinctly cognitive nature: the love Plato presents in 
                                                
1 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy IV: Plato, the Man and his Dialogues (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), xiii.  
2 Gerasimos Santas, Plato and Freud [Plato] (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 12, n. 15. 
3 Symposium, 199b. 
4 In this thesis, I refer to both erôs the emotion, and Erôs the daimon. When speaking specifically of the 
latter, I will capitalise the proper noun.  
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the Symposium is of a different sort than appetitive emotion. It has an orientation to 
reality, and is an intellectual love. Third, this chapter will review a number of 
competing interpretations regarding the objects and aims of love, and present an 
argument as to what it is exactly that love is ‘of’: bringing to birth in beauty. Finally, the 
chapter locates the erôs of the Symposium within Plato’s theory of desire. Taking the 
object of love to be not beauty but the creation of beauty will provide a defence of the 
use of the English term ‘love’ as a suitable translation of the Greek ἔρος, taking into 
particular account the on-going debate instigated by Vlastos’ seminal critique of 
Platonic erôs as having little to do with interpersonal love as normally experienced.  
By positing a cognitive reading of erôs, this chapter shall argue that erôs in relation 
to the beautiful requires an inexhaustible commitment to coming to know beauty itself, 
a commitment which is not only manifest in but requires the creation and nurture of 
beauty in the sensible world, and ultimately, in oneself through the cultivation of a 
beautiful soul. Far more than an encouragement to armchair reflection, Plato’s aim in 
the ascent passage of the Symposium is an inducement to a fruitful way of life, whereby 
the desire to possess is to be understood as a desire to bring forth. 
 
 
 I. THE TRUTH ABOUT ERÔS 
 
 I.a. Diotima and the origin of Love 
 
A significant area of controversy in the literature regards the conative nature of erôs: 
is the love Plato has in mind desiderative, appropriative, and appetitive? Is it “the 
frenzy-thrill, the fever-pain” depicted by Euripides?5 Does it differ in kind from the sort 
                                                
5 Euripides, Iphigenia at Aulis, in The Plays of Euripides, vol. II, trans. E. P. Coleridge (London: George Bell & 
Sons, 1891), vv. 547-551. Sappho 31 paints a portrait of erôs that “set the pattern for all of Greek and Latin 
literature”, as David Konstan says quite rightly in “Between Appetite and Emotion, or Why Can’t Animals 
Have Eros?” [“Appetite”], in Eros in Ancient Greece, eds. Ed Sanders, Chiara Thumiger, Chris Carey, and 
Nick J. Lowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 13. On Sappho’s poem, see William D. Furley, 
“‘Fearless, bloodless…like the gods’: Sappho 31 and the rhetoric of ‘godlike’,” The Classical Quarterly, New 
Series, 50:1 (2000): 7-15; Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical 
Literature (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 240-241; and Armand D’Angour, “Love’s 
Battlefield: Rethinking Sappho fr. 31,” in Sanders et al., 59-71. On Plato’s own recognition of the dangers of 
erôs’ excess, see, e.g., Laws 837a-d. 
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of emotion we feel towards food, money, or power?  A textual analysis of Socrates’ 
speech will aim to place Platonic erôs within its intended sphere of emotion theory.  
At the outset of his speech, Socrates asserts that erôs “is the love of something” and 
that it “desires this something” of which it is.6 The focus here on the object makes 
evident the complex relational quality love maintains: love cannot be fully understood 
apart from its object, because a specific type of relation is essential to its nature.7 In the 
transitional interlude between Socrates and Agathon, the two come to an agreement 
that “Erôs is love, first of all, of some things, and secondly, of whatever things the need 
for which is present to him.”8 As will be shown in more detail in §III, below, the precise 
nature of what love is “of” was a source of confusion for Agathon and the younger 
Socrates. The older Socrates, however, wishes to set the record straight about love and, 
after reducing Agathon to a similar state of lack as Erôs, Socrates lets him free and 
begins his speech. 
Rather than give a monologue as the others had done, Socrates famously defers to a 
recitation of a series of conversations he had with a tutor of his, the priestess Diotima of 
Mantineia. Whether the woman who taught Socrates how to love is real or fictional is 
perhaps lost to history, and her inclusion in the dialogue has caused no end of 
speculation as to Plato’s purposes in choosing her as his primary mouthpiece in this 
dialogue.9 Contrary to his interlocutors’ previous speeches, Socrates asserts that Erôs is 
                                                
6 Symposium, 200a. Desire, here is ἐπιθυμεῖ. Socrates’ question to Agathon on this point is reminiscent of his 
similar discussion with Menexenus at Lysis 218d regarding whether a friend is the friend of someone or not. 
7 Dirk t.D. Held, “Erôs, Beauty, and the Divine in Plato,” New England Classical Journal 36:3 (2009): 160. 
8 Symposium, 200e. My italics. 
9 On Diotima’s fictionality, see Léon Robin, Le Banquet, in Platon: Œuvres Complètes IV, 2ième partie (Paris: 
Les Belles Lettres, 1951), xxii-xxvii; Sir Kenneth Dover, Plato: Symposium [Symposium] (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), 137-138; Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics 
in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy [Fragility] (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 177, 467, n. 
28; Robin Waterfield, Plato: Symposium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 99-100; Christopher 
Rowe, “Socrates and Diotima: Eros, Immortality, and Creativity” [“Socrates and Diotima”], Proceedings of 
the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy XIV, eds. John J. Cleary and Gary M. Gurtler (Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Brill, 1998), 173; Mary Ellen Waithe, A History of Women Philosophers (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1987), 83-116, esp. 92ff; and John P. Anton, “The Secret of Plato’s Symposium,” Diotima: Review of 
Philosophical Research 2 (1974): 27-47. Walther Kranz, “Diotima,” Die Antike 2 (1926): 313, 321; and A.E. 
Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (Mineola, NY: Courier Dover Publications, 2001), 224, both accept 
Diotima’s historical existence. On philosophical reasons for Diotima’s gender and character, see David M. 
Halperin, “Why is Diotima a Woman?,” in One Hundred Years of Homosexuality (New York, NY: 
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lacking in beauty, though is not necessarily ugly, and that it is for this reason that Erôs 
longs for, strives after, and cunningly plots to trap the beautiful wherever he can find it. 
The genealogy given by Diotima details the reasons for his character. “Conceived after a 
wild and debauched drinking party (a parodic heavenly counterpart to the all-too-
human and yet self-controlled symposium reported in the dialogue),”10  Erôs was born 
of two quite different parents, Need and Resource. His mother, Penia, was the spirit of 
poverty and need. Literary accounts of Penia report her as intractable, conniving, and 
with a “wild tragic look in her eyes.”11  Despite her poverty, according to the historical 
Aristophanes, Penia was indeed clever, and you required “all your wits” to beat her in 
logical argument.12  His father, Poros, was the spirit of resource and the means required 
for the accomplishment of goals. Indeed,  
the word poros, with the privative prefix a, means not only the same 
thing as penia but the difficulty or perplexity that is provided by a 
contradiction in an argument. An aporia arises at the point in an 
argument when the interlocutor contradicts himself and must look for a 
solution but does not know quite how to do so. He is literally without 
resource.13   
 
Plato mentions Poros’ mother, Metis, who was the goddess of good counsel, cunning, 
and planning, and maintains a maternal relation to the goddess of wisdom, Athena. 
From his father, Erôs received his proclivity for “weaving intrigues”, his love of wisdom, 
and his schemes to “trap the beautiful and the good.”14  In accordance with his lineage, 
then, Erôs’ neediness is cleverly and artfully employed, and, because of his being 
                                                                                                                                     
Routledge, 1990), 113-151, 190-211; and Luc Brisson, “Agathon, Pausanias and Diotima in Plato’s 
Symposium,” in Plato’s Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception, eds. James H. Lesher, Debra Nails, 
and Frisbee Sheffield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 229-251. Intriguingly, the city of 
Mantineia would go on to hold a fateful role for Alcibiades’ expression of erôs. See also n. 40, below.  
10 Glenn Most, “Six remarks on Platonic Eros,” trans. Thomas Bartscherer, in Erotikon: Essays on Eros, Ancient 
and Modern, eds. Shadi Bartsch and Thomas Bartscherer (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 
36. 
11 Alcaeus, “Fragment 364,” in Greek Lyric I: Sappho and Alcaeus, trans. D.A. Campbell (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1982); Symposium, 203b7-8; Aristophanes, Plutus, trans. Eugene O’Neill (New 
York, NY: Random House, 1938), 424.  
12 Plutus, 487. 
13 Allan Bloom, “The Ladder of Love,” in Plato’s Symposium, trans. Seth Benardete (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 2001), 132. 
14 Symposium, 203d. 
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conceived on Aphrodite’s birthday, he maintains a relationship with her. Erôs is not, 
however, in love with this divine mistress. He attends to and follows Aphrodite, but 
“his main attention is directed elsewhere”, as shall be evident given one further facet of 
his inheritance.15  For it is due to his parentage that Erôs is not a god, but a daimon: 
neither mortal nor immortal, Erôs is in between, and in the same manner possesses 
neither ignorance nor wisdom, as what is “supplied to him is always gradually flowing 
out.”16  Diotima completes the comparison by asserting Erôs to be therefore a 
philosopher, in love with wisdom as it is one of the most beautiful things to behold, and 
accordingly in between being wise and being ignorant. As Diotima’s story unfolds, the 
convictions of erôs explain the inner means of fulfilling those desires that lead one to 
action, and, even more so, to the creative life of philosophy.   
Being a daimon, Erôs fills a gap between the mortal and the immortal. “Erôs is an 
intermediary. So also is Socrates, whose task it is to convey the wisdom of the priestess 
Diotima to the company at the party.”17  If this image is intentional, as I argue it is, it is 
a possible explanation as to why Plato, first of all, has Socrates introduce a new 
character to the dialogue, and, second, why she is a priestess—she has contact with the 
immortals. As Cicero writes of Socrates, he was “the first to bring philosophy down 
from the heavens and put it into the cities with people and to make it ask questions 
about life and about right and wrong.”18  The similarities between Socrates and the Erôs 
portrayed in the dialogue are well-documented: both are shoeless,19  poor,20  always 
fluttering around the beautiful (even “lying in ambush, as a habit”),21  clever and 
                                                
15 Rowe, Plato: Symposium [Plato] (Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1998), 176 ad loc. 203c4. 
16 Symposium, 203e-204a. On the mortality of Penia, see Frisbee Sheffield, Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of 
Desire [Ethics of Desire] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 43; Harry Neumann, “Diotima’s Concept 
of Love,” The American Journal of Philology 86:1 (1965): 50; and R.G. Bury, introduction to The Symposium 
of Plato (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1909), xl-xli; cf., on Bury’s association of Penia with matter, Hans 
Kelsen, “Platonic Love,” The American Imago (April, 1942): 15; and Kranz, “Diotima von Mantinea,” Hermes 
LXI (1926): 441. 
17 Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 100-101. 
18 Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, ed. Max Pohlenz (Leipzig: Teubner, 1918), V.10. 
19 Symposium, 203d, 220b.  
20 Ibid., 203c; Apology, 38a-b. 
21 Symposium, 203d, 206d, 213b, 216d, 223a. 
WARE CHAPTER III: ERÔS IN THE SYMPOSIUM 76 
 
  
cunning,22  courageous,23  portrayed as a daimonic half-man, half-god,24  between 
beautiful and ugly,25  skilled in a kind of poison,26  and the archetypical philosopher—
between being wise and being without understanding.27  Socrates even manages to be 
like a daimon in mediating between lover and beloved in “seeming to be a lover 
(ἐραστής) while really establishing himself as a beloved boy (παῖς) instead”,28  as 
Alcibiades wistfully complains.  
Now Socrates, reciting his conversation with Diotima, continues with the 
discussion that mortal nature is conscious of its own transience. Once one dies she is 
very likely soon forgotten. The way to conquer this loss is through immortality, a 
manner in which “that which is departing and growing old leaves behind another young 
thing that is as it was.”29  It is in this way that the old shares in immortality through that 
which was generated and remains. Erôs, then, and its lovers, are completely consumed 
with the immortal—those who pursue erôs in some way seek their own immortality.30  
Erôs longs for the immortality of his father, and because “he is by nature a lover in 
regard to the beautiful”, attends to Aphrodite and follows after the beautiful.31  His 
                                                
22 Symposium, 203d, 213c. 
23 Ibid., 203d, 212b, 219d.  
24 Ibid., 202d-203a, 215b, 219c, 221d. 
25 Ibid., 203c-d, 216a-217a. 
26 Ibid., 203e1, 217e-218a. 
27 Ibid., 203e-204b, 177d, 212b; Apology, 21d, cf. 21b; Meno, 80d. Given the above, one is reminded of 
Dante’s (La Vita Nuova, trans. Reynolds, Sonnet 9) description of personified Love: 
 As I rode forth one day not long ago,  
 Pensive about my journey and distressed, 
 I met Love, like a traveller, humbly dressed, 
 Coming along my path, forlorn and slow. 
 He might have been a monarch dispossessed. 
28 Symposium, 222b3-4. On the identification of Socrates with Erôs, see Marsilio Ficino, Symposium 
Commentary, Oratio septima, 11. 105v-106r; Robin, La théorie platonicienne de l’amore, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1964), 161-164; Thomas Gould, Platonic Love (London: Routledge, 1963), 45 ff; 
Bury, lx-lxi; Dover [Symposium], 164; Osborne, 93-101; and, recently, Sheffield [Ethics of Desire], 185-201, 
and “Alcibiades’ Speech: A Satyric Drama,” Greece & Rome, 2nd Series, 48:2 (2001): 193-209, who draws new 
and exciting comparisons between Alcibiades’ speech and Greek satyr plays with Socrates as an erotic, satyric 
character. Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Symposium (New Haven, CT: 1968), 233-236 downplays the similarity. 
29 Symposium, 208b.  
30 Interestingly, in the Charmides, 156d, Socrates states that he received the idea of moderation, the great 
virtue of the Symposium as noted at 209a, from a doctor who was known for being able to make men 
immortal. 
31 Symposium, 203c.  
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servitude to Aphrodite is explained by the fact that he was conceived during her 
birthday party—love and beauty enter the world together—but his longing after 
immortality and the beautiful comes from his parents. Socrates asserts that erôs is not 
the love of the beautiful,32  but that erôs is “love in relation to the beautiful”.33  The fact 
that Plato employs the accusative rather than the genitive case when explaining the 
relationship of Erôs to the beautiful is a significant, yet oft-ignored, issue which will be 
examined in more detail in §§III.a-b., below.  
Although Erôs lacks and is in need of beauty, this is not what he actually desires. 
Socrates asks Diotima, “Of what use is erôs for human beings?”34  Diotima explains that 
this question can be answered by investigating “in what manner and in what activity 
would the earnestness and intensity of those who pursue the good be called erôs?”35  
What in fact are they doing when they so act? She answers, “Their deed is bringing to 
birth in beauty both in terms of the body and in terms of the soul.”36  Everyone, she 
espouses, is at some point pregnant, and their nature desires to bring to birth. Erôs, 
then, is not of the beautiful, but of what it does to the lover: it releases her from labour 
pains and initiates her bringing to birth in beauty.37  Because conception and generation 
are in the business of “leaving behind another that is young to replace the old”,38  an 
engendering is the way in which human nature is capable of attaining immortality. This 
“engendering” is the result of a man and a woman being together.39  Bringing to birth in 
beauty is the expected result of the coming together of man and woman, man and 
virtue, and finally, man and Kallone.40  It is on this foundation of coupling that Diotima 
                                                
32 Symposium, 201e5 (τῶν καλῶν), 206e2-4 (ἔστιν γάρ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ὡς σὺ οἴει). 
33 Ibid., 203c (ἅμα φύσει ἐραστὴς ὢν περὶ τὸ καλὸν), 204b3 (Ἔρως δ’ ἐστὶν ἔρως περὶ τὸ καλὸν). Cf. 
Dover [Symposium], 142 ad loc. 
34 Symposium, 204c. 
35 Ibid., 206a. 
36 Ibid., 206b. 
37 Ibid., 206e. 
38 Ibid., 207d. 
39 Ibid., 206c. There is nothing in the dialogue to indicate Plato thought philosophy was only possible for 
men, of course. While those pregnant in body hoping to produce human children must each be of different 
sexes, the second two levels’ description as being of male-female coupling is purely metaphorical. 
40 “Μοῖρα οὖν καὶ Εἰλείθυια ἡ Καλλονή ἐστι τῇ γενέσει”, Symposium, 206d. Kallone is a cult name of 
Artemis-Hecate (Seth Benardete, Plato’s Symposium,  (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 37, n. 
17). On the goddess, see Hermann Usener, Kleine Schriften, vol. 4, Arbeiten zur Religionsgeschichte 
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describes what is brought to birth by such lovers. In so doing, she constructs a series of 
levels of erotic activity, each below the next in dignity and difficulty: the so-called 
ladder of love.41  
 
 I.b. The ladder of love 
 
The base level of erôs is that of the physical. “Pregnant in terms of their bodies”,42  
these men and women look to each other for the satisfaction of their immortal desires 
through the only thing they know to be like it—the satisfaction of transitory, physical 
desires. These lovers toil to achieve for themselves “an immortal remembering of their 
virtue”: the child.43  Similar in stature and feature to his parents, this heir will provide 
for his progenitor the opportunity to further that name. This kind of erôs draws one to 
the beautiful body, and to the production of children. As a means to obtain 
immortality, two technical issues immediately draw attention to the insufficient and 
superficial nature of this manner of begetting. First, although one produces children, 
and can see the furtherance of her name for, perhaps, the next eighty years of her child’s 
life, it is either illogical or ignorant to suppose that the span of a genealogy will be in 
any degree eternal. The product of this begetting is only another mere human. A second 
difficulty is that it is not nature that establishes one’s heirs, but human law. 
Determining who is legally a part of which family is a matter for the Athenian courts. 
                                                                                                                                     
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), 1-92, esp. 90-91. The name is rare in classical literature: one 
of the only existing fragments referring to the goddess by the name Καλλονή was found—interestingly 
enough—in Mantineia. Inscriptiones Graecae, V, 2. Inscriptiones Arcadiae, ed. Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen 
(Berlin, 1913), 268.46, 51-52 = IG V2 268.46, 51-52. 
41 Symposium, 210b7, 210a2. The concept of Plato’s “ladder of love” has enjoyed a prominent role in 
Western and Eastern thought ever since. Bury notes “the dream ladder at Bethel”, ad loc. 211c; other allusions 
likely taken from this concept include Climacus’ The Ladder of Divine Ascent in Eastern monastic 
Christianity, Bonaventure’s Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum, and Dante’s The Divine Comedy in Western, and the 
Liber Scale Mahometi (Book of the Ladder of Muhammad) detailing Muhammad’s journey to the heavens on 
the Mi’raj (literally, “ladder”, Sachiku Murata and William C. Chittick, The Vision of Islam (New York, NY: 
Paragon House, 2006), 81). See also the evocative choice of lyrics in the English translation of Bach’s 
Visitation cantata “Herz und Mund und Tat und Leben” (BVW 147, comp. Martin Janus), itself a work in 
honour of divine conception and engendering, by the English poet laureate Robert Bridges. Bridges’ Platonic 
background is evident in his poems on Greek literature and myth, notably The Testament of Beauty: A Poem in 
Four Books (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), esp. ll. 120, 202-206, 221-241, and 430-460. Ll. 229 and 791 
refer specifically to “Plato’s ladder.” 
42 Symposium, 208e. 
43 Ibid., 208d. 
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An ordained marriage, not merely the begetting of children, discerns legitimate offspring 
from the illegitimate.44  This lowest level of love is, then, concerned with the immediate 
and present, and produces that which lasts barely longer. As the lover’s primary erotic 
longings are fulfilled, the tangible result is that the drive required to ascend the ranks of 
erôs is exhausted.45   
Diotima next makes a specific distinction in kind (signalled by “Οἱ μὲν οὗν 
ἐγκύμονες κατὰ τὰ σώματα…οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν”) between those pregnant in the 
body and those of the next level of erôs: those who are “pregnant in terms of the 
soul.”46  She explains that what is appropriate for the soul is “prudence and the rest of 
virtue,”47  namely, wisdom, courage, and justice. The lover now turns to the beautiful 
soul, and, full of desire to give birth in beauty thereof, spills over in and through 
exhortation and instruction. His offspring is tutored in the virtuous life. Diotima asserts 
that the one pregnant in soul will seek out as a partner not merely a beautiful body, but 
“if he meets a beautiful, generous, and naturally gifted soul, he cleaves strongly to the 
two (body and soul) together.”48  The poets, the inventive craftsmen, and even the 
statesmen are included as examples of those who long for the satisfaction of generating 
these virtues through their seed of literary, material, and political work. To their 
students these lovers espouse their ideals of “what sort the good man must be and what 
he must practice,”49  as part of their education in virtue. Whereas the physical body, 
being mortal, is seemingly irrational in the vain attempt to procreate eternally; the soul, 
as of an intangible nature, is a better fit for the discussion and production of prudence 
and justice. An interesting aspect of this second level of erôs is when Diotima explains 
that this kind of lover:  
                                                
44 Bloom, 141-142. On classical Greek inheritance law, see, e.g., Roger Just, Women in Athenian Law and Life 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 1991), 76-105; and Alberto Maffi, “Family and property law,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Ancient Greek Law, eds. Michael Gagarin and David J. Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 254-266, esp. 254-256. 
45 Neumann, 51.  
46 Symposium, 208e-209a 
47 Ibid., 209a. 
48 Ibid., 209b. 
49 Ibid., 209c. 
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gives birth to offspring with which he was long pregnant; and whether 
the [lover] is present or absent he holds the beautiful one in memory, 
and nurtures with him that which has been generated in common.50   
 
Two insights emerge. First, this lover was long pregnant—the brood birthed at the first 
satisfaction of erôs were premature. Underdeveloped, these products stand little chance 
for survival long enough to garner immortality through their eternal preservation; they 
mirror the state of their parents in that manner. Second, because the products of those 
pregnant in soul are not children, but poetry, cities, and laws—and the virtues they 
encourage—the erotic longing does not culminate in merely their birth, but in their 
nurture and nourishment as well. Socrates speaks of “their showing forth of many 
beautiful deeds… [engendering] every kind of virtue.”51  The idea of producing not just a 
family of immediate children, but a whole school of students, or city of law-abiding 
citizens, is both much more attractive and more satisfying. It is with this offer that 
Socrates seduces Glaucon and Alcibiades in the Republic—with the proposal of 
founding a city, wherein they can educate the populace according to their definitions of 
virtue, moderation, and justice.52  The principal characteristic of this second erotic 
echelon is its concern for the soul, at least in addition to, if not over, the concern for 
the body. This sentiment is echoed in Socrates’ persuasion in the Apology, for men not 
to care for the physical things of the city until they have learned to care for the nurture 
and improvement of the soul, through training in the beautiful.53   
Once one has brought to birth in the beauty of the soul, the rightly ordered lover 
will go on to see the beauty in “customs and laws (τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς 
νόμοις)”,54  and to understand how this beauty is related to the earlier beauties. As 
Russon states, “The reasons that make us responsible to one soul, then make us 
responsible for the well-being of all souls with whom we have dealings, and for that 
                                                
50 Symposium, 209c. 
51 Ibid., 209e. 
52 Republic, 368bff. This possibility continues to attract students of the Socratic school, as Nietzsche 
describes it, “most often in maieutic and educational influences on noble youths, with a view to eventually 
producing a genius.” The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967), 
97. 
53 Apology, 36b-c. 
54 Symposium, 210c3. 
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reason the next move up the ladder is the erôs for laws and customs, that is, the 
commitment to the ways in which many souls in community represent their interests 
and upon which they depend for well-being.”55  The lovers of pursuits, laws, and 
customs in this respect may also do so because it is these very aspects of culture which 
nurture and provide for the development of beautiful citizens. This is most likely to 
occur “when laws have been established not haphazardly and as tradition or the 
powerful prescribe, but as knowledge dictates.”56   
After giving birth to poetry, and educating her students, the lover also realises the 
“beauty of the sciences” further for herself. “Sciences” here translates ἐπιστήμας, a term 
associated for Plato with wisdom, prudential knowledge, and the skills acquired when 
acquainted with an object of study.57  In studying the beauty of these sciences, the lover 
comes to recognise the beauty of becoming acquainted with wisdom. Now in 
contemplating these beautiful ideas that shape the soul and society, she will  
no longer be content with the beauty in just one of these objects of 
knowledge…but with a permanent turn to the vast open sea of the 
beautiful, behold it and give birth—in ungrudging love of wisdom—to 
many beautiful and magnificent speeches and thoughts; until, there 
strengthened and increased, the lover may discern a certain single 
philosophic science, which has as its object [the immortal Form, 
beauty].58   
 
Socrates then reaches the highest level of erôs—the pinnacle and most noble of 
pursuits, that “for which the others are means, if one were to proceed correctly in 
them” and “for whose sake alone all the other prior labours were undertaken.”59  
Through philosophy, the virtuous soul reaches the end of the lessons for which the 
prior levels had trained and prepared it, “at last to know what is beauty itself.”60  
                                                
55 John Edward Russon, “Erôs and Education: Plato’s Transformative Epistemology,” Laval théologique et 
philosophique 56:1 (2000): 118. See also Darnell Rucker, “Plato and the Poets,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 25 (1966-1967): 167-170 for an engaging reading of the Republic based on this stage in the ascent. 
56 Alexander Nehamas, “Beauty of Body, Nobility of Soul: The Pursuit of Love in Plato’s Symposium” 
[“Beauty”], in Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, ed. Dominic Scott 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 122. 
57 Symposium, 210c. 
58 Ibid., 210d-e. 
59 Ibid., 210e. 
60 Ibid., 211c. 
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Following the longest and most detailed description of a Form in the Platonic corpus,61  
Diotima reveals that the goal of all love is the lesson of what makes the beloved 
beautiful in the first place. Here, she is placed to be able to discern how “[t]he beauty 
of boys, their souls, the practices that make them beautiful, even the knowledge on 
which those practices are based, and their objects is one and the same”.62  What 
transpires in this quest is the training of the soul in the truly beautiful. In beholding the 
beautiful, one gives birth in the love of wisdom, to many beautiful speeches and 
thoughts. Using the beautiful particulars she experiences on earth as “steps”, the lover 
can finally come to know what beauty truly is. It is here, Diotima asserts, in beholding 
the beautiful itself, that it is worth living.63  For only here, can one have togetherness 
with the beautiful, and engender true virtue, and cherish true virtue, and in doing this, 
become dear to the gods and inherit immortality as much as it is possible for a mortal 
being to do. Erôs is the best attendant to human nature for this inheritance. A 
comparable passage is found in Phaedrus 248d3-5: 
The best human life is that of a philosopher, a lover of beauty, or a man 
of culture and erotic desire. 
 
τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου 
ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ.64  
 
At this, Socrates concludes his speech, but before anyone can ask any questions, 
Alcibiades bursts into the party and drunkenly disrupts the discussion. The remainder 
of this chapter will aim to examine Socrates’ account of erôs. 
 
 I.c. Who loves whom? 
 
Considerable debate has arisen in the literature as to the roles of the lover, beloved, 
midwife, and issue that cluster around the beautiful in the ascent passage. An 
                                                
61 Symposium, 210e-212a.  
62 Nehamas [“Beauty”], 123. 
63 Symposium, 211d1-2 
64 Phaedrus, 248d3-5, trans. Paul Woodruff and Alexander Nehamas (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1995). In a later essay, Nehamas [“Beauty”], 129, asserts that their 1995 translation “suggest[s] 
Plato’s distinction here [was] exclusive, specifying three different modes of life—a view of which my present 
interpretation of the Symposium is causing me to be less confident.” 
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investigation into the text will elucidate these roles more clearly, which, in their final 
image, reveal the cognitive metaphysics I argue that Plato sets out in the Symposium. 
The multiple layers of characterisation and description made throughout the dialogue 
are indeed rather dizzying: is Diotima’s description of the shoe-less, wandering, 
philosophizing erôs intended to be a portrayal of Socrates himself? Are beautiful youths 
meant to be impregnated with wisdom, taken as inducements to pregnancy, employed 
as midwives, or enjoyed as replicable products of some other mystic union? The 
confusion resulting from these various role-reversals is well-documented, but no clear 
consensus has as yet been achieved.65  The solutions that have been proposed tend to 
fall along three main lines. First, that the Form of beauty takes the role of the begetter, 
a position put forward by Pender; second, the account of Socrates as the lover who 
begets ideas in the minds of the beloved, as characterised by the influential 
interpretations of Neumann and Dover; and finally, Edmonds’ recent explanation which 
advances championing Socrates as the beautiful beloved who serves as midwife to a 
philosophic lover. These three competing interpretations of the roles played in the 
ascent passage provide valuable insight into the nature of Diotima’s intention, and must 
be evaluated if one is to understand the cognitive complexities of the dialogue.  
 
 I.c.1. Philosopher loves the Form of beauty, beauty begets 
 
The first view of the roles of the ascent passage is expounded by Pender, who takes 
an unconventional reading of the text to assert, 
It is the Form of beauty, rather than the lover of beauty, that is pregnant 
at 212a, which means that in the course of Diotima’s speech the role of 
‘beauty’ changes from that of presiding deity in childbirth to that of 
sexual partner and mother. […] Thus it is the Form that experiences the 
pregnancy, labour and birth of the soul-child, with the lover taking the 
role of the proud father.66   
 
                                                
65 Waterfield, xviii; Sheffield [Ethics of Desire], 191-193; Radcliffe G. Edmonds, “Socrates the Beautiful: Role 
Reversal and Midwifery in Plato’s Symposium,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 130 
(2000): 262ff; John Rist, “Plutarch’s Amatorius: A Commentary on Plato’s Theories of Love?”, The Classical 
Quarterly 51:2 (2001): 565.   
66 E.E. Pender, “Spiritual Pregnancy in Plato’s Symposium,” The Classical Quarterly, New Series, 42:1 (1992): 
72, 84. 
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The view of beauty as begetter is, for Pender, the result of a structural requirement that 
Plato arranges in the text, and veils for a variety of reasons—notably because he realised 
the logical conclusion of such an arrangement is ultimately problematic. It is because of 
Plato’s obfuscation, argues Pender, that the startling conclusion of beauty as begetter 
has been overlooked in previous analyses of the text: Plato realised his view was wrong, 
and covered it up to prevent readers from finding the same problems with it that he did. 
According to this interpretation, Plato has constructed in Diotima’s speech a mirrored 
arrangement of four types of pregnancy, two physical and two spiritual. The first is the 
physical pregnancy of a female which results in the birth of a physical child; second, a 
male expectancy resulting in the issuance of physical seed through emission; third, 
mirrored on the second, a male expectancy resulting in the issuance of spiritual seed; and 
fourth, mirrored on the first, a spiritual pregnancy of a female which results in the birth 
of a spiritual child. Pender argues that the need to view Diotima’s speech as loaded with 
role reversals is unnecessary, as the traditional occurrence of pregnancy is simple enough 
to serve as a metaphor for all of Plato’s aims. Further, she argues the passage does not 
fall victim to the charge of “strange reversals”, 67  if one allows male expectancy and 
travail to be included in the description Diotima gives of τίκτειν.68  This view gets its 
foundation from the reading of τόκος in 206c as referring to male emission of seed. As 
τίκτειν was used to refer to both the male sense of ‘begetting’ a child and the female 
activity of ‘bearing’ one,69  this is not unusual. Further, it can be supported by the 
commonly accepted understanding of pregnancy in ancient Greek culture, whereby 
begetting takes place at conception.70  Pender goes on to find textual support in 206e4, 
reading ἐν τῷ καλῷ in the traditional dative of location, completing the sexual imagery. 
Finally, an interpretation of ἔχοντα can find that “the one who has the beautiful” has a 
                                                
67 Myles Burnyeat, “Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration,” in Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates, ed. 
Hugh Benson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 54 
68 Pender, 86.  
69 Dover [Symposium], 147. 
70 Nancy Evans, “Diotima and Demeter as Mystagogues in Plato’s Symposium,” Hypatia 21:2 (Spring 2006): 
15. See also Homer, Iliad, trans. A.T. Murray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924), 2.628, 6.155 
of Phyleus and Glaucus, and 16.180, 22.428 of Polymele and Hecuba. 
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literary history of familial and sexual connotation in the sense of ‘to have as a wife or 
lover’. 71   
At the base level of erôs, Pender finds male expectancy requiring female pregnancy 
and childbirth if a child is to have been created. The first two physical levels of erôs, 
then, result in physical female pregnancy and childbirth following from the physical 
male emission internal to the female counterpart. At the first spiritual level, “those 
pregnant in terms of their souls”,72  Pender asserts the male expectancy issues forth in 
begetting his “soul-seed in philosophy, which takes the place of the beloved in 
intercourse and assumes the female role.”73  This provides a unique reading of “the lover 
will…behold it [θεωρῶν, the beloved74] and give birth in ungrudging philosophy to 
many beautiful speeches”.75  It is at this stage that poems and laws are created, as 
children resulting from the union of the male lover and the female philosophy. As 
support for the role of female pregnancy in intellectual childbirth, Pender cites the well-
known midwife passage in Plato’s Theaetetus.76  Pender accounts for the apparent 
omission of any mention of female pregnancy at this point by attesting that Socrates’ 
male, largely homoerotic audience at the symposium would have had little interest in 
such matters, which would have come across as “out of place”.77  However, Plato’s 
interlocutors in the Theaetetus would be of the same social set, so this explanation 
falters. Finally, on this reading, the lover is together with the Form of beauty. Using a 
parallel passage from the Republic, Pender draws attention to the distinction between 
images of virtue and true virtue as indication of an additional character.  
It is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what is; and he 
does not tarry by each of the many things opined to be but…grasps the 
nature itself of each thing which is…And once near it and coupled with 
what really is, having begotten intelligence and truth, he knows and lives 
truly, is nourished and ceases from his labour pains…78 
                                                
71 Symposium, 206e1. See LSJ, s.v. ἔχω, A.I.4. 
72 Symposium, 209a. 
73 Pender, 81. 
74 Bury, ad loc. 
75 Symposium, 210d.  
76 Theaetetus, 149b-151e; Pender, 79. 
77 Pender, 79. 
78 Republic, 490b. 
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Because at this stage the offspring of the union is not an image of virtue, but true virtue, 
Pender espouses that the change in partner is the cause for the change in the nature of 
the child: the lover must not be begetting spiritual seed at this point because a different 
partner would not result in different spiritual seed. A child must have been created. 
Pender concludes, “As spiritual children are procreated in this passage, then someone or 
something must have given birth to them. If we follow the analogy of physical 
pregnancy and birth, as I feel we must, then this someone or something must be their 
father’s sexual partner, which at this stage is nothing other than the Form of Beauty.”79  
Following the requirement of a female pregnancy and childbirth because of male 
issuance and the begetting of a child, Pender’s interpretation requires a female 
pregnancy, which under these conditions must be that of the Form.  
Of course, this conclusion is incompatible with the description of the Form given 
by Diotima a few lines earlier: it is specifically an unchanging being, one that could not 
become pregnant as a result of the lover’s involvement with it.80  For Pender, this means 
that “the metaphor completely breaks down at this point”, resulting in Plato’s 
avoidance of mentioning the Form’s pregnancy in an attempt to manoeuvre himself out 
of the illogical corner into which Diotima’s speech has steered him.81  Considering, 
however, the conviction with which Pender earlier expressed Plato’s carefulness in 
crafting his metaphors, it is disturbing how easily she allows this apparently illogical 
conclusion to break down the interpretation.82  If Plato really did take such great pains 
to buttress the logical stability and validity of his metaphors, it seems this faulty 
conclusion should be investigated a little further before discarding the possibility that a 
rational account is given by Plato at all in the passage. 
 
 I.c.2. Philosopher loves a beautiful particular, begets in the mind of the beloved 
 
A second view interprets the passage such that it is the lover who is pregnant, 
begetting ideas into the mind of the beautiful beloved. While this seems most plausible 
                                                
79 Pender, 86. 
80 Symposium, 211b. 
81 Pender, 84, 80, 86. 
82 Ibid., 74-75. 
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at the second stage in the ascent, an analysis of this interpretation demonstrates its 
inconsistencies with the text. Neumann espouses the rather ominous thesis that the 
lover’s “knowledge—even of absolute beauty—is a tool for gaining undying fame.”83  
On this view, “the highest type of physical childbirth [is] the generation in others of 
moderation and justice…those intent on begetting these beauties wander around, 
seeking the beautiful in which they can do this.”84  Whilst the first level of erôs involves 
the desire to be relieved of travail in the production of physical children, at the second 
level of childbirth, the lover, in “taking this beauty in hand, he fathers in his (the 
beauty’s) soul the things which have been on his mind for a long time.”85  It is at this 
stage that Neumann finds Diotima culpable of the egoistic trickery of which Popper 
accuses Socrates in the Republic.86  For if all souls desire to give birth—albeit on perhaps 
different levels—would not the lover’s use of the beloved beauty be stifling to the 
younger’s own longing to give birth?87  Following this potential threat with respect to 
Diotima’s sophistic endeavours, “the goal of her love is not the beautiful, but the 
acquisition of happiness by giving birth in or through the beautiful.”88  Support for this 
interpretation is found by Neumann throughout Diotima’s speech. A detailed reading of 
the Penia and Poros encounter reveals that perhaps Erôs got a little of his cunning and 
trickery from his mother as well: Penia took advantage of Poros to attain her ends, and 
to secure for herself the things that she lacked—might Erôs use the beloved in a similar 
fashion?89  Further, Neumann understands Diotima’s intentions in the speech to imply 
that union with the beloved is never the aim of an erotic encounter. Accordingly, 
“Diotima’s erôs does not share the Aristophanic yearning for an ultimate union with its 
object, since that object is attractive solely as a medium in which the lover may give 
birth…Immortal glory is the highest goal of psychical reproduction.”90  The connection 
                                                
83 Neumann, 44. 
84 Ibid., 39, 44, 47. 
85 Ibid., 39.  
86 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 140 ff., 271. 
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between the erôs of the Symposium and that presented in the Republic is further 
tightened by Neumann through his conclusion that Diotima’s erotic educator seeks to 
extirpate this union of lover and beloved outright. By engendering the virtues of an 
empire that bind men together, erôs endeavours to enact a dictatorship under the guise 
of civic virtue and communal self-interest. Drawing the citizens under his influence 
together in this way encourages the beloveds to seek the common good rather than 
their own—that good which might distract their attention and remove them as a 
possible vehicle for the lover’s own aims.91  This second reading of the text concludes 
with the realisation that Diotima’s speech merely feigned interest in understanding of 
the Forms as espoused, perhaps more innocently, in other Platonic texts, but was truly 
an encomium to the nefarious and tyrannical erôs of the Republic, “the lover’s arrogant 
conviction that the whole external universe is to be employed solely as a means to his 
own happiness.”92  Of course, if this insight into his nature is true, Erôs has indeed 
acquired quite a bit of fame for his handiwork. 
The argument that the erôs of Socrates’ speech culminates in “begetting in a 
beautiful medium”, is also Dover’s position,93  and both he and Neumann come to 
similar conclusions. At 206c5, Dover supports the use of the dative definite article 
found in the medieval manuscripts, but not the papyrus. He asserts, “It is not 
uncommon for the article to be absent from the first member of a pair of nouns but 
present with the second; cf. Arist. Poetics, 1449a1.”94  This common understanding 
serves Dover’s concession that one can at once read the passage as “giving birth in the 
many beautiful mediums” as well as “in beauty”.95  He uses this in order to make a 
smooth transition to the final stage in begetting in beauty in the abstract. This must not 
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be seen as an endorsement of Pender’s view of begetting as impregnating the Form. 
While both Dover and Pender acknowledge male emission as a type of expectancy, 
Dover avoids Pender’s conclusion that male expectancy “would not, on its own, result 
in the birth of a child.”96  The notion of erôs as being the driving force to impel lovers 
into begetting in the minds of beautiful beloveds their own offspring yields similar, 
negative conclusions for Dover as it does for Neumann. The latter asserts,  
One can only conclude that this passive role [of the beloved] is not 
natural…In order to gain undying glory by fathering the moral virtues of 
a civilization, Diotima’s educator must do violence to the naturally 
pregnant, making them forget what she regards as their deepest desire. 
Her concept of physical reproduction is little more than indoctrination, 
however beautiful the rhetoric employed to describe it.97   
 
This rhetoric would indeed be seen to be beautiful to those seeking to take advantage 
of a beloved: it is rhetoric that encourages unsuspecting young men voluntarily to 
submit to being used in this way. An assertion reached by both is the complaint dividing 
Platonic erôs from, among other things, Christian agape, and love more generally 
experienced and accepted in our post-Kantian society: that it does not love the 
beautiful bodies and beautiful particulars “for themselves”.98  Dover twice mentions 
Plato’s “having parted company with love” when Diotima reaches the higher mysteries, 
wherein (apparently acceptable) love for the beloved is “decisively rejected”.99  Dover 
views this as symptomatic of Plato’s endeavours more generally, introducing the 
dialogue with the biting reproof: “Plato writes not as a scholar or scientist but from first 
to last as an advocate, an heir to the tradition of didactic poetry, a nursling of Attic 
drama and a product, no less than the politicians and litigants which he criticised so 
ardently, of a culture which admired the art of the persuader.”100  Upon reaching the 
higher mysteries of erôs, Dover finds Diotima to have disassociated herself entirely from 
compassionate, human love, and spoken purely as an opportunist, careful not to betray 
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her lack of experience—and potential disbelief—in the sentiments she so enticingly 
advocates.101  
This reading of the ascent passage as stifling indoctrination, however, overlooks 
three aspects of the intentions of erôs, which, I argue, indicate that exploitation of the 
beloved for personal gain is not its aim. First, I question whether it is really immortal 
fame for which erôs strives. Neumann, following Wilamowitz, faults Diotima’s 
“Ruhmbegierde”,102  yet while it is true that Diotima concedes that what the lovers at 
the lowest level want is “an immortal remembrance of their virtue”,103  this facet of 
desire is perhaps only symptomatic of the lower mysteries. By the second level of erôs, 
fame is only part of the equation, as that with which offspring might supply their 
progenitors, even incidentally, and not what prompted their engendering in the first 
place.104  It is completely absent in the higher mysteries of the ascent passage. Just as 
lower level erôs is confused about the means to its end, these lovers of bodies might also 
misunderstand the nature of their strivings. Their believing beautiful bodies are the key 
to immortality resembles the sight-lovers of the Republic, who confuse particular 
instances of beauty and justice for the Forms.105  Rowe takes issue with the fame 
accusation as well, asserting: “The claim that (literally) everyone does (literally) 
everything for the sake of fame and reputation sounds not just un-Socratic, and un-
Platonic, but plainly false.”106  Taking the lemma at 208e1 as an explanative 
qualification to Diotima’s claim starting in 208d7, one can understand that the reason 
those at the lower mysteries seek out fame and a good reputation is because they 
believe it to be, in fact, good: they do it for the sake of the good, “because they love the 
immortal” (208e1). Diotima leaves room for such a concession. “Those who are 
pregnant in terms of their bodies…turn to women and are erotic in this way, furnishing 
for themselves through the procreation of children immortality, remembrance, and 
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happiness (as they believe) for all future time.”107  They may think fame is the way to go, 
but as it plays no part whatsoever in the higher mysteries, they are likely incorrect 
about this too. For those pregnant of soul, true virtue is a much greater testament to 
the Form than fame, as it is what “is [most] appropriate for the soul to conceive and 
bear”,108  as Diotima asserts. 
Second, at the highest level of erôs, it is not merely the generation of famous laws or 
scores of students that promises immortality for the lover of wisdom, but the 
θρεψαμένῳ of this engendering as well. This term, which encompasses nurturing, 
nourishing, and rearing up to be noble, fits in very clearly with the first kind of 
begetting: the feeding, instructing, and protecting of human children. With the second 
type of begetting, it is reasonably clear: making poems more beautiful and compelling, 
and laws more fitting and effective. But the third level of psychical progeny is more 
difficult: what does it mean to nurture true virtue? If it is in herself, this would possibly 
include defending one’s virtue against those who would want to corrupt her, and 
practicing virtue so it becomes stronger and more natural, through habituation. It 
might be objected at this point that if what the lover at the highest mysteries engenders 
is actually true, unqualified virtue, then it cannot be corrupted nor improved. Still, 
θρεψαμένῳ can also be translated as “cherish” in this context,109  which incorporates 
not just the nurturing of virtue, but attaching importance to it. This would be 
comparable to Socrates’ descriptions of the lovers of wisdom in the Republic whose 
thought not only comprehends the Form, but “delights” in it as well.110   
Third, the process does not have to be stifling to the beloved. If one follows the 
ἐραστής/ἐρώμενος motif in the dialogue—the pederastic-educational relationship of 
older male to adolescent boy—with its prevalence in ancient Greek culture, it is clear 
that the mutual relationship is based upon the instruction the younger gets from the 
older: their time will come later.111  Burnyeat expounds on this idea, asserting, “The 
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great lover in the spiritual sense is Socrates himself, as we learn from Alcibiades’ speech 
in his praise. It is Socrates whose talk with the young is rich with images of virtue 
(222a) and productive of improving effects (216b-217a), he therefore who is most 
fruitfully pregnant… [with] improving discourses.”112  Those keen to identify role-
reversals in the dialogue will enjoy the fact that the female Diotima has apparently 
taken the role of ἐραστής to a younger Socrates’ ἐρώμενος. As he asserts at the end of 
his recounting of Diotima’s discourse on love, Socrates has trained himself up to an 
exceptional level in these matters since then: he has perhaps not yet come to the final 
understanding, but is clearly encouraging others on the endeavour now.  
 
 I.c.3. Philosopher loves a beautiful beloved, begets virtue in herself 
 
Edmonds offers a third reading of the roles played in the Symposium. Rather than 
viewing the beloved as the receptacle in which the virtue engendered by the lover will 
take form, Edmonds’ interpretation posits, “the entire process of procreation takes 
place within the lover: arousal, begetting, pregnancy, and parturition.”113  The lover is 
naturally pregnant, and is able to give birth under the care of the beautiful beloved who 
acts as midwife to her deliverance. Accordingly, “the lover does not beget his offspring 
upon the beloved, who then gives birth to them. It is the lover himself, already pregnant 
by virtue of his stage in life, who gives birth with the assistance of the beloved.”114  
Taking hints from the role Socrates plays in the dialogue with respect to Alcibiades, 
Edmonds asserts that contrary to his resemblance to the portrayals of erôs offered, 
Socrates in fact acts as the beautiful beloved. Socrates’ avowal of his encouragement to 
the pursuit of, and training in, erotics at the conclusion of his speech identifies his place 
as assistant to the birth of the philosophic lovers’ offspring.115   
Departing strongly from Neumann and Dover’s characterisation of erôs as paradigm 
of selfish indoctrination, the argument of this interpretation is that Socrates’ company 
with the young lovers “serves as a stimulus for these youths to bring forth their own 
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ideas…relieving them of the pains of their spiritual pregnancy and helping them actively 
pursue philosophy.”116  With beauty in the role of the midwife, this reading would lead 
to the conclusion that, ultimately, the Form serves as midwife. This concession is tacitly 
supported by Price, and gains strength from the poetic crowning of beauty as the 
goddess of childbirth and midwifery at 206d.117  An interesting turn in this reading is 
that, in the course of the dialogue, “Socrates is both the lover and the beloved, both the 
seeker of true philosophic beauty and the embodiment of it. Not only does he seek 
beauty in Alcibiades, but he possesses the beauty sought by Alcibiades.”118  That a 
person could be both lover and beloved at different times in her life is not unusual. 
Alcibiades himself asserts his enamoured frustration with Socrates’ appearing to him a 
devoted lover and pursuer and, at the same time, the coy and beautiful object of 
affection. That Plato depicts Socrates—the expert in erotics and very image of erôs—as 
balancing both roles is also indicative of the dual nature of the daimon.  
 
 I.c.4. Philosopher inspired by beauty, begets virtue in the world and in the soul 
 
While the readings of beauty as begetter, of lover as begetting into the minds of the 
beloved, and of lover as begetter engendering and nurturing virtue in herself each 
illuminate certain aspects of Plato’s discussion of erôs in the Symposium, none present 
an entirely unproblematic depiction of the encounter. If it is “only in the contemplation 
of beauty that human life is worth living” and that it is at this point, in beholding the 
beautiful that it lies within the lover to come nearest a mortal can to the unchanging 
nature of the immortal, then one must consider what the engendering and cherishing of 
true virtue would be.119  A fourth possible reading of the ascent passage agrees with 
Neumann and Dover in identifying the lover as begetter, who is together with the 
beloved beauty, and begets virtue. However, instead of finding the engendered offspring 
in the minds of the beloved, the erôs most in accordance with wisdom would engender 
true excellence in the first instance within herself, but of likely benefit to others in her 
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circle of influence nevertheless. While in the earlier stages of erôs, the joint nature of 
the action was a manifest aspect of the relation—both the younger beloved and the 
older lover found pleasure and satisfaction in learning about the beauty of the sciences. 
In the final stage, however, the beloved no longer aids in beholding some other, external 
beauty: the beloved is the Form, and the method is beholding it. Yet the goal is not to 
stop there, but rather to bring to birth in the lover’s soul. The notion of nurturing 
“together” (συνεκτρέφει) with the beloved from 209c is dropped, and θρεψαμένῳ of 
the offspring is the sole responsibility of the lover. This reading is supported by 
O’Brien, who argues, 
[T]he friendship of the gods comes to one who begets true virtue, and 
elsewhere in Plato this friendship is a consequence of one’s own virtue. 
… [Euthyphro 11a, Republic 612e, 621c]. If these parallels have any 
force, the phrase τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ refers primarily to the 
philosopher’s own virtue and not primarily (let alone exclusively) to the 
results of his good influence upon others.120   
 
Rowe also takes note of this development regarding the absence of the particular 
beloved in the higher mysteries, although he does not hold the Form to be the beloved. 
Once the lover has come to an appreciation of beauty through beautiful bodies, and has 
now embarked on her ascent, there has been a switch: “since then, the source of beauty 
has all along been the things ‘contemplated’…and it is these things to which the lover’s 
attention has been directed, for the sake of the ‘offspring’ that they enable [her] to 
produce.”121  This offspring is the quality of true virtue within the lover, and comes to 
shape her actions and being, as she cherishes and nurtures this development. Now, 
Socrates concludes, erôs is the best guide for mortal lovers in their inheritance. This 
interpretation leads also to the conclusion that the Form, the author and cause of the 
particular beloveds’ beauty, was the object of contemplation in the lower mysteries as 
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well—although perhaps unknown to those lovers so contemplating. Support is lent to 
this conclusion by the fact that Plato is explicit in stating that it is the beloved’s beauty 
she finds attractive from at least the psychical level in the ascent: she “must believe that 
the beauty in souls is more honourable than that in the body…may be compelled to 
behold the beauty in pursuits and laws…may see the beauty that belongs to sciences.”122  
What exactly it is that the lover loves when she beholds a beloved will be examined 
more closely in the following section, yet it is evident at this point that Plato intends 
for the lover to have erôs regarding a beautiful beloved, and engender offspring of virtue 
in the sensible world and, in the best cases, in herself.  
 
 
 II. ERÔS IS DISTINCTLY COGNITIVE 
 
Soble’s description of the structure, rationality, and morality of love within the erôs 
tradition provides possible insight into the relationship of the cognitive activity of love 
and the attraction to beauty and beautiful particulars. He asserts: 
When x loves y, this can be explained as the result of y’s having, or x’s 
perceiving that y has, some set S of attractive, admirable, or valuable 
properties…These properties of y are the basis or ground of x’s love and 
hence, in the [erôs] view, something about the object of one’s personal 
love is a crucial part of the explanatory source of love.123  
 
According to Soble, erôs is thus “property-based” and “reason-dependent”;124  it is 
based upon the property or properties of the beloved, and one can state as a reason for 
why she loves the beloved the existence or perceived existence of the property in the 
beloved. It is therefore the (perceived) merit of the beloved that functions as both the 
cause and explanation of love.125  Soble further proposes the distinction between object-
centric love, and subject-centric love. In the former, the grounding of love is in the 
objective qualities of the beloved, that is, “those that are y’s independently of y’s being 
evaluated by anyone, that are in some sense inherent in y, and whose presence in y is 
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publicly and empirically verifiable”;126  whereas in the latter, love is grounded in the 
appreciation of subjective properties, “those that are not inherent in y because their 
existence depends altogether on an evaluation by the perceiver.”127   
Although Soble does not make the comparison in his text, this framework is useful 
in determining the cognitive function of the erôs of the Symposium. Platonic erôs is 
meant to be object-centric: the lover loves the beloved because of the beauty she 
perceives the beloved possesses. Diotima declares, “So it is beautiful bodies rather than 
ugly ones to which he cleaves because he is pregnant; and if he finds a beautiful, 
generous, and naturally gifted soul, he cleaves strongly to the two (body and soul) 
together.”128  Now, in order for the lover to perceive that the beloved has beauty, the 
lover must be able to, at least in some small way, recognise beauty. She must be able to 
understand the beauty of particulars, even if she at this point will not understand their 
relation to the Forms. What is clear from the text is that one loves a beautiful boy 
because of his beautiful properties, as Soble would agree, which, if the lover is correct in 
identifying them in the beloved,129  are there because of the Form of beauty. The beauty 
of particulars is grounded in the Form of beauty, which functions as its cause. The 
beauty of the boy does not depend on the lover loving him, or believing him beautiful, 
but rather, it depends on the boy actually having beauty, which in turn depends on the 
Form. Love therefore depends on the Form, coupled with an at least initial recognition 
of the Form. Soble’s delineation of the cognitive process as it relates to encountering 
beauty in the sensible realm can thus provide a valuable method of understanding 
attraction to the beautiful as a deliberative function of love. 
The human erôs of the Symposium can further be understood to be distinctly 
cognitive when one considers its role in persuading others to a certain form of life, the 
philosophic life of the mind. This persuasion is not unique to the Symposium, but of 
course plays a role in many of the Platonic dialogues, notably the Apology. In the 
Apology, Socrates presents his famed knowledge of ignorance: “For neither of us really 
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knows anything beautiful or good, but this man thinks he knows something when he 
does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, 
to be wiser than this man in just this little thing: that what I do not know, I do not 
even think I know.”130  In the Symposium, he boasts of his exceptional knowledge of erôs 
and its ways: “I claim to have expert knowledge of nothing but erotics.”131  The 
connection between these two is more than superficial, and does not express the 
contradiction found by a number of commentators.132  As presented in Diotima’s 
speech, Erôs is characterised by a lack, and is cognisant of this lack: he has knowledge 
of his own ignorance. Socrates’ knowledge of (his) erôs is knowledge of a lack, and the 
solution presented by Diotima is training in speeches regarding the beautiful with the 
aim of attaining that highest and most beautiful type of knowledge, the grasping of 
which becomes the best life imaginable. The exhortations to knowledge found in both 
dialogues then, culminate in an exhortation to what could be termed a ‘lifestyle choice’ 
that most makes life “worth living”.133  As Bloom states, “Eroticism gives a more inward 
expression of what is so unsatisfactorily explained in the Apology, the turning of the lack 
into a quest.”134  A look at this life conveys to the reader its cognitive force. 
Nehamas defines Platonic love as a belief about the object that one’s life “would be 
better if that object were a part of it”.135  The beauty in sensible objects, he asserts, 
constantly beckons one forward to get to know it more intimately. It is sometimes 
difficult to tell, however, in what way an attachment to the object will affect her. It is 
for this reason that the lover is led to study and come to know the object, so as to 
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know whether time spent with it will leave her better or worse. Nehamas then presents 
a compelling view regarding the interrelation of all beautiful particulars and their union 
with the philosophic life. As one becomes attracted to a beautiful particular, and 
pursues it with natural curiosity to learn more about it—‘What are its ways? Its 
divisions? Where did it come from and how does it move?’136 —she will find herself 
pursuing other beautiful particulars in ever-expanding circles of beauty. As one is 
beckoned forward by beauty to come to know one work or object, she will find she 
must learn about another, its context, its language, its history, and other similar 
beauties. Nehamas asserts,  
To love something is always in part to try to understand what makes it 
beautiful, what drew me—and, as long as I love it—continues to draw 
me toward it. To understand what it is and to see how it will affect me 
and to see what it will be able to give me. The more I try to understand 
a particular object, the more I need to learn about the world in general. 
The deep and the broad are just facets of one another.137   
 
Speaking of his high regard and love for Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, Nehamas 
gives an example of how far exactly one beauty may take its lover in the pursuit of 
knowledge about it, a description worth quoting in full as it impresses upon the reader 
the interpersonal elements this account of love holds essential: 
…I need to learn more about Proust generally, more about the social, 
cultural, and political situation in Paris between the end of the 19th-
century and the beginning of the 20th; I need to improve my French, to 
understand more about the Dreyfus affair, about anti-Semitism, and 
homosexuality; I need to understand more about the history of the 
French novel, and the history of the novel more generally; I need to look 
at Vermeer, with whom Proust is very taken; I need to listen to 
Debussy’s music…It requires travelling, it requires meeting new people, 
it requires literally taking a different path through life, a path different 
than I would have taken had I not been interested and attracted in that 
particular way. It requires spending a part of my life in ways I would not 
even have imagined without having been led to them by Proust.138  
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Indeed, falling in love is a risky business. When Diotima referred to “the greatest, all-
beguiling, and treacherous erôs”,139  her assessment was not far from the truth. Being 
never at any point completely wise, the lover of beautiful particulars takes a risk every 
time she devotes part of her life to learning deeply about a beloved: she does not know 
where it will take her, and whether, in the end, she will come out having been shaped 
for the worse or the better. It is this vulnerability to the beloved, and willingness to 
change for it, which, I argue in following Nehamas, brings in a distinctly human element 
to Platonic erôs that absolutely identifies it with love of individuals. The extent of that 
debate, however, will take place in the final section of this chapter.  
The ascent passage depicts exactly such a progression of love and knowledge, in 
which “the contemplation of the whole is simply a perfection of the original erotic 
attraction to a single person.”140  The lover makes her first foray into the erotic 
mysteries with the love of a single beautiful youth. This love is not at this point 
diminished in loving another beauty, but rather the lover finds in both something that is 
there to love—a common beauty between the two. At this point, she realises that “the 
beauty that is in any body whatsoever is related (ἀδελφός) to that in another body.”141  
The connection here is familial, the two beauties, literally, “sons of the same 
mother.”142  From two she sees the beauty in many and indeed in all beautiful 
particulars as one and the same, and with further pursuit her eyes are eventually opened 
to the “vast open sea of the beautiful”,143  which she pursues with the initial, youthful 
passion, now seasoned and matured to a higher level of understanding. It is in this way 
that the statement ‘This is beautiful’ is not a conclusion, but a commitment to coming 
to learn about those beautiful things of which one would say, ‘A city that has these at 
its centre is one of which I would want to be a part.’ The role of erôs in human 
cognition is in this way tied to its role in human morality, through an attraction to and 
desire to attain the best life.  
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There remains, however, the question of why. Why does Socrates insist the 
philosophic life—a life defined by constant, Tantalean-like searching—is the only life 
worth living? The received view of the Symposium holds that man’s only interaction 
with the Forms is a rational endeavour: understanding. Yet, as Plato explains at length 
in the Symposium, the appropriate response to a beautiful beloved is to behold it and 
give birth in beauty. “But why,” Dover asks, “does anyone embark on the road whose 
ultimate destination is the fusion of reason and desire in knowledge of the good? In the 
Symposium, Plato offers an account of the operative force, an ingredient in the structure 
of the universe, which propels us on that road. That force is erôs.”144  It is erôs that 
drives the lover on the way of the philosophic life, erôs with his place as a follower after 
beauty, who enjoins her to pursue the beautiful wherever she can find it, and who uses 
this attraction to lead the lover on upwards to the more mature beauties and at last to 
know the Form of beauty itself. Working from his incompleteness and lack, erôs sets 
about through cognitive pursuits to seek the beautiful, in part for its use in bringing to 
birth the natural travail of the soul.  
Yet there remains the vital and “mysterious”145  question of how man became 
pregnant in the first place. Diotima asserts vaguely that all men conceive and at some 
point their nature desires to give birth.146  At the conclusion of his speech, Socrates also 
mentions this desire is embedded in man’s “nature”.147  Is this just a given fact about the 
world for Plato? Possibly. Yet this natural travail is so central to the whole message of 
Diotima’s speech that it seems a bizarre detail to be left unexplained. The answer, 
perhaps, can be found with another question left vague: If Erôs is the one in the service 
of beauty, who lacks and desires after it, why does not Erôs just go about pursuing it on 
his own? What has man to do with the interests of a daimon? The solution lies just a 
few pages earlier, when Diotima explains the power and purpose of the daimon class:  
Interpreting and ferrying to gods things from human beings and to 
human beings things from gods: the requests and sacrifices of human 
                                                
144 Dover [Symposium], 8. 
145 Burnyeat, 55. See also Neumann, 39. 
146 Symposium, 206c.  
147 Ibid., 212b. 
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beings, and the orders and exchanges-for-sacrifices of gods; for it is in 
the middle of both and fills up the interval so that the whole itself has 
been bound together by it. Through this proceeds all divination…and 
initiatory rituals…and magic. For a god does not mingle with a human 
being; but through this occurs the whole intercourse and conversation 
of gods with human beings.148  
 
Erôs fills a fundamental gap in the teleological structure of the world, the connection 
between mortals and immortals, through his ferrying of entreaties and orders between 
the two. Erôs attends to mortals when laden with the orders of the gods. Man receives 
his natural travail as such a divine order, exactly as Socrates describes his Delphic 
decree in the Apology: the command to know.149   
In his essay, “On the God of Socrates”—a commentary on the Symposium—
Apuleius paints a portrait of the daimon class. The daimons are like the clouds, in 
composition, “a mixture of both” earthly and heavenly, seen by some and not by others, 
given the refraction of brightness, and which, “if they are teeming with the moisture of 
water, they are depressed downward, as though for the purpose of bringing forth.”150  It 
is for this reason that Socrates asserts at the very end of his speech, that for the 
inheritance of immortality through creation of new beauty, “man could get no better 
helper in this endeavour than Erôs.”151  Erôs has an orientation to reality. The lack we 
acknowledge and experience navigates and binds together the two realms of the visible 
and the intelligible. On a definition of knowledge as understanding the difference 
between particulars and Forms, and not confusing the two, love in the Symposium is 
distinctly cognitive in that the contemplation of the whole of beauty itself is a result of 
the original erotic attachments one has to any and all beloved beauties—however dimly 




                                                
148 Symposium, 202e-203a. 
149 Apology, 28e. 
150 Apuleius, On the God of Socrates, in The Works of Apuleius, trans. Hudson Gurney (London: Bell & Daldy, 
1866), 350-373, 359. 
151 Symposium, 212b. 
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 III. OBJECTS AND AIMS OF ERÔS 
 
 III.a. Love is not of beauty, but of bringing to birth in beauty 
 
It will be remembered that the framing characteristic of erôs that Socrates sought to 
convey at the outset of his speech is that love is “of something”.152  Plato’s focus on the 
object reveals the complex relational quality essential to love. For love to have an object 
is simply part of its grounding logic, and the identification of this object is thus 
fundamental to any attempt to define love. It is commonly claimed that the object of 
love, in the Symposium, is beauty.153  I argue, however, that a close look at the Greek 
text demonstrates that beauty is decidedly not the object of love. The role of the 
accusative case throughout Socrates’ treatment of erôs is significant, yet has been all but 
ignored in the literature.154  Plato refers to love being “in relation to beauty” four 
distinct times in Socrates’ speech, and each time uses the accusative “περὶ τὸ καλόν” 
                                                
152 Symposium, 200a. Socrates’ question to Agathon on this point is reminiscent of his similar discussion 
with Menexenus at Lysis 218d regarding whether a friend is the friend of someone or not. 
153 See, generally, F.C. White’s survey, “According to many scholars, the central theme…is that the primary or 
ultimate object of love is the Form of Beauty. Thus among such scholars Beauty is variously described as: 
love’s primary object (Irwin); its final object (Cornford); its final goal (Grube); its final ‘why’ (Morgan); its 
ultimate objective (Raven); its ultimate object (Teloh); its ultimate goal (Grube). Or it is described more simply 
as the object of love (Hamilton); as the goal of Eros (Bury)…and so on”, “Love and Beauty in Plato’s 
Symposium” [“Love”], Journal of Hellenic Studies, cix (1989): 151. See also Obdrzalek, 416, 440; Nehamas 
[“Beauty”], 123; Lloyd Gerson, “A Platonic Reading of Plato’s Symposium,” in Plato’s Symposium: Issues in 
Interpretation and Reception, eds. James H. Lesher, Debra Nails, and Frisbee Sheffield (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 48, 64, 65; Edmonds, 266, 268-269; Michael Gagarin, “Socrates’ Hubris 
and Alcibiades’ Failure,” Phoenix 31 (1997): 33, 27; Pender, 72, 77-78, 82, 85, 86; Richard Patterson, “The 
Ascent in Plato’s Symposium,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy VII, ed. John J. 
Cleary (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 198, 207; Halperin, “Platonic Erôs and What 
Men Call Love” [“Platonic Erôs”], Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985): 180; Halperin, “Plato and the metaphysics of 
desire” [“Plato”], Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Philosophy V, eds. John Cleary and Daniel 
Shartin (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 34; and Kyung-Choon Chang, “Plato’s Form of 
the Beautiful in the Symposium versus Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover in the Metaphysics (Λ),” Classical Quarterly 
52:2 (2002): 433, 439.  Notable exceptions include Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, “The Historicity of 
Psychological Attitudes,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy X (1986): 407, who claims it is “the Beautiful 
Good”; and Neumann, 42-47; White, “Virtue in Plato’s Symposium” [“Virtue”], The Classical Quarterly New 
Series, 54:2 (2004): 369-375; Rowe [Plato], 184 ad loc. 206e2-3, 206e5; and Vlastos, “The individual as an 
object of love in Plato” [“Individual”], in Platonic Studies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 
20-22, who argue that the object of love is not beauty but the possession of the good.  
154 To my knowledge the only commentators to identify this distinction are White [“Love”], 153; and Rowe 
[Plato], 176 ad loc. 203c4; see also Rowe [“Socrates and Diotima”], 248, esp. n. 21. Both, however, follow the 
received view that the object of erôs is “some kind of permanent possession of the good” (Rowe [Plato], 184 
ad loc. 206e2-3, 206e5), despite Diotima’s hesitancy in using the genitive with the good at 207a1, and 
despite the fact that the Form of the good is never mentioned in the Symposium.  
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rather than the unambiguously genitive “τῶν καλῶν” expected for the English 
translation “of the beautiful”.155  The proposition at 204d3 that “love is of beautiful 
things” is, as Rowe notes, qualified by her use of “ὡς σὺ φῄς.”156  Taken in the context 
of Diotima’s direct reference back to 201e5 at 204d3, “for I came pretty near, in 
speaking to her, to saying the same sort of thing that Agathon said to me now—that 
Erôs was a great god, and was the love of beautiful things (εἴη δὲ τῶν καλῶν)”, it is 
clear that the genitive there employed was for the purpose of detailing Socrates’ earlier 
mistaken opinion.  
As Diotima never says the object of love is beauty, and as both Agathon and the 
younger Socrates are reprimanded for claiming it is, the case for beauty as the object of 
love appears to be growing thin. In fact, Diotima states quite plainly: 
For erôs is not, Socrates, of the beautiful, as you believe. […] It is of 
engendering and bringing to birth in beauty.157  
 
Diotima’s insistence that there is a distinction between what love is “of” (its object), 
and what love is “in relation to” (what beckons or inspires), coupled with Plato’s care 
in emphasising this distinction in the text grammatically, signals that he is forging new 
territory here and proposing a definition of love quite different to that held by his 
contemporaries.158  An examination of the objects and aims of erôs will provide valuable 





                                                
155 Symposium, 203c4, 204b3, 206e1, 209b. 
156 Rowe [Plato], 176. 
157 Symposium, 206e. 
158 Ivo Bruns, “Attische Liebestheorien und die zeitliche Folge des platonischen Phaidros sowie der beiden 
Symposien,” Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und deutsche Literatur und für Pädagogik 5 
(1900): 22-24; G.M.A. Grube, Plato’s Thought (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1935), 115; 
R.A. Markus, “Dialectic of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” in Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, vol. II, ed. 
Gregory Vlastos (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 137, 141-142; Neumann, 46; 
Vlastos [“Individual”], 20-22; Philip W. Cummings, “Eros as procreation in beauty,” Apeiron 10:2 (1976): 
23-28; Nussbaum, “Commentary on Halperin [“Plato”],” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy V, eds. John Cleary and Daniel Shartin (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1989), 57-60; Rowe [Plato], 176. 
WARE CHAPTER III: ERÔS IN THE SYMPOSIUM 104 
 
  
 III.b. No shifting goalposts: Socrates presents a consistent object of erôs 
 
The starting point for this examination is the distinction in species drawn by Santas 
between what he calls “generic erôs” and “specific erôs” or “erôs proper”, according to 
which the former holds as its object the good, and the latter, the beautiful. Referencing 
Diotima’s controversial substitution of the good for the beautiful at 204d-205a6, 
Santas asserts: 
We can understand Diotima’s questions by drawing a distinction 
between the object and the aim of erôs, parallel to the distinction Freud 
draws between the object and the aim of the sexual instinct: the object 
is that from which the attraction emanates or which the lover finds 
attractive; the aim is that towards which the instinct of erôs strives. 
Diotima gives the object in her questions, the beautiful in the first case, 
the good in the second, and she asks for the aim.159   
 
In the case of generic erôs, the object is the good and its aim is possession of that 
good.160  Santas develops this theory from Diotima’s ποίησις interlude at 205b-d where 
she explains that whilst all makers (ποιητής) could be called poets, only those specific 
makers of lyrics and rhythms get the name of the whole. In the case of specific erôs, “it 
is the beautiful rather than the good that is the attracting object; and unlike the former 
case where possession of the good was the aim, here the aim is not to possess the 
beautiful but to generate offspring on it.”161  On this reading, erôs proper is taken to be 
a sub-species of generic erôs, with the egoistic desire for begetting beauty functioning as 
the means by which desirable immortality and, presumably, happiness can be gained—
the aim of generic erôs. Santas asserts that Diotima “consistently argues that this desire 
for immortality is the cause (aition) of the desire to beget offspring on a beautiful 
object…Erôs proper is the desire for begetting offspring on a beautiful object by means 
of a body or soul for the sake of the lover’s own immortality.”162  
This is in line with Santas’ influential theory of intentional versus actual objects of 
desire, according to which the intentional object of desire is that which one truly wants 
                                                
159 Santas [Plato], 31. 
160 Santas, “Plato’s Theory of Eros in the Symposium” [“Plato’s Theory”], Noûs 13:1 (1979): 70. 
161 Santas [Plato], 35. See also Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 72.  
162 Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 71-72. My italics. 
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and the actual object of desire is that towards which she is currently aiming. His oft-
cited example consists of someone wanting the pepper pot but mistaking for it the salt 
pot. On Santas’ reading of desire, the intentional object is the truly-desired pepper and 
the actual object is the salt pot for which she, in her confusion, reaches. Santas explains, 
“The intentional object of generic eros is the good rather than the beautiful”.163  This 
distinction, however, is not necessary in the Symposium: Plato has already made it clear, 
through his genitive-accusative delineation, which would likely have been more obvious 
to his ancient Greek readers, that the object of love (what it is “of”) is “bringing to 
birth in beauty.”164  The intentional object of Platonic erôs is generation. It is also clear 
from the text that the many beautiful beloveds—and, as their cause, the Form of 
beauty—can be considered “the attracting object” as Santas and several other scholars 
would have it,165  in the sense that it is what attracts and the lover is drawn to it. But 
love’s aim and object are—at least in the Symposium—one and the same thing: bringing 
to birth in beauty. On this reading, the object of erôs is never the Form of the beautiful, 
in the grammatical sense of the direct object, nor Santas’ intended object.166  It is 
possible Diotima would allow the beautiful beloved or the Form of beauty to fill the 
role of Santas’ actual object: but, as in his example, only if the lover is mistaken about 
what it is she truly wants! This mistaking beauty for the object of love is, I take it, what 
is at fault with the lovers of bodies at 208e (note Diotima’s veiled derision in “ὡς 
οἴονται”), who commit the same error as the Republic’s sight-lovers.167  Perhaps as well 
do Aristophanes’ lovers who, in sex, “each plainly want something else. What it is, it is 
incapable of saying” until what they really want—absolute, and not merely physical 
union—is offered as an option.168   
                                                
163 Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 71. 
164 Symposium, 206e5. 
165 Santas [Plato], 31, 35; cf. Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 72; Halperin [“Platonic Erôs”], 178; Neumann, 42-44; 
White [“Love”], 152-155, [“Virtue”], 369-375. 
166 This can, perhaps, speak to the confusion noted by Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 72. 
167 Republic, 475d-476d. 
168 Symposium, 192c-e. Whether union with each other is, in the end, the object of erôs, will be examined in 
the following chapter. 
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The confusion surrounding the object of erôs in the Symposium, and the associated 
oversight regarding the understanding of the English prepositions employed in 
translation, can perhaps be attributed to the same sort of confusion exhibited by these 
lovers in the lower mysteries of erôs (and knowledge) who mistake particulars for the 
Forms. This confusion has led to a trend in the literature to refer to a “shift” in the 
object of love or a “demotion” of the Form of beauty identified at one stage or another 
in the ascent.169  Obdrzalek, for example, argues:  
Plato is quite clear that there is a shift in the object of erôs, and that the 
object of erôs, in the ascent, is beauty. Diotima states at 206e2-5 that 
erôs is not of beauty, but of birth in beauty, then claims at 207a3-4, 
208b5-6, and 208e1 that erôs is of immortality. However, as I have 
emphasised, in the ascent, it is the vision of Beauty at which the lover’s 
erôs aims. When the Form is first introduced, it is described as the telos 
of the erotika (210e3-5) and that hou heneken all the earlier toils were 
(210e5-7).170  
 
Obdrzalek identifies in this shift “the problem of unity […] the fact that Plato does not 
appear to offer a consistent object of erôs”, and then goes on to argue that “this shifting 
in the objects of erôs is actually part of Diotima’s explanatory strategy.”171  According to 
this strategy, Socrates initially perceives the correct object (beauty) then goes through 
three other potential objects of erôs—the eternal possession of the good, giving birth in 
beauty in terms of the body and soul, and finally immortality—but then in the end 
“Diotima reveals to him that the proper object of erôs was beauty all along, but that 
the appropriate relation to it is one of selfless contemplation.”172  Obdrzalek views this 
as a way around the problem of unity, noting that any interpretation that does not 
identify a shift in the object of love will require an explanation as to how Plato means 
                                                
169 See Obdrzalek, 430; G.R.F. Ferrari, “Moral Fecundity: A discussion of A.W. Price, Love and Friendship in 
Plato and Aristotle”, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 9 (1991): 180-181; Halperin [“Platonic Erôs”], 
176-182; Osborne, 102-103; Bury, xlvi; Guido Calogero, Il Simposio, 2nd ed. (Bari: G. Laterza, 1946), 52-53; 
Rosen, 240-241, 262, 273; Chang, 434; and Vlastos [“Individual”], 20. But see White [“Virtue”], 369, n. 16. 
Diotima has not shifted anything: she is teaching Socrates and correcting his (and Agathon’s) false idea.  
170 Obdrzalek, 440. 
171 Ibid., 439. 
172 Ibid., 437, 439. 
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to explain setting as the goal of all love an eternal possession no lover can never 
accomplish.  
This “problem of satisfaction”173  will be addressed in Chapter 4, §V, however it is 
important to note a number of issues that arise in interpreting Plato as shifting his 
goalposts when it comes to the object of erôs. The first problem is literary: it is well-
established that Plato, especially in the ‘Socratic’ dialogues, often employs the 
technique of having his interlocutors go through a number of possible definitions before 
they reach a conclusion (or aporia). However, in these cases, the rejected definitions are 
clearly dismissed—no such dismissal occurs in the treatment of the supposed object(s) 
of love in the Symposium: the dialogue flows naturally and these ‘conflicting’ objects are 
interspersed in a developmental fashion, as opposed to the expected suggestion-
rejection method employed in other dialogues. The second problem is philosophical: 
Diotima’s description of beauty as “that very thing for whose sake alone all the prior 
labours were undertaken”174  is not at all the same thing as asserting beauty is the direct 
object of love. When I have a sip of tea, the direct object of my drinking (what it is that 
I drink; tea) is not the same thing as that for whose sake I undertake to drink. It is 
surely not for the tea’s sake. My love may very well be of something in particular but for 
the sake of something else. The difference here is between what love is of and what it is 
for: but Plato gives us no indication that he conflates the two. It furthermore seems 
fairly clear from the text—specifically, the repeated use of ἕνεκα and ἕνεκεν at 210a 
and 210e, respectively—that the prior labours referred to were to be understood as 
something akin to preparation or priming. The language of instruction, training, and 
ritual in this passage support this reading. 
Osborne also identifies a shift in the object of love. She asserts, “We start with an 
analysis of love as desire, or more specifically the desire to possess some class of good 
things, which happen to be the property of certain individuals.”175  But, Osborne argues, 
while erôs at the lower levels may begin with this possession-based erôs, 
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174 Symposium, 210e3-5. 
175 Osborne, 102. 
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this is modified…[in the begetting passage] where the emphasis changes 
from possessing the beautiful to gazing on beauty and goodness itself, 
while the need to possess is a need to possess immortality in order to 
gaze forever on the beautiful itself. […] The ultimate aim of his love is 
not possession of good things but a vision of unfailing beauty.176  
 
Given Plato’s use of θεωμένῳ,177  it is clear that the visual aspect of erôs’ aim is of 
fundamental import—but this is not the goal of erôs entire. That there is no shift and 
that the original erôs Diotima endorses throughout her speech is always of bringing to 
birth in beauty is evident from two points. First, the terminology of possession is only 
employed in Socrates’ introductory interlude with Agathon, when discussing Erôs’ 
beauty or lack thereof. As soon as Diotima is introduced, Erôs’ need for beauty is 
explained as part of his genetic psychology but not his defining feature—possessing the 
beautiful is never Erôs’ ultimate aim. Second, at 206e, rather than “remark[ing] on the 
revision of the original analysis”178  (the shift from desiring to possess the beautiful to 
desiring to gaze on it), as Osborne argues, Diotima is correcting Socrates on this very 
point. She specifically tells Socrates he was wrong to believe erôs was of the beautiful—
of possessing it, or any other way in which the beautiful can be the object of love. The 
correction Diotima wants Socrates to understand is not that he was wrong that erôs is 
about possession, but that he was wrong to take the beautiful itself as the object of 
love. 
 
 III.c. Objects of love compared to objects of knowledge 
 
The parallel Plato makes between love and cognition will be of use here. A 
comparison can be made to the distinction drawn by Lloyd regarding thinking of and 
thinking about.179  Lloyd explains, “…while it may seem immediately evident that 
thinking about X entails something thought about X, it does not seem so immediately 
                                                
176 Osborne, 102-103. 
177 See LSJ, s.v. θεωμένῳ, A.1., “gaze at”; A.2., “of the mind, contemplate”; A.2.b., “see clearly”. 
178 Osborne, 102-103. 
179 A.C. Lloyd, “Non-Discursive Thought: An Enigma of Greek Philosophy,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, New Series, 70 (1969): 261-274. 
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evident that thinking of X entails something thought about X.”180  One of the problems 
about non-discursive thought Lloyd identifies as making it “enigmatic” is “the puzzle of 
what led [the thinker] to do so”.181  Diotima’s ascent passage describes how, exactly, 
one is led to think of the Form: from one to two, two to many, effect to cause, specific 
to general, and general to definitive and essential. Held makes the claim here that “[w]e 
think about Beauty through propositions latent in the predicates Diotima presents” in 
210e-211b.182  Thinking of beauty must either not involve transitional propositions 
from concept to concept, as Lloyd describes it, or else, I argue,—an option Held does 
not consider—it involves a kind of cognitive process or endeavour that has as its object 
other varieties of knowledge: non-propositional knowledge. 
Chappell’s innovative discussion of “objective knowledge (OK)”, and its elucidation 
of what he calls “humane knowledge” is worth considering on this score as possible 
content for non-propositional knowledge. According to Chappell, objective knowledge  
sets out a framework within which the other, secondary varieties of 
[knowledge] such as PK [propositional knowledge], EK [experiential 
knowledge], and KH [knowledge how] have their various places. OK 
leads naturally to exploration of what is true about the thing, and so to 
OK about it; to sensory encounter with the thing, so to EK of it; to 
practical handling and exploration of it, so to KH about it. OK stands 
to them not as a collective name, but as a cause.183  
 
Thinking of beauty, understood as cognitively obtaining objective knowledge of the 
Form, is perhaps what is meant by Diotima’s account of beholding beauty. It is not 
propositional knowledge, but—in a parallel way to the descent described in the 
Republic’s Divided Line Simile of 509d-513e—can aid propositional knowledge which, 
while being not the same thing nevertheless resembles it. This reading has two benefits 
over the purely propositional understandings of the aim and object of erôs. First, it 
solves the problem left open by Lloyd about “how the reflection and the intuition are 
                                                
180 Lloyd, 273. 
181 Ibid., 261. 
182 Held, 163. 
183 Timothy Chappell, “The Varieties of Knowledge” (paper presented at the University of Edinburgh, 28 
October, 2011). 
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connected more than contingently.”184  Plotinus describes how when we think about an 
object, we “withdraw from it…we reflect and we attend to a ‘trace’ of it like a footprint 
or an after-image, which we can describe in words; the words will not describe the 
intuition but they will describe something which resembles it.”185  On this reading, 
when one thinks about beauty, she might—after some serious time spent in beholding 
it—have in her mind propositional statements such as those listed by Diotima in her 
description of the Form at 210e-211b or 211e. Thinking of beauty, however, actually 
“in beholding the beautiful itself…in seeing in the way the beautiful is seeable”,186  is the 
activity of this objective knowledge. Resemble is a suitable word here, in terms of the 
degree to which particulars are like the Form: a continuum, rather than an unbridgeable 
difference in kind, grasped at different stages by different varieties of knowledge. This 
reading also solves the problem as to whether emotional models of non-propositional 
thought are rightly regarded as thought. Lloyd states that he did not “consider models of 
non-discursive thought which would assimilate it either to emotion or to sense 
perception and which sacrifice altogether its link with thought.”187  Thought that is of 
objective knowledge, at least as described in the Symposium, is fundamentally erotic, 
and thus emotional, without being very far at all from what can be normally regarded as 
thought. This more robust view of knowledge is then perhaps what Plato has in mind in 










                                                
184 Lloyd, 269. 
185 Ibid., 269. 
186 Symposium, 211d, 212a. 
187 Lloyd, 268. 
188 Objective knowledge in this sense, when compared to propositional knowledge, could perhaps be more 
closely associated with σοφία than ἐπιστήμη. 
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 IV. IN DEFENCE OF LOVE 
 
 IV.a. Possessive lovers 
 
The fact that Plato is at pains to establish that love is of something, has given rise in 
the literature to a rather negative conception of love as ‘possessive’—that the Platonic 
lover seeks to possess her beloved. When the beloved is held to be a person, claims of 
inhumanity and abuse arise; when the beloved is taken to be the Form, it seems an 
impossibility. If love is logically and fundamentally of, is it possessive? In the following, I 
will assess the main streams of misunderstanding in the text in order to argue that, yes, 
Platonic love is possessive, but this attribute of love is not vicious. 
Halperin argues, “The purpose behind Diotima’s refusal to call erôs a desire for the 
beautiful tout court is to avoid the otherwise inescapable implication that erotic desire 
aims at the possession of beautiful things.”189  Rather, he states, Diotima “concludes 
that the ultimate aim of erôs is to achieve eudaimonia (204e-205a, 205d2), which she 
construes as the lover’s perpetual possession of the good (206a11-12, 207a2) […] and 
its ultimate object is the beautiful.”190  Santas takes a similar line in asserting that 
“[p]ossession of a beautiful object is rejected as an aim of the lover (206e); rather the 
role of the beautiful object is as the attracting object that releases the desire to 
beget…Beauty may be what elicits our desire but its acquisition is not the ultimate goal 
of the desire it arouses.”191  Neumann and White agree that beauty never serves as an 
object of erôs in the ascent, but only as a means to inducing labour.192  The common 
interpretation here as to what it is that can or ought be possessed is very different from 
possession of beauty or beautiful objects, but rather the good: with the beauty of good 
things functioning as an enticing advertisement for the prospect of happiness to 
follow.193  Despite the focus in the literature afforded Plato’s frustratingly casual 
replacement of beautiful things for good things during the example given at 204d-206b, 
                                                
189 Halperin [“Platonic Erôs”], 177. 
190 Ibid., 179, 180. 
191 Santas [“Plato’s Theory”], 72. 
192 Neumann, 42-44; White [“Love”], 152-155, and [“Virtue”], 369-375.  
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l'Amour (Boston, MA: Michel Levy Bros., 1857), 34, n. 1. 
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the Form of the good is never mentioned at all in Socrates’ speech.194  Any reference to a 
further purpose behind possession of the beautiful, must therefore take into account the 
passages at 201a (“the perfect revelations, for which the others are means…”), 210e 
(“that very thing, for whose sake alone the prior labours were undertaken…”), and 
211c-d (“to end at that lesson, which is the lesson of nothing else than beauty itself…”)   
where Diotima identifies the final rung on the scala amoris. If the lover’s early erotic 
attempts were indeed for some further purpose, she is plain about what that ultimate 
goal involves: beholding beauty itself, being together with it, and, if possible, giving 
birth to and cherishing true virtue. This “perfect end (τοῦ τέλους)”195  of love says 
nothing about possession for means of obtaining the good, eudaimonia, or even 
happiness. To see the aim of love as possession of tools to be used, then, is largely 
incongruous with the text. 
Obdrzalek provides an alternative account of the possession problem when she 
asserts that  
[b]ecause Socrates focused on corporeal beauty, he thought that the 
appropriate relation to beauty was possession. […] Socrates’ focus on 
possession was, however, misconceived […]. In the ascent, this 
possession-based model of love becomes eclipsed by one focused on 
contemplation and admiration. The reason for this is that the Forms are 
not the sort of objects that can be possessed: it would be like saying you 
own all the prime numbers.196   
 
Engaging with Kraut’s argument that “Forms can be possessed in the sense that one can 
have an intellectual relation to them”,197  Obdrzalek concludes that this “stretches the 
sense of possession too far”, particularly given Diotima’s assertion at 211a that the 
Form will not appear to anyone as a λόγος or ἐπιστήμη “which implies a distinction 
between knowledge of the Form and the Form itself. […A] contemplative relationship 
differs sharply from a possessive one.”198  The distinction she draws between knowledge 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 320-321. 
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of the Form and the Form itself holds, yet I am not convinced that it is as sharp as her 
argument requires. Her reading of θεωμένῳ as being “purely…receptive” and 
passive199  explains why she cannot see them as being the same. A close look at what this 
action entails for the lover, to be examined in detail in the next two chapters, will 
defend a much more complete reading θεωμένῳ, which is far from passive. 
Barney asserts of Plato’s theory of erôs that it is “an impulse to attain some object: 
when we desire, as Socrates says, what we want is for the object of desire to become 
ours…”.200  In her work on Plato’s moral psychology, she claims: 
The good is the object of our desire, which seeks, as Plato says in the 
Meno, ‘to possess or secure’ its object for oneself (77c7-8). But in 
coming to understand what really is good, we must also ascend to a 
more refined conception of what its ‘possession’ amounts to. To 
understand the real good is, among other things, to grasp that we 
benefit not from owning it, ruling it, eating it or wearing it, but simply 
being together with it (sunousia); which, given the kind of thing the 
Forms are, can only mean contemplation of it in thought.201  
 
This “more refined conception” of possession comes closest to what I take to be Plato’s 
intention in the Symposium. That beholding the beautiful will entail cognitive 
contemplation cannot be denied. However, this does not make it the passive state 
Obdrzalek imagines or the purely cognitive one Barney intimates by “only” in the above 
quotation. It must involve more than simply sitting in Metéora, thinking about the 
Form, if it is this activity alone that can lead one to bringing about true virtue. The way 
in which love swept through the entirety of the young lover’s life in the ascent 
passage—from juvenile infatuation to earnest and beneficial relationships with 
soulmates, to cultural and political engagement, to both deep and broad study of the 
sciences, and a climactic realisation of what matters most in the world—requires that 
Platonic love be life-altering. 
                                                
199 Obdrzalek, 432, 435. 
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If possession is what Plato has in mind for the nature of the relationship the lover is 
to have with the ladder’s beauties, is it truly appropriative in an acquisitive way? 
Nehamas offers an insightful understanding, which fits with the view of both love and 
its object offered in this reading. 
Possession, though, is not identical with ownership—or, if it is, it is 
ownership of a different kind: I may possess something as a detachable 
piece of property, losing which will not affect who I am, or as a genuine 
part of myself, which I cannot lose without undergoing a serious change 
of my own. […] ‘Making it mine’ means to see it as no one else has seen 
it before. […] To the extent that being involved with it has changed my 
life, that book has come to possess me; to the extent that I have found 
something new and unusual in it, I have made it mine; and to the extent 
that I have become new and unusual myself.202  
 
The beholding of beauty Diotima’s exhortation implies involves such time and devotion 
as to effect such a change. The sort of possession that may be entailed by erôs involves a 
serious commitment to coming to know beauty itself, and making it one’s own to the 
extent that it has such an effect on one’s life. It is thus not possession or ownership of a 
kind that can be satisfied; it is not a conclusion, but a forward-looking engagement that 
promises a life most worth living. 
 
 IV.b. Possession does not entail the exclusivist’s reading 
 
The establishment of Platonic love as an intellectual desire—more than a purely 
appetitive or appropriative one—enables it to avoid two crucial problems traditionally 
found in analyses of the theory of love offered in the Symposium. First, an examination 
of the exclusivist’s reading will form the background for an argument as to whether 
Plato’s theory of erôs as depicted in the Symposium can be rightly considered a theory of 
interpersonal, human love. Second, the problem of satisfaction will be considered, and 
will provide valuable insight into the nature of philosophic love as distinct from general 
desire in exactly that way: for the very reason that it is not the sort of activity that can 
be satisfied, erôs can be neither appetitive nor dispensable. 
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A significant portion of the literature devoted to Plato’s erôs concerns itself with a 
distinct controversy regarding Plato’s estimation of the value of those particulars 
“use[d]… as steps” in the ascent.203  Two views regarding love for individuals in Plato’s 
theory of love have become prominent in the latter half of the 20th century: the exclusive 
view, which holds that the “objects of aspiration [at the lower levels of the ascent, 
including beautiful souls] are not kept but are totally replaced by the new objects”, and 
the inclusive view, according to which “our erôs widens as we make progress from stage 
to stage; we do not abandon physical and aesthetic love for the love of spiritual beauty, 
nor do we jettison the latter in favour of the life of the sciences.”204  One particular 
point of contention is the possibility of love for human individuals, and whether in fact 
Plato’s theory of love in the Symposium is meant to encompass this branch of love at all.  
The exclusive view has become strongly associated with a seminal essay by Vlastos, 
who argues that the type of love championed in the dialogue is not meant to—and 
indeed does not—admit of love for whole persons, but only the images of the Form 
present in them. Vlastos, and those who follow him, find fault with Plato’s theory of 
love thus understood for four reasons:  
1) that erôs is impersonal and selfish, and that it does not do justice to those 
“essential ingredients of the highest type of interpersonal love”, namely, “kindness, 
tenderness, compassion, concern for the freedom, respect for the integrity of the 
beloved”;  
 
2) that it is fixated on qualities, that it does not make allowances for love of 
individuals in their total package, the beautiful, the ugly, and the nondescript;  
 
3) that even if these first two complaints can be assuaged, erôs cannot account for 
anything but sexual or romantic love, and thus excludes the love we would normally 
feel for friends and family; and,  
 
4) that the erôs of the Symposium does not treat particulars as “ends in themselves”, 
taking steam from the Kantian notion of love for one’s own sake, and not for any 
further means. 205   
                                                
203 Symposium, 211c. 
204 J.M.E. Moravcsik, “Reason and Erôs in the ‘Ascent’-Passage of the Symposium,” in Essays in Ancient Greek 
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These four arguments fuel the exclusivists’ view that if the theory encourages the 
dismissal of earlier loves, it must not allow for human love of human individuals. The 
thought of a theory of love that neglects these principles is disquieting indeed for the 
scope of influence it seems Plato would be wanting to effect. The majority of the other 
speeches presented in the Symposium deal exclusively with interpersonal love, and that 
Socrates’ speech would depart from this arrangement strikes an odd chord in the unity 
of the dialogue as a whole. It would further be curious for Socrates to ignore 
Eryximachus and Phaedrus’ proposed theme of the symposium. In order to investigate 
the merits of the exclusivist reading of the Symposium, these four problems will be put 
alongside Rowe’s inclusive reading. This examination will set the groundwork for an 
understanding of the specific role particulars play in the ascent passage of the 
Symposium.  
Vlastos’ first critique is that the love praised by Plato does not cover the range of 
affectionate feelings one would normally experience and express when she loves. In 
particular, he is concerned that “the fashioner of this utopia has evidently failed to see 
that what love for our fellows requires of us is, above all, imaginative sympathy and 
concern for what they themselves think, feel, and want.”206  Rowe, however, asserts that 
the emphasis placed on the improvement of the individual’s soul and mind displays the 
highest form of care and concern.207  Diotima describes how once the lover has found a 
beloved with a beautiful soul she “must love and cherish him and engender and seek 
such speeches as will make the young better.”208  Vlastos himself asserted that “for 
Plato, as for Socrates before him, the supreme goal of all human endeavors is the 
improvement of the soul.”209  Viewed from Plato’s perspective, the relationship of lover 
to beloved in this sense would constitute a great amount of concern for what the 
beloved wants and needs, and will further help to develop those desires to encourage 
the beloved become the best he can be. Furthermore, I argue, this goal extended 
beyond individual responsibility to the state as well, to legislators and statesmen Plato 
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could only dream would become the heads of education in his ideal regimes. As 
depicted in the Laws,  
For I lay it down that only that law is rightly enacted which aims, like 
an archer, at this and this alone: how beauty should come about in 
consequence of it, passing over every other consideration, be it wealth 
or anything else devoid of beauty and virtue…Unlike the majority of 
mankind, we do not regard mere safety and survival as matters of 
greatest value, but rather that men may become and be as virtuous as 
possible as long as they do survive.210   
 
The image presented in the Symposium further shows the effort with which a lover tries 
to enrich her beloved’s situation. The speeches she prepares in her nurturing of the 
beloved are no less than a bringing-to-birth, a psychical creation generated after especial 
seeking and inquiring after what might make the beloved a better human being. 
The love proposed in the Symposium is not incompatible with compassion and 
“wish[ing] for another’s existence, preservation, and good”211  either. When Diotima 
describes how Alcestis died for the sake of her lover Admetus, and the mythical Codrus 
for his children, she admits their erôs for empire and questions their motivation had 
they not thought they would gain an immortal remembering of their virtuous acts. 
Rowe reminds the reader, however, that these martyrs were only of a second-tier erôs: 
While the agents in these cases may not be seen as doing things 
exclusively for the sake of others, there is nothing here to make us 
suppose that the (real) good desires will exclude reference to the good of 
others, and positive evidence that such a reference may in fact (at least 
sometimes) be included…Alcestis and company will ultimately turn out 
to be poor models: since they presumably have not encountered Beauty 
Itself, they cannot procreate ‘true virtue’…212  
 
Whilst Alcestis and Codrus failed to reach the higher mysteries, the text leaves no 
reason to assume a more maturely erotic lover would not exhibit the same great 
compassion and self-sacrifice to see her beloveds safe that they might go on to yet 
understand the true virtue of her actions.  
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A chronic characteristic of interpersonal love absolutely incompatible with Platonic 
erôs, however, is that of the love-sick puppy: believing the particular beauty on earth to 
be the only source of fulfilment in life, around which one’s whole conception of 
happiness is built. Plato’s admonition against obsessive devotion to a single beauty 
recalls the image Pausanias gives in his speech of the enthusiastic ἐραστής: “making his 
request by supplication and entreaty, swearing oaths, sleeping in doorways, willing to 
submit himself to forms of slavery to which no slave, even, would submit himself”.213  
Vlastos warns against the sort of “pathetic fallacy” and slavish obsession lower-level 
lovers can find themselves having with a beloved, setting Plato’s commitment to the 
Form over romantic enslavement as his “sterling asset”: that his theory of love 
engenders a “freedom from the tyranny which even the unidealised love-object can 
exercise over a lover.”214  It was indeed the intensity and slavishness of the lover that she 
was first taught to disdain in the ascent: it was not the beloved, but the fixation on one 
thing that made the lover “a sorry sort of slave, worthless and petty.”215  Platonic erôs 
leaves room for all manner of affectionate concern and romantic devotion suitable to 
interpersonal love, especially as it relates to an encouragement towards moral 
improvement. It will not, however, stand for that helpless infatuation which blinds the 
lover to other aspects of a full life.  
The second critique offered by the exclusive reading addresses the notion that what 
the lover loves in the ascent passage is not the beloved himself, but the beauty present 
in him. If this is the case, Platonic love must be fixed on qualities rather than 
individuals and thus cannot be healthy, human love. Vlastos laments, 
What we are to love in persons is the ‘image’ of the Idea in them…The 
individual, in the uniqueness and integrity of his or her individuality, 
will never be the object of our love. This seems to me the cardinal flaw 
in Plato’s theory. It does not provide for love of whole persons, but only 
                                                
213 Symposium, 183a; see also Theaetetus 172c-174a; and, on the symptoms of a similar lovesickness in 
Horace, Ode 1.13.5, R.G.M. Nisbet and Margaret Hubbard, A Commentary on Horace Odes, Book 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970), 173. 
214 Vlastos [“Individual”], 30. 
215 Symposium, 210d; Rowe [Plato], 196-197, ad loc.  
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for love of that abstract version of persons which consists of the complex 
of their best qualities.216   
 
The critique here is that the beloveds are not being loved for themselves—which might 
include various shortcomings—but for their beauty. This is taken to be a shallow sort 
of love. Authentic love, argues Vlastos, should be for the whole person embodying a 
unique collection of virtues and flaws, not just a bundle of their best qualities, or their 
resemblance to some abstract ideal. In her essay on the conative attitude, Kamtekar 
argues that, according to Plato, when one desires something, she always really desires 
the Form: 
As belief aims at the true, so desire aims at the good…as the doctrine of 
recollection attributes to us beliefs other than those we avow, in order 
to explain our cognitive behaviour, so the attribution to us of a standing 
want for the good explains some of our conative—and indeed 
cognitive—behaviour: not only what we try to get, but also what we are 
satisfied by, and finally, what we want to know, is best explained by our 
wanting the real good. 217   
 
Such a reading is compatible with the exclusive view of Platonic erôs, in that if one 
loves beauty for the sake of the Form, and loves the beauty in a particular, she loves 
that beauty for the sake of the Form. This is not satisfactory for Vlastos, who finds it 
insufferably superficial. Irwin offers an understanding of the compatibility of knowledge 
with love that may be of use in satisfying both requirements: the need of the beloveds to 
feel they are being loved for their unique selves, and the goal of the ascent passage to 
hold the Form in a higher position of real value than the beautiful particular. He 
suggests, “When someone reaches the Form of Beauty he finds a reliable account of 
what beauty is…The correct account allows us to love the lower objects to the right 
extent, and for the right reasons, in so far as they are really beautiful.”218  Indeed, 
knowledge of the Form may enable the lover to love the beloved even more deeply. If 
knowledge is understood as an holistic understanding of a Form in relation to the many 
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particulars that partake in it, and what role both play in the teleological system, then 
the knowledge of the Form attained in the highest stages of the ascent will offer the 
lover a more accurate perception of her human beloved—certainly nothing that 
precludes her continuing to love the beloved, and in fact more likely the opposite. One 
is reminded of the final lines of Lovelace’s poem: “I could not love thee, dear, so much, 
lov’d I not Honour more.”219  
A third complaint is that, even if these first two problems can be overcome, it 
appears not to account for anything but sexual or romantic love, and not the love we 
claim to have for close friends or family. This argument gains support from Socrates’ 
initial interrogation of Agathon, during which Socrates asks the latter about Erôs and 
his object. Socrates asks,  
Since you have explained fairly and magnificently all the rest about what 
sort he is, then tell me this as well about Erôs: is Erôs the sort that is of 
something or of nothing? I am not asking whether he is of a mother or 
of a father (for the question whether Erôs is love of mother or father 
would be laughable), but just as if I asked about this very word, father—
is the father father of something or not?220   
 
The notion of erôs of parents being laughable is in line with the conventional views 
about erotic love in ancient Athens.221  However, what Plato goes on to do in the 
duration of Socrates’ speech is to create a neologism—a new theory of erôs that suits 
his philosophic treatment of human behaviour, moral psychology, and aesthetic 
creation.222  While in modern English, it would be quite natural to say one loves her 
parents, under the ancient Greek tradition, the conventionally appropriate feeling 
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would be closer to respect, admiration, and, possibly, gratitude. According to Plato’s 
new theory of erôs, erotic love can be thought of as a species of general love—
characterised by a passionate and intense commitment to coming to know the beloved 
better. This passionate element shares certain features with desiderative or acquisitive 
emotion (and manifests itself as such when wrongly ordered: one’s wrongly-ordered love 
for a beloved might lead to her taking advantage of a friend; or one’s wrongly-ordered 
love for a beautiful soul might lead to her wanting sexually the beautiful body attached 
to it),223  but this is simply confusing acquisitive or hedonistic desire with true love. 
Furthermore, it is not unusual to develop or even to seek out a friend-like relationship 
with one’s parents or adult children. They could then be counted under two categories: 
biological family, and friend, when the latter is an individual with whom one would still 
have the same or very similar relationship even if the two were not related. In this case, 
some family members can be counted as friends. Can Platonic erôs, however, account 
for friends? I argue that the development of the lover at 210b4-c leaves open this 
possibility. At this stage, the lover has moved beyond loving only beautiful bodies, and 
has come to “believe that the beauty in souls is more honourable than that in the 
body.” The love one has for beautiful souls can include those of one’s friends and 
family—if indeed they are beautiful souls and they are loved as such. The brief aside at 
210c1 (ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ) indicates that these relationships can in fact be distinctly non-
sexual. Seen in this light, being able to have erôs—when conceived and acted upon 
appropriately—for one’s parents may move beyond being laughable to being, in fact, 
rather enviable.224  
                                                
223 Symposium, 218e: “For you are trying to acquire the truth of beautiful things in exchange for the seeming 
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A final exclusivist critique is that Plato’s theory would treat human beauties 
exploitatively, as means to an end, instead of as ends in themselves with their own aims, 
feelings, and desires. The crux of this issue is that Plato’s theory of love seems not to 
allow for one to love another person “for his own sake”,225  nor, as Kant would express 
it, “as an end in himself.”226  While Rowe suggests the first mention of the phrase “the 
perfect revelations—for which the others are means”,227 in Socrates’ speech, refers to 
the first and second types of engendering (human children and soul-children),228  there is 
no getting around the similar phrase at 211c, “…always to proceed on up, using these 
beautiful things here as steps.” There is also no denying that Plato’s theory requires 
particulars—including human beings—to be “used” in this way, however unsavoury 
that may sound. However, the way in which an individual beloved is used is not at all 
exploitative: rather, I argue, it is decidedly aimed at the interest of the beloved for his 
own sake. When it comes to human beloveds, the manner in which they are 
approached is that of, as has been asserted, intellectual edification and moral 
improvement through speeches and guidance.229  Individual beloveds in the Symposium 
do specifically benefit—and in an important way for Plato—by the role they play in the 
ascent. While it may be their beauty that attracts a lover, it is the most unique part of 
themselves—the soul—that benefits and is the focus of the lover’s attention. Irwin 
asserts that because, as Plato claims, 
persons have tripartite souls, and have interests including above all the 
supremacy of reason in the soul; and a Platonic lover who makes his 
beloved virtuous will be essentially concerned with him as a 
person…the person or self whom a virtuous man loves and benefits, his 
own or someone else’s, is the character which benefits from being 
virtuous. On this view, concern for persons’ overriding interests and 
concern for persons as persons must be exactly the same.230  
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For the exclusivist to criticise Platonic erôs because the lover herself does benefit from 
what the beloved can offer her, through conversations and exploring together the world 
of beauty, would be to advocate a selflessness too far. 
As Vlastos frames his understanding of loving individuals for their own sake in 
Kantian terms, a second response to this complaint is a Kantian one. Both Vlastos and 
Irwin note the problem of treating individuals as passive objects, waiting to be shaped 
and acted upon by the lover. The Kantian critique will not be satisfied with the lover 
acting in the beloved’s best interest if this is not what the beloved wants. Plato, of 
course, would find this nonsense: no one knowingly desires what is bad for him, so if 
some course of activity or lesson is, in fact, good for him, it remains good for him 
regardless of whether or not he himself desires it.231  Hence the Kantian view faces the 
conflict of letting the beloved be free to harm himself, or go against his interests, or get 
himself into a position that will limit his autonomy or freedom. To be forced to be free 
does not satisfy the Kantian need for respect as autonomous end-choosers.232  The all-
encompassing respect and tolerance that the Kantian critique finds lacking in Plato’s 
theory also distances it from the very aim for which it was intended in Vlastos’ critique: 
it does not really sound like love at all. Working within Kant’s framework, impartial 
respect is due to all persons, even strangers; any amount of personal attachment—and 
especially love—must include more than mere respect, but end-oriented respect: valuing 
the beloved enough to know when acting to benefit them is needed, regardless of the 
consequences. 
Is Platonic love exclusive, discarding its objects once a more brilliant beloved is 
found? No. In the first two steps, it is the beauty in bodies that is thought trivial or 
petty—not the soul. Beyond this, as Rowe asserts, “there is no indication that the lover 
will ever desert the beloved, even if his love turns out to include others as well…love of 
other people evidently does have a part in Plato’s scheme.”233  As a final note as to the 
value of individuals as objects of love in the scala amoris, regard the remarkably 
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overlooked omission of the soul in the summary passage at 211c-d. Considering the 
“close attention”234  Diotima bid the reader pay just prior to the summary of the scala, 
and the fact that in place of the soul it was again the body thought trivial at 210c (all 
that was said of the soul in this regard was that it was more honourable than the body), 
this is “a further indication, perhaps, that the lover never moves beyond his attachment 
to souls, that is, to ‘caring for’ and improving them.”235   
I propose that an appropriate way to understand the role of the many beautiful 
particulars discussed in the ascent passage is not of as tools—disposable objects 
meritorious only for their use in achieving an end—but as necessary lessons, valuable in 
their own right and accordingly worthy of cherishing as the origin and instigator of 
proper ocular turning, as it were, in one’s youth and the course of continued delight 
and inspiration to greater virtue in her maturity.236  At the foothill of the final stage in 
the ascent, Diotima asserts: 
Whoever has been educated up to this point in erotics, beholding 
successively and correctly the beautiful things, in now going to the perfect 
end of erotics shall suddenly glimpse something wonderfully beautiful in 
its nature…237  
 
The terminology employed here sets the level of measure that Plato is using in 
describing the distinction between lower and higher levels of erôs. These beauties are to 
be viewed clearly as successive steps, perhaps laterally rather than strictly and only 
hierarchically of value. Further, the previous stages of erôs are, in the quoted passage, 
explained as part of erotic education. Like successive lessons in mathematics, the earlier 
stages may fulfil the very important function of providing a foundation upon which to 
build, a foundation that is not despised, thought worthless, or regretted because one 
goes on to learn about other subjects in time. While the latter is valued more highly in 
the sense that it is “more honourable”,238  the curriculum-like language of succession 
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and correct order suggests that perhaps there is something to the focus of succession 
worth valuing in its own right.  
The role of succession (ὲφεξῆς) in Plato’s lexical thought provides insight into its 
use in the Symposium. In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger broaches the subject of words 
and their order, asserting “those which are spoken in order (ὲφεξῆς λεγόμενα) and 
mean something do unite (συναρμόττει), but those that mean nothing in their 
sequence (συνεχείᾳ) do not unite.”239  Succession in grammar gets its value through the 
unity of meaning, which the Stranger defines as creating discourse: “making a statement 
about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be”.240  The words must 
indicate existence of anything that exists, which is what gives meaning to succession. If 
the succession of loves in the Symposium is subjected to this standard, then their 
meaning must originate in an intimation of something that exists: the presence of 
beauty in the beloveds. As the succession continues to its culmination, the lowest 
together with the highest can be said to be in harmony. Viewed in this light, it is 
notable that Plato uses συνόντος both at the beginning and the end of his scala amoris: 
first when speaking of beholding a beloved body, then in beholding the beautiful 
itself.241  For even “the most abstract and intellectual beauty provokes the urge to 
possess it no less than the most sensual inspires the passion to come to know it 
better.”242  United by a continuous pursuit of beauty, the loves of the lesser and higher 
mysteries are bound together in a meaningful development. 
That the particular beauties are also to be loved “correctly” (ὀρθῶς) for the lover 
to continue on the ascent is furthermore significant. The adverb is used six times in just 
over one Stephanus page, and thus merits investigation.243  With a strictly lexical 
translation of “straight in height or in line”,244  the term captures the sense Plato 
                                                
239 Sophist, 261d-e. 
240 Ibid., 262d. 
241 Symposium, 211d6, 212a2; Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art 
[Promise] (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 141; see LSJ, s.v. σύνειμι, 672-673. 
242 Nehamas [Promise], 7. Cf. Vlastos [“Individual”], 27. 
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requires for the passage by its association with sight: to see straight, as the opposite of 
being blind.245  Beholding beautiful particulars correctly is the responsibility of an 
education in erotics, not only to ensure that the student proceeds along in the 
appropriately successive order, but also that she sees and beholds these beauties 
‘straightly’, that is, in the right way. The primary argument of the exclusivist 
interpretation is that the ascent passage speaks contemptibly of earlier beloveds as the 
lover ascends the scala. The language of four passages in particular fuel these 
accusations. First, when progressing from the love of one beautiful body upwards, the 
lover is encouraged to “realise [she] must be the lover of all beautiful bodies and in 
contempt slacken this erotic intensity for only one body in the belief that it is petty.”246  
Second, when she sees the beauty in laws and activities is all related to itself, she “may 
come to believe that the beauty of the body is something trivial.”247  Third, when she 
sees the whole vast sea of the beautiful, the lover, “by looking thus on beauty in the 
mass may escape from the mean, meticulous slavery of a single instance, where [she] must 
centre all [her] care, like a lackey.”248  Finally, describing the lover’s experience when at 
last beholding the beautiful itself, Diotima illustrates the Form as “not infected with 
human flesh, colours, or a lot of other mortal foolishness.”249   
While the language employed by Diotima is striking, the exclusivist’s claim cannot 
be substantiated without taking the negativity of the language into consideration 
alongside the content of those passages. Her description of the duties of the guide in 
erotic education in the passage at hand upholds the necessity of having an account as a 
resource in making the ascent at each particular step. The scope of such an account 
merits revisiting a previous concession. The curriculum model proposed above 
accurately describes what is happening in the ascent passage from a structural 
                                                                                                                                     
*eredh-, “high; to grow”. Julius Pokorny, Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch (Bern: Francke, 1989), 
339. The moral sense of this uprightness, associated with the term by Plato’s time, would perhaps have come 
from the difficulty in and discipline required for scaling such bodies, cf. the Latin arduus (“high, steep”) and 
its English cognates.  
245 Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, ed. Sir Richard Jebb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1887), 419. 
246 Symposium, 210b.  
247 Ibid., 210c. On this notion of triviality, see Chapter 4, §I.A. 
248 Symposium, 210c-d. 
249 Ibid., 211e. All my italics. 
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perspective, yet objections arise when one questions how this curriculum arises 
naturally. Irwin provides a valuable insight when he espouses:  
Plato does not mean to describe just a curriculum, where the pupil sees 
no reason to pass from one stage to the next. We might suppose that 
just as we need to learn some mathematics to learn physics, we must see 
the less abstract kinds of beauty at the lower stages before we see the 
more abstract at the final stages. But this alone will not satisfy Plato; for 
it would still require compulsion to move a pupil from the lower to the 
higher stages. In Plato’s ascent, a pupil at each stage has to be shown, 
from principles he already accepts, that he has reason to move to the 
higher stage.250   
 
As I interpret this passage of the Symposium, the guide, who is mentioned briefly at 
210a, is to lead the lover to love and then to come to a realisation about the object of 
this love. This realisation provides the lover with the reason for her ascent. The 
inclination of moving from loving one body to realising the beauty there is related to 
that in another, and from loving two bodies to realising the beauty in all bodies is one 
and the same, is a process of loving something, seeing it correctly, then loving something 
further. The love of an earlier beloved was therefore necessary to see it correctly. Loving 
something correctly—and coming to see it as it really is—is essential for the course of 
erotic education to persist. An inclusive reading of the text is supported in this respect 
by Reeve, who explains the negative realisations as epistemological accounts conducive 
to continued love. “The lover comes to see his beloved’s beautiful body as one among 
many: if it is beautiful, so are any other bodies the accounts fit. And this initially 
cognitive discovery leads to a conative change.”251  Coming to love another beautiful 
beloved is not to think less of the first, but to think of it appropriately, that is, in 
accordance with wisdom and in light of the reasons for its particular beauty. Beautiful 
particulars thus do function as steps leading successively from one to the next, and this 
inclination is an epistemological ascent as well.  
The role of dialectic in the education of the philosopher-kings in the Republic 
provides insight into the nature of how such an account may be generated. It was 
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dialectic that best caught sight of the true nature of the objects and subjects under 
contemplation. “Dialectic gently draws [the mind] forth and leads it up above, using 
the arts we described as assistants and helpers in the turning around.”252  It was erôs, 
Socrates asserted in the end of his speech, whom he believed to be the best assistant 
and co-worker with human nature in the attainment of making the ascent. Bury, in fact, 
hypothesized that the “certain single philosophic science” at 210d was dialectic, 
although he does not go into it any further.253  As Plato, the literary champion of the 
dialogue form, would assert, dialectic gets its most crucial value from the interaction of 
interlocutors. Thus, the role of interpersonal dialectic grants individual beloveds to be 
of the utmost importance for Plato’s theory of love and philosophic progress. The 
knowledge gained in the love for an earlier beloved is not destroyed because one now 
knows something new. In fact, it is the “vast open sea of the beautiful” in its breadth 
that provides the vantage point from which one can suddenly catch sight of the Form of 
beauty itself.254   
 
 
 V. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
Rather than being a vicious and Tantalean-like circle of pursuit, the love Plato 
depicts in the Symposium is a virtuous one. Precisely because “erôs cannot be classed 
together with hunger and thirst among the desires capable of satisfaction”,255  it does 
not fall prey to the negative complaints of exclusivity and misuse. Erôs cannot be 
consummated by owning the beloved in an appetitive way because its telos is not 
acquisition or collection but union and assimilation. Appetitive emotion is dispensable 
because it can be satisfied, whereas philosophic erôs cannot—it is thus neither strictly 
desiderative nor dispensable. It is built into the nature of Platonic love that it not be 
satisfied. For this reason, no expression of erôs has been more fraught with controversy 
and danger than the love of wisdom. It is life-consuming. It hardly matters, then, if—as 
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Halperin appropriates Shelley—men don’t call it love.256  This creative impetus is what 
makes life most worth living: a powerful rebuttal to those who claim Plato takes the 
best life to be an ascetic one. 257  
                                                
256 Halperin [“Platonic Erôs”], 189. 
257 Taylor, 209, 233; Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1938), 179; Peiwan, 29; 
Obdrzalek, 437-439, 443; Konstan, “Love and Cognition: The View from Ancient Greece—and Beyond,” 
Acta Neuropsychologica 8:1 (2010): 6; Anna Lännström, “Socrates, the Philosopher in the Theaetetus 
Digression (172c-177c), and the Ideal of Homoiôsis Theôi,” Apeiron 44:2 (2011): 125. 





 CHAPTER IV: 
 




Argument: The emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation Plato presents in the ascent passage is the 
clearest picture he paints of what participation is. 
 
 
The precise nature of the relation between Forms and particulars is a notoriously 
outstanding problem for understanding Plato’s metaphysics. Participation is often taken 
to be an “undefined”, “primitive” term.1 Plato does not set out a straightforward 
definition of participation—but then, of course, that is not his way. What we are 
offered in the dialogues are glimpses, descriptions, similes, stories: “phantom images”2 
of the teleological structure Plato attempts to uncover through his chosen philosophic 
method. In this chapter, I argue that the emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation Plato 
presents in the ascent passage of the Symposium is the clearest picture he paints of what 
participation is. Participation is a forward-looking, generative assimilation. As love 
leads, in the best cases, to knowledge, so does knowledge lead to assimilation. This 
assimilation manifests itself in the production of beauty and virtue of soul. Love in 
relation to the beautiful leads to desire for knowledge of the Form, enabling the lover to 
cultivate and bring into being new beauty in herself and in the perceptible world. The 
participation relation presented in the Symposium is love, which acts as a bridge binding 
the two—Form and particular—together in a generative manner, fulfilling all the 
metaphysical requirements of the individual’s qualification by participation. This 
                                                
1 Richard Patterson, Image and Reality (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 121; Allan 
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2 Symposium, 212a. 
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generative account of participation, I argue, explains how love in relation to the 
beautiful can enable the lover to inherit the only immortality available to mortals.  
My challenge is to satisfy those who claim that Plato does not present in the 
dialogues any clear explanation of participation. Silverman suggests that participation 
“somehow”3 brings about the particular. My account explains how: the love one has for 
a beautiful beloved manifests itself in a commitment to knowledge—knowledge which 
leads to assimilation via generation; that is, to becoming beautiful by producing beauty 
in the soul. If participation is to account for how particulars become beautiful, this love 
relation just is participation. One hermeneutic benefit of my interpretation is that it 
can offer a coherent explanation of how love brings a kind of immortality to mortals, as 
Socrates suggests it can do at the conclusion of his speech. The immortality available to 
mortals is not immortality via fame, remembrance, or vicariism, but immortality via 
sameness and the resulting indissolubility that occurs of those compounds between 
whose elements there is no contrariety. 
I aim to answer two questions in this chapter: (1) Can erôs as presented here count 
as participation; and (2) Can what Plato says deliver what he wants? To answer 
question one, I will first detail how knowledge of the Form leads to generating the same 
virtue in the soul as the Form contemplated, and that this knowledge is strong enough 
to ground action. Second, I will show how assimilation motivates becoming beautiful 
by the production of beauty in the soul. This will be explained as the activity of the 
participation relation and the aim of love. Third, I will respond to objections regarding 
this description of the participation relation. Once I have set out and defended how 
love functions as participation, I will assess the second question of whether Plato’s 
theory can deliver what he wants, and conclude that the production of beauty which 
occurs in the assimilation of individual to Form does, in fact, bestow upon the lover a 
kind of immortality that is more than mere metaphor. In holding this view of 
participation, Plato opens a two-pronged account of being and immortality (one 
manner for Forms and one for particulars), one which is internally consistent and which 
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offers previously unharnessed support for traditional predication problems—specifically, 
the resemblance regress and recent developments in the Third Man Argument.  
 
 
 I. KNOWLEDGE LEADS TO GENERATION 
 
 I.a. The explanatory power of an erotic education 
 
The portrait of erôs painted in the Symposium reveals that love involves a forward-
looking commitment to knowledge, a commitment to coming to know what it is that 
makes the beautiful objects that attract us beautiful. The cognitive nature of human 
erôs is made clear in Diotima’s description of the lover’s ascent, as detailed in the 
previous chapter. From the first steps in the ascent, the lover finds herself reflecting on 
the beautiful beloveds with which she comes into contact, and coming to realise facts 
about them.4 This cognitive engagement with the beauty of the sensible world 
continues on throughout the ascent, during which Diotima consistently refers to the 
lover’s activity as a series of “lessons”, and calls even the beginning stages of the ascent 
an educative process—whether the lover was aware of it at the time or not!5 
The subject of these lessons—towards which erôs’ cognitive endeavours aim—is the 
ultimate reality and cause of all that is beautiful in the world. The attraction we have 
towards a beautiful object leads the lover to wanting to know more about it, and thus 
erôs’ orientation to reality is demonstrated in how it links attraction and attention to 
particulars to knowledge of the whole of beauty. In this section, I will show how the 
steps of the ladder of love are each organised not haphazardly but causally. In just over 
one Stephanus page, Diotima uses the word “correctly” (ὀρθῶς) six times to describe 
the steps of beauty with which the lover will spend time.6 What is the reason for this 
orderliness? It is especially striking in a context such as love—a decidedly personal 
experience associated in the ancient Greek world to unpredictability, chaos, even 
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5 Ibid., 210c, 210d, 210e, 211c-d. 
6 Ibid., 210a2, 210a4, 210a6, 210e3, 211b5, 211b7. 
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madness in its uncontrollability.7 Our modern, Romantic conception of pursuing love 
as the freedom to ‘follow your heart’, wherever it may lead, might even chafe against the 
idea of orderly love with a preset curriculum. A close reading of this passage of 
Diotima’s speech, however, suggests the relation of one step to the next—rather than 
being an external order imposed on the lover—is tied closely to an explanatory 
ontological connection.  
Diotima states of the erotic mysteries that the lover begins with one beautiful 
body,8 which she will eventually see is related—ἀδελφόν, literally brother—to the 
beauty of other bodies. Whilst Diotima next makes mention of the beauty of souls, I 
maintain this is not the next level of the ascent, for two reasons. First, Diotima never 
says here that the lover will pursue or love the beauty of souls, as she describes the 
lover’s activity in 210b as “going to beautiful bodies” and later in 210c as “beholding 
the beauty of pursuits”. All she says is that after seeing that all bodily beauty is “one and 
the same” that the lover will come to “believe that the beauty in souls is more 
honourable than that in the body.”9 I take this to mean that when the lover concerned 
herself with the beauty of bodies, she was engaging in the type of behaviour 
characteristic of those pregnant in body. Now, upon realising that caring for the beauty 
of one’s soul is a more honourable pursuit, she sets out on the way to producing beauty 
of the soul, and retains this focus for the duration of the ascent. The second reason I 
take beautiful souls not to be an individual step is that in 211c-d, when Diotima 
                                                
7 See Willem Jacob Verdenius, “Der Begriff der Mania in Platons Phaidros,” Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 44 (1962): 132-150; David Halperin, “Plato and the Metaphysics of Desire,” Proceedings of the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy V, eds. John J. Cleary and Daniel C. Shartin (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1989), esp. 39, n. 28; generally, Hermann Gundert, “Enthusiasmos und Logos 
bei Platon,” Lexis 2 (1949): 25-46; and cf. Georg Simmel, “Eros, Platonic and Modern,” trans. Donald N. 
Levine, in Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms, ed. Donald N. Levine (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1971), 241. In Plato, see Phaedrus 244a-249e and Laws 837a-d; and in poetry, e.g., Euripides, 
Iphigenia at Aulis, in The Plays of Euripides, vol. II, trans. E. P. Coleridge (London: George Bell & Sons, 1891), 
vv. 547-551. On the representations of the experience of love in the erotic poets and Greek literature 
generally, see Claude Calame, The Poetics of Eros in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (Princeton, NJ: 
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summarises the ascent, she makes no mention of souls whatsoever,10  but moves directly 
from all beautiful bodies to beautiful customs; as will we. 
The next rung in the ascent is the beauty of customs and laws (τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι 
καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν).11  Now, what is the “correct” progression Diotima is at pains 
to ensure between beautiful bodies and beautiful customs and laws? It is, on my 
reading, a successive relation of causal explanation. All instances of bodily beauty are 
said by Diotima to be “brother” to each other. Though different, they share something 
in common that enables a familial resemblance, the recognition of which enables the 
lover to see that their beauty is the same. The source of this sameness, I argue, is hinted 
at in the customs and laws that shape the individual. The beauty of a culture’s customs 
and laws explains, at least to a certain extent, what makes the individual human 
beautiful. Whilst this is not the ultimate cause of particular beauty, it is the direction of 
knowledge the lover can identify at this point. Each progressive step along the ascent is 
to come to learn about an earlier generation in the family tree of beauty, as it were. To 
this it may be objected that it is not culture that brings about bodily beauty—but 
genetics! But Diotima is crafting a larger genealogical story here. At the level of beauty 
of customs, she describes how the lover will “engender and seek such speeches as will 
make the young better”.12  What speeches are these? Those learned in beholding the 
beauty of customs and laws. Speeches concerning the beauty of customs and laws are 
what make the young better. Accordingly, the young is made better by the beautiful 
customs and laws. Soon enough, she will realise this is not the end of the story, but 
progress on to the beauty of lessons and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), which make the 
customs and laws orderly and beautiful. These intermediate causes, however, do not 
explain as well as the higher levels. So, then, the lover is compelled to see that the 
objects of knowledge are what cause those sciences to be beautiful. The final object of 
                                                
10 Christopher Rowe, Plato: Symposium [Plato] (Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1998), 200, ad loc. 210c3-
6, suggests a complimentary reason for the absence of souls in Diotima’s summary, “a further indication, 
perhaps, that the lover never moves beyond his attachment to souls, that is, to ‘caring for’ and improving the 
soul.” 
11 Symposium, 210c. 
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beautiful knowledge—and the explanation for each beautiful particular going on down 
the ladder—is, of course, the Form of beauty. 
The benefits of this reading are two-fold. First, it goes some way in the defence of 
the individual as object of love. A common support of the exclusive reading of Platonic 
love, detailed in Chapter 3, is that when the lover ascends to the beauty of laws, she 
comes to think the beautiful body as something trivial and small, something σμικρόν.13  
Viewed according to the genealogy of causation, however, the judgement is appropriate 
to the object. The particulars within one class (all beautiful bodies) are sons of the same 
mother. The Form, then, is in a way the great-great-grandparent of that human 
beauty.14  Of course the lover will come to think of the beauty of bodies as something 
σμικρόν…it’s just a little one! Second, it follows from what Diotima says at 210e-
211a, that it was for the sake of the Form of beauty that the earlier labours were 
undertaken—it is the Form of beauty that explains all particular beauty, such that 
coming to understand about the Form of beauty finally answers the question of why the 
particular beauty is the way it is (and also why it is qualified the way it is—it is not the 
Form).  
Yet the lover’s interest in what is beautiful does not stop there—with a purely 
cognitive achievement. Instead, the lover aims to come to behold the beautiful as 
intimately as she can, which leads her to create beauty, both in herself and in the world. 
Whilst erôs leads the lover to come to know and experience greater and wider realms of 
beauty in the world, the activity of erôs is further constituted by the generation of 
beauty, by creating and engendering. As analysed in Chapter 3, Socrates’ account holds 
that the object of all love is “bringing to birth in beauty both in terms of the body and 
in terms of the soul.”15  This engendering activity takes place at each step of the ascent: 
from the first love of a beautiful body as she is led to “generate beautiful speeches 
                                                
13 Symposium, 210c. 
14 See Aristotle, Physics, 192a14, at which point the Prime Mover is said to be “the mother, as it were, of 
creation.” 
15 As argued in more detail in Chapter 3, §III.a., I take this “bringing to birth in beauty” to be the object of 
erôs from the fact that this is the objective genitive. See, e.g., Symposium, 206b, 206c, 206e.  
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(λόγοι)”16  to the very height and perfect end of all erôs when she beholds beauty itself 
and there “give[s] birth to and cherishe[s] true virtue”.17  The hypothesis we are 
presented with in the Symposium is that every contact with beauty (from perceptual and 
sensual contact, to emotional and cognitive contact) gives rise to erotic desire to 
generate in beauty. This generation, I will argue, takes the form of assimilation with 
beauty itself. Erôs unites the Form with the particular lover, binding them together, 
thus enabling the production of any and all particular beauty. 
 
 I.b. Education grounds generative activity 
 
Is the cognitive nature of erôs Plato has in mind here strong enough to ground such 
generative activity? Much has been said about the desiring temperament of Erôs. Of his 
blood relations, it is Penia with whom most commentaries tend to associate him.18  Yet, 
throughout the entire text of the dialogue runs the notion of Erôs’ duality: of the 
productive tension resulting from his intermediate state between need and resource, 
mortality and immortality. He inherits much from his mother, but it must not be 
forgotten that Erôs’ father dines with the gods.19  I argue that as Erôs regarding the 
beautiful has led to knowledge, so does knowing about the beautiful lead to 
assimilation. Such a tendency finds comparison in the Republic, where training in 
dialectic leads the young philosopher-kings to becoming morally virtuous and hence to 
being able to lead well and to produce a good city. In the Symposium, cognition and 
contemplation of the beautiful similarly lead to association and assimilation, and hence 
to being able to produce beauty on earth.  
In the course of his educational exposition in Book VII of the Republic, Socrates 
reveals how an understanding of the truth is more than a displacement of ignorance for 
knowledge, but is intimately tied to bringing about a moral change in the student. The 
study of dialectic enables one “to attain to each thing itself that is…[to] grasp the 
                                                
16 Symposium, 210a. 
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18 Harry Neumann, “Diotima’s Concept of Love,” The American Journal of Philology 86: 1 (1965): 33-59, esp. 
52. 
19 Symposium, 203b. 
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reason for the being of each thing”,20  with the result that one will be able to separate 
decisively the Form from the many particulars that bear a relation to it. Thus grounded 
in the truth, the philosophers will be in the best position to produce good things—in 
themselves and in the city. Socrates asserts, “Once they see the good itself, they must 
be compelled, each in his own turn, to use it as a pattern for ordering the city, private 
men, and themselves for the rest of their lives.”21  These philosopher-rulers are 
pronounced thoroughly beautiful (πάγκαλος),22  and can become “authors of the 
greatest good” by bringing into being the “well-governed city”.23  But is witnessing the 
Forms, in whatever way mortals might be able to do, enough to cause or bring about 
moral change? 
The method by which the philosopher-king shapes and creates the beautiful city 
and beautiful citizens (including herself) is described by Socrates as that of the inspired 
artist: 
I suppose that in filling out their work they would look away frequently 
in both directions, towards the just, beautiful, and moderate by nature 
and everything of the sort, and again, towards what is in human beings; 
and thus, mixing and blending the practices as ingredients…taking hints 
from exactly the phenomenon in human beings which Homer too called 
god-like and the image of god…And I suppose they would rub out one 
thing and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as 
dear to the gods as they admit of being.24  
 
This time spent in contemplation of the Forms provides a way for the philosopher to 
become like them, through imitation and assimilation. Socrates concludes, “Then it is 
the philosopher, keeping company (ὁμιλῶν) with the divine and the orderly who 
himself becomes orderly and divine, in the measure permitted to man.”25  What we have 
                                                
20 Republic, 532a, 534b. 
21 Ibid., 540a-b. 
22 Ibid., 540c. 
23 Ibid., 495c; cf. 499b, 520d, 521a. 
24 Ibid., 501b. See also Timaeus 28a-b: “Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be 
created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator, whenever he 
looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must 
necessarily be made beautiful and perfect, but when he looks to the created only and uses a created pattern, it 
is not perfectly beautiful.” 
25 Republic, 500c-d. 
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here is an account that seeing the Form, and then comparing it to what is in humans, 
compels one to recognise a deficiency in herself, which is motivation to rectify the 
deficient aspect and bring about a change in herself in the attempt to make what is 
mortal more like the immortals. This harmonises with what Socrates asserts regarding 
being compelled to use the Forms as patterns for shaping and ordering themselves and 
the city.26  There is good in them because of their knowledge of and assimilation with 
the Form, and as a result of this togetherness, they are the best able to produce good 
things in the city.  
Assimilation with the beautiful occurs when the mortal produces beauty on earth in 
the same way that the Forms do in the universe. There has been much discussion in the 
recent literature regarding Plato’s notion of ‘becoming like god’ (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ).27  This 
idea is presented analogously in the Philebus and Laws. What place, if any, do 
association and assimilation have in becoming like god? Armstrong employs the notion 
of becoming like god to assert that, contrary to a number of Plato’s ancient critics, this 
activity does not necessarily mean a devaluing or abandonment of the temporal world.28  
He asserts, “When we consider the role of intelligence in Plato’s cosmology and theory 
of virtue, we can see the deep and elegant connection between metaphysics and ethics 
in Plato’s thought.”29  In the Philebus, Socrates assigns to intelligence a fundamental 
role in the realm of being: “to mix limit and unlimited to produce harmonious and well-
proportioned things such as the most perfect forms of music, the seasons, health in the 
body, and virtues in the soul (25d-26b).”30  In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger asserts, 
“For mortals, the god would be the measure of all things…The one who would be dear 
                                                
26 Republic, 540a-b. 
27 Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 52-71; David 
Sedley, “‘Becoming like God’ in the Timaeus and Aristotle,” in Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias: Proceedings of 
the IV Symposium Platonicum, eds. Tomás Calvo and Luc Brisson (Sankt Augustin, Germany: Academia 
Verlag, 1997), 327-339; Sedley, “The Idea of Godlikeness,” in Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Plato, vol. II, 
ed. Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 309-328; John M. Armstrong, “After the Ascent: Plato 
on Becoming Like God,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXVI, ed. David Sedley (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 171-183. 
28 See Armstrong, 171-183, esp. 172, n. 2, for a list of the ancient thinkers who interpreted Plato—with 
specific focus on Theaetetus, 176a5-b2—in this way. 
29 Armstrong, 182. 
30 Ibid., 175. 
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to such a being must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character to that 
being.”31  Armstrong’s reading of what the gods do provides a way for him to understand 
Plato’s ethical theory as deriving out of that activity: 
Like god, we are agents: efficient causes of change in the world (cf. Tim. 
89a). Unlike god, however, we can be more or less intelligent and thus 
more or less effective at creating order in the world and in ourselves. To 
become like god, then, is not only to have goodness, beauty, or 
proportion feature more prominently in our own souls; it is to effect 
order in the world of change.32  
 
This cosmologically-derived theory of ethics is indeed helpful in understanding how 
being leads to becoming in the Symposium. Armstrong cites the discussion between 
Clinias and the Athenian Stranger in Book XII of the Laws that reveals how the 
guardians must have knowledge of the beautiful and the good, and be able to articulate 
the relationship between the good itself and the many good things in the world, and 
thus be “capable of expounding it in speech and conforming to it in deed.”33  The 
change effected through association with the beautiful in the Symposium is also a 
process of knowledge and cognition (though not exclusively), with the same result of 
becoming “dear to the gods”.34  As Armstrong finds in the ethical theory presented in 
the Laws, “a metaphysical backdrop that connects the ordering agent of the universe 
with that which orders individual souls and cities”,35  so can we find in the erotic theory 
of the Symposium a metaphysical understanding of how education in the beautiful, 
through contemplation and the performance of beautiful deeds, results in the lover 
becoming beautiful as well. 
The parallel in the Republic continues when Socrates states that the sufficient 
condition for the unity of the state is the education and nurture of its citizens. At 423e, 
he asserts of the future philosopher-kings that “if, well-educated, they become 
measured men, then they will see all these things easily”.36  Now, the received view is 
                                                
31 Laws, 716c1-d3. 
32 Armstrong, 175. 
33 Laws, 966b5-7. 
34 Ibid., 716c; Symposium, 212a. 
35 Armstrong, 181. 
36 Republic, 423e5-7. 
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that the vocabulary of vision Plato uses here and indeed throughout the dialogues is 
simply a metaphor for understanding.37  On this view, Plato would not be committed to 
saying that the natural faculty of sense-perception can be educated. Instead, it would be 
left up purely to the intellect.  This view is supported by the idea identified elsewhere in 
the Republic,38  and perhaps most notably in the Phaedo,39  that sense-perception ought 
be abandoned by the intellect as much as possible if one is really serious about reaching 
true knowledge. A different response to Plato’s use of perception terminology asserts 
that the point of this metaphor is to show that understanding is determined by some 
kind of direct contact with its objects. However, I want to argue that these responses 
underestimate the cognitive significance of perception as detailed both in the Republic 
and in the Symposium. Furthermore, as McCabe notes, a purely metaphorical view of 
sight “fail[s] to explain how education and dialectic would render us capable of direct 
contact with the supreme realities” at all.40  
Perceptions such as those of the finger at Republic 523c-525e, the view of the sun 
outside the cave at 516b, and the philosophical dog at 376b, support the idea that the 
perception Plato has in mind here has complex cognitive content: it is not merely 
passive attention to what the eyes take in, but rather it could be parsed as ‘perception 
that’ or ‘perception as’. A virtue of this reading is that it makes sense of how the 
released prisoners of the cave can be said to see more correctly. Note Socrates’ claims in 
the following lines: “Once freed and able to turn and see different things, they are able 
to reflect on their present perspective relative to their perspective from before, and 
eventually conclude that their vision has improved—that they can see things for what 
they really are.”41  It would seem, then, that Plato held the view that vision can thus be 
developed—indeed, educated.  
What Socrates seeks to accomplish in the education of the philosopher class is to 
make them in some way better. In Republic 518b-d, he asserts: 
                                                
37 See, e.g., Peter Pesic, “Seeing the Forms,” Plato: Journal of the International Plato Society 7 (2007): 1-12. 
38 Republic, 537d. 
39 Phaedo, 64c-67b, esp. 67a, 83c-e. 
40 M.M. McCabe, “‘Look, see!’: Plato on Moral Vision” (paper presented at the Northern Association for 
Ancient Philosophy meeting, University of York, United Kingdom, 7 April, 2011). My italics. 
41 Republic, 515d3-4. 
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Education is not what the professions of certain men assert it to be. 
They say that they put into the soul knowledge that isn’t in it, as 
though they were putting sight in blind eyes. The present argument, I 
say, signifies that this capacity in the soul, and the instrument by which 
each person learns—as if an eye were not able otherwise than with the 
whole body to turn towards the light from the darkness—so with the 
whole soul it must be turned around from what is coming into being 
until the soul becomes able to bear the view towards what is and towards 
the brightest part of what is…42   
 
Accordingly, to be educated requires more than an increase in cognitive content, but a 
complete change to a new capacity. The phrase of δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι at 
518c indicates that the goal of this sort of education is a capacity, an ability. Education 
via contact with the Form will generate more than simply the acquisition of new 
content, but the ability to bear it. Such a change to the whole of body and soul would 
be a transformation of one’s very character. But what does this transformation entail? 
To answer this we must look more closely at what sort of assimilation occurs in 
‘keeping company’ with the divine.  
 
 
 II. GENERATION: BECOMING BEAUTIFUL BY CREATING 
 BEAUTY  
 
As put forward in the previous chapter, the object of love in the Symposium is the 
generative activity of bringing to birth in beauty. In this section, I argue that we can 
interpret this activity as the creation of new beauty. Generation, resulting from the 
desire to know the beautiful, occurs in becoming beautiful by the production of beauty 
in the soul and in the wider world. I aim to accomplish this through (1) proving the 
generative nature of erôs by textual support in the dialogue; (2) advancing an account of 
what exactly it is that is generated in this activity, arguing against Sheffield’s 
interpretation; and (3) showing that this generation of beauty is a becoming beautiful, 
an assimilation to the Form of beauty. This will set the stage for the main argument of 
this chapter: that this generating  is the mortal method of participation. 
                                                
42 Republic, 518b7-d1. My italics. 
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 II.a. What is generated mirrors its cause 
 
Love is the spark of the divine in us mortals. Not only is Erôs, as a daimon, divine 
due to his parentage, but what erôs effects in the human individual is said by Diotima 
to be divine as well: “This matter of giving birth is something divine: living creatures 
contain this immortal element, of pregnancy and bringing to birth—it is something 
immortal in the animal that is mortal.”43  Generation, creativity—this is the immortal 
activity that humans can perform. Erôs, the divine in us, is, as Socrates concludes at the 
end of his speech, the best co-worker we can find for realising our potential for 
immortality.  
Recent trends in the literature have championed this creative aspect of erôs.44  
Controversy extends, however, in defending what it is, exactly, that is generated. 
Sheffield praises erôs’ creative activity in its ability to help us realise our human nature. 
She argues,  
If it is the case that all human beings are pregnant in body and soul and 
we naturally desire to give birth when we reach a certain age (206c1-4) 
in reproductive activity, these dual claims suggest that erôs is the natural 
way in which we express our nature. […] [W]hat we desire is not just 
ourselves, but ourselves realized in our productive activities as good. 
This is what eudaimonia consists in, and it is the task of our productive 
ergon to effect this self-transformation, and of beauty to inspire each 
thing towards the realization of its own nature in the best way 
possible.45  
 
All human beings carry various natural potentialities (206c1-3) which 
require productive work for their expression (206c1-8). […] Expressing 
true virtue (delivering our pregnancy) in the work of reproduction is 
also to realize our nature. If so, then we might also say that our nature, 
properly speaking, is the virtue of nous…[expressed in] contemplating 
the form (noetic activity) and begetting true virtue.46  
                                                
43 Symposium, 206c. 
44 Halperin, “Platonic Eros and What Men Call Love,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985): 180-182; Frisbee 
Sheffield, Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Gabriel 
Richardson Lear, “Permanent Beauty and Becoming Happy in Plato’s Symposium” [“Permanent”], in Plato’s 
Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception, eds. James H. Lesher, Debra Nails, and Frisbee Sheffield 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
45 Sheffield, 111. 
46 Ibid., 136, 134. 
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Taking into account the productive work of erôs, the desire to engender at its most 
divine level is thus a “self-transformation”, as Sheffield asserts.47  However, in contrast 
to Sheffield, who holds it to be “ourselves realised in our productive activities as good”, 
Diotima never says anything about generating goodness. The only reference to the good 
in the passage Sheffield refers to is at 207a, and it is doubly conditional: “From what 
we’ve agreed, it is necessary to desire immortality along with the good—if indeed love is 
of the good’s being one’s own.” Rowe notes here with interest that Socrates does not 
say that he has agreed to this formulation.48  While Sheffield’s insight into the “intimate 
relationship” between one’s erotic and pregnant nature and the productive work 
necessary for its expression in the realisation of her telos follows a tight and precise 
reading of the text, there remains more to be said about how exactly one carries out the 
activity of erôs she identifies. Bury asserts what is generated is “thought”49 . Along 
similar lines, Sheffield claims “contemplating the form just is to beget the virtue of 
nous”, “contemplation of the form just is the production of true virtue”.50  Is this just it? 
Let us press further. Sheffield continues that “the compressed description of 
contemplation and [begetting] virtue suggests that there are not two distinct activities 
[…which] gives us no reason to think that there is anything further required for 
eudaimonia.”51   
Sheffield follows Menn52 in defining nous as a virtue—the virtue of thinking—as 
opposed to the faculty of thought. She asserts that this virtue of thinking is man’s telos, 
and that human happiness resides in contemplation. I disagree on lexical grounds with 
Sheffield’s identification of nous as the virtue posited of the soul in contemplation of 
beauty. For contemplation is a pale translation of θεωμένῳ, the activity described at 
                                                
47 Sheffield, 111, 224. 
48 Rowe [Plato], 184, ad loc. 
49 R.G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1932), 210, ad loc.  
50 Sheffield, 134, 153. My italics. 
51 Ibid., 134, 135. 
52 Stephen Menn, Plato on God as Nous (Carbondale, IL: Journal of the History of Philosophy Monograph 
Series, 1995), 14-18.  
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the height of the ascent at 211d.53  The Greek word has cognitive connotations, to be 
sure, but also involves a grasping or beholding that is much richer than even the virtue 
of thinking.54  If we unpack this beholding as possessing or taking the object into 
oneself, then the perfect end of all erotics is beholding beauty and making it ours. It is 
not immediately clear that this actually is contemplation in thought, even if that 
activity is construed as a virtue. How do we take beauty into ourselves and possess it 
ourselves? Whilst Sheffield reads “production as possession”,55  I argue possession 
requires production.  
The productive activity of erôs is the generation not of nous, nor the virtue of 
thinking, but the virtue of beauty in the soul. In what follows, I aim to show that 
cognition is not just equal to the acquisition or production of virtue, but that it is a 
step along the way to the productive activity of generation. The case I make for this 
claim will involve a brief triangulation of three sources of explanation: Plato’s discussion 
of education for virtue in the Republic, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ discussion of phantasia, 
and Diotima’s discussion of engendering.  
Recall again the philosopher-qua-artist passage in Republic Book VII, in which the 
philosophers were said to look “towards the just, beautiful, and moderate by 
nature…and again, towards what is in human beings…they would rub out one thing 
and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as 
they admit of being.”56  In the maieutic process of shaping the soul, the philosopher 
takes the particular Form to be imitated as the model for assimilation: she looks to the 
Form to create in the soul something similar (that is, to produce the virtues she aims to 
bring about, and to make as close a resemblance as possible). Nous, or thinking, is not 
that model. Sheffield acknowledges that no claim is made in the Symposium that the 
gods engage in contemplation,57  and Diotima herself makes it explicit that “no one of 
                                                
53 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 78, 
asserts that the term “ecstatic contemplation” captures the lover’s experience most aptly. 
54 LSJ, s.v. θεάομαι. 
55 Sheffield, 99. 
56 Republic, 501b. 
57 Sheffield, 136.  
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the gods philosophises and desires to become wise—for he is so.”58  The burden of proof 
therefore lies on Sheffield if she is to claim that contemplation of one Form (beauty) 
yields the generation of a different virtue (nous).  
A illuminating parallel, purely for illustrative purposes, can be found with reference 
to Alexander of Aphrodisias, in the section of his De Anima that examines the effect 
perceptual objects can have on the soul. First, he details how objects of perception 
imprint the soul as a kind of portrait, asserting:  
We need to understand that as a result of the activities involving 
perceptibles, a kind of imprint, as it were, and picture is produced inside 
of us…It is a kind of trace of the change produced by the perceptible 
that persists and is preserved even when the perceptible is no longer 
present, like a kind of portrait of it, which, when preserved by us, is also 
responsible for memory.59  
 
Alexander explains that this kind of imprint is called a “representation…an impression 
in the soul, and in the governing part”.60  For Alexander and the Peripatetics, this 
governing part is not the mind, but rather the heart. The perceptible particulars 
produce a representation within us, our way of seeing has been changed, and in turn 
that produces a change in the soul: 
[Given that]…the primary perceptual organ, which was changed by 
perceptibles through the activity involving them,61  in turn produces 
change itself in the soul for representing through the change that had 
been produced in it by the perceptibles, just as perceptibles produce 
change in the soul for perceiving it, [it follows that] in the same way 
similarly, what occurs in us pictorially and from things which are not 
present produce change.62  
 
What has been created here is a trace of the change produced by activity involving the 
object of perception, which lingers and accounts for memory of the object. He goes on 
to explain that “[a] true representation is a representation in activity involving a trace 
                                                
58 Symposium, 204a. 
59 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima, trans. Victor Caston in Alexander of Aphrodisias: On the Soul: Part I: 
Soul as Form of the Body, Parts of the Soul, Nourishment, and Perception (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012), 
68.4-10. 
60 Alexander, De Anima, 68.10-12. 
61 The organ was changed, hence the way of seeing itself has been changed. 
62 Alexander, De Anima, 69.22-26. 
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that (i) has been produced from something that is, and (ii) is the sort of thing the 
[object] is and is in the state [the object is in] when the representation involving the 
trace occurs.”63  True and lasting changes are those that have been produced from 
contact with something that unqualifiedly is and, crucially, is the same sort as the 
object.  
More than the similarity of language and metaphor, these two descriptions of 
perception-based education may help to explain Diotima’s account of the generation of 
psychical children in the Symposium. She asserts: 
So in touching the one who is beautiful, I suspect, and in association 
with him, he engenders and gives birth to offspring with which he was 
long pregnant; and whether the [lover] is present or absent he holds the 
beautiful one in memory and nurtures with him that which has been 
generated in common. Therefore, those of this sort maintain a greater 
association and firmer friendship with one another than do those who 
have children in common, because the children they share in common 
are more beautiful and more immortal.64  
 
Taking these three explanations together, it is clear that the source of the imprint in the 
soul responsible for change via production of a virtue is, for Plato, the Form which 
corresponds to that virtue. In the Symposium, the Form being contemplated is, without 
question, the Form of beauty. Thus, the activity of erôs will be the generation of beauty 
in the soul—becoming beautiful. 
This production of beauty can be read as one’s becoming beautiful, an assimilation 
to the Form of beauty. To become more beautiful is to bring into being new beauty in 
the soul. It must be noted, however, that Diotima concludes her speech by saying that 
the lover in contact with true beauty will be able to give birth to and cherish true virtue 
(τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ), not beauty. This follows from what she 
said earlier regarding the cultural creations of Lycurgus and Solon, who “by their 
showing forth of many beautiful deeds, have engendered every kind of virtue.”65  What is 
                                                
63 Alexander, De Anima, 70.23-71.2. 
64 Symposium, 209c. 
65 Ibid., 209e. Luc Brisson, Platon: Le Banquet (Paris: Flammarion, 1998), translates παντοίαν ἀρετήν by 
“des formes variées d’excellence”. Robin Waterfield, Plato: Symposium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), by contrast, gives “virtue in some form or other”. Cf. Sir W.R.M. Lamb, “manifold virtues”, Plato: 
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the connection between beauty and virtue, and what is it that is created in the lover’s 
engendering? 
 
 II.b. The beauty of virtue 
 
The text, as well as related discussions elsewhere in the corpus,66  indicates that the 
lover responds to the beauty she encounters by creating beauty. I follow Lear67  in 
concluding that whilst Socrates does not here state that this virtue is beautiful, 
nevertheless all previous creations in Socrates’ speech were called beautiful. It is 
therefore plausible to assume the true virtue generated at the height of the ascent is, 
indeed, something beautiful. In the lower mysteries, the lover gives birth to speeches, 
poetry, laws, civil societies, and deeds of justice, moderation, prudence, and every kind 
of virtue. The creations love inspires are many and varied—but each of them is 
described by Diotima as beautiful.68  As these creations are held to be “more beautiful 
and more immortal”69  than the human children produced by those pregnant in body, it 
stands to reason that the creations at the higher levels of ascent increase in beauty as 
well. And indeed they do. When the lover encounters a beautiful body, she gives birth 
to beautiful speeches,70  and when she spends time soaking up a beautiful culture and 
beholding the vast beauty of the sciences, she creates many speeches that are beautiful 
and magnificent (μεγαλοπρεπεῖς), befitting a great soul.71  In beholding true beauty 
itself—no mere illusion—the lover gives birth to that which is true, and creates and 
nurtures a true virtue which must be most beautiful of all human creations.  
Using Diotima’s multiple references to the generation of beautiful speeches, White 
argues that “by now it should be plain that this true virtue is not a state of their souls” 
but rather “the works that they produce and leave behind them”, specifically, external 
                                                                                                                                     
Symposium (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1967); and Walter Hamilton, “good fruit of all kinds”, 
Plato: The Symposium (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1951). 
66 For example, Republic 501b, as above; Timaeus 28a-b; and, in Symposium 174a, when Socrates says he has 
“made himself beautiful to go to a beauty.” 
67 Lear [“Permanent”], 99-100. 
68 Symposium, 209a6-8, 209d6-e3. 
69 Ibid., 209c. 
70 Ibid., 210a7. 
71 Ibid., 210d4-5. 
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discourses about virtue.72  This, however, is to ignore the majority of the very examples 
Diotima gives. Of those pregnant in body, she notes “how terribly their disposition 
(διάκεινται) is made by their love”,73  including Alcestis’ self-sacrifice to save Admetus, 
Achilles’ fateful activity following Patroclus’ death, and the mythical king Codrus’ 
deliberately allowing himself to die for his city. This is not to mention the activities of 
the animals obviously incapable of speech, who “stop at nothing to nourish their 
offspring.”74  But perhaps what White has in mind is that it is characteristic only of 
those pregnant in soul whose immortal creations are only external discourses. Yet this is 
not so either. For Diotima specifically says at 209a-b that those pregnant in soul 
“conceive those things that it is appropriate for the soul to conceive and bear. And what 
is appropriate for the soul? Prudence and the rest of virtue; it is of these things that 
…[they] are procreators” and that they are “pregnant in the soul with these things”.75  
What lovers are pregnant with, they procreate. Beautiful speeches are a facet of what is 
included amongst those things, as Diotima implies at 210d, but hardly all. Whilst the 
creation and delivery of beautiful speeches are evidently important to the lover’s 
pedagogic and personal endeavours towards producing true virtue itself, it is clear from 
the text that Diotima believes the development of personal virtue in the soul is one of 
the most beautiful offspring the lover in the presence of beauty could hope to bring 
forth.76  
                                                
72 F.C. White, “Beauty of soul and speech in Plato’s Symposium” [“Beauty”], Classical Quarterly 58:1 (2008): 
74-75, 73, 72. G.R.F. Ferrari also limits psychic lovers’ generations to speeches, “Platonic Love,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 255. 
73 Symposium, 208c. 
74 Ibid., 207b. 
75 I follow Rowe [Plato], 190, ad loc. 209b1, in taking “these things” to be the virtues of prudence, 
moderation, and justice just mentioned. 
76 Of those who interpret the lover’s offspring to include—or, indeed, culminate in—virtue, the following 
also hold it is specifically a virtue of soul: Reginald Hackforth, “Immortality in Plato’s Symposium,” Classical 
Review 64 (1950): 45; R.S. Bluck, Plato’s Phaedo (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), 29, n. 1; 
Waterfield, xxxix; E.E. Pender, “Spiritual pregnancy in Plato’s Symposium,” Classical Quarterly 42 (1992): 85; 
Kyung-Choon Chang, “Plato’s Form of the Beautiful in the Symposium versus Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover in 
the Metaphysics (Λ),” Classical Quarterly 52:2 (2002): 433, 435, 436; and Sheffield, 151. 
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Furthermore, I argue, it is a Platonic convention to regard virtue as itself beautiful. 
In the Republic, Socrates describes virtue as “a beauty of the soul”.77  This comes just 
after his discussion with Glaucon in Book IV regarding the critics who would complain 
at a statue’s eyes not being painted purple in order to put the most beautiful colour in 
the most beautiful part of the body. Socrates retorted to these supposed critics, “Don’t 
expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so beautifully that they will not be like eyes at 
all, nor the other parts. But observe whether by assigning what is proper to each we 
render the whole beautiful.”78  What is proper for the soul, according to Socrates, is, of 
course, to carry out its function or achieve its end. This is put forward most clearly later 
on in the Republic, when Socrates asks of Glaucon, “Do not the virtue, the beauty, the 
correctness of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the necessary 
use79  for which each is made or by nature engendered?”80  Fulfilling its purpose, the soul 
is rendered beautiful. An orderly soul, well-proportioned and fitting to its work, will be 
beautiful (as indicated elsewhere in the dialogues, e.g. Laws 668a-b, Gorgias 503a-504a, 
and Timaeus 87c). In the Symposium, what is proper for the soul to bear, is virtue—and, 
specifically, the beautiful manifestations of that virtue in their own καλὰ ἔργα.81  It is 
                                                
77 Republic, 444e. Cf. Plotinus, “all the virtues are a beauty of the soul”, The Six Enneads, trans. Stephen 
MacKenna and B.S. Page (London: The Medici Society, 1930), I.6.1; Diogenes Laërtius, citing Chrysippus 
in his On Eros, “beauty is the flower of virtue”, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers: Book VII: The 
Stoics, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: George Bell & Sons, 1895), 7.130; and Zeno, who made beauty “the 
manifestation of endowment for virtue”, Malcolm Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 113. 
78 Republic, 420c-d. See also, for this aesthetic principle, Phaedrus 264c, and Aristotle, Poetics, 1450b1-2. 
79 I take χρεία, here, as more than a merely functional “use”, but as tied to an ultimate (and so, necessary) end 
or purpose. This is reflected in the sense of χρεία of an intimate need stemming from a lack (see, e.g. Republic 
566e, 373d, 369d; and, as Poverty personified, Euripides Helen, 420, a sentiment hinted at in Socrates’ 
question to Diotima at 204c, “τοιοῦτος ὢν ὁ Ἔρως τίνα χρείαν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;”). Adam, ad loc., 
notes, “The historical Socrates was in the habit of testing the beauty, excellence etc. of an object by the degree 
in which it fulfilled its function or purpose: see especially Xenophon, Symposium, 5.5ff. together with other 
passages cited by Krohn Pl. St. p. 369. Plato himself adopts the same standard in [Republic] 352e-353e and 
elsewhere.” The Republic of Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902). 
80 Republic, 601d. See also Hippias Major 295c: “For I say, then: whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful 
(τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ἡμῖν καλόν, ὃ ἂν χρήσιμον ᾖ).”  
81 Symposium, 209e3-4; Lear [“Permanent”], 99. 
WARE CHAPTER IV: PARTICIPATION IN THE SYMPOSIUM 150 
 
  
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the true virtue engendered by the Symposium’s 
lover, is indicative of its beauty.82  
 
 
 III. PARTICIPATION BY GENERATION 
 
In his exhaustive analysis of Platonic participation, Bigger asserts, “‘Participation’ is 
the name of the ‘relation’ which accounts for the togetherness of the elements of diverse 
ontological type in the essential unity of a single instance.”83  In this section, I argue that 
the generation of beauty in the soul—becoming beautiful—is the mortal method of 
participation in the Form of beauty. I will take the following premises as steps to 
explain how generating beauty is participation, the causal sharing-in the Form: (1) Love 
is a bond, uniting mortal and divine; (2) this bond is between two different ontological 
types; and (3) this bond brings the two together in a unity through generation; to 
conclude that the generative relation of love satisfies the function of the Form’s causal 
relation to particular beauty. Love leads, in the best cases, to production of new beauty, 
fully explaining how beauty comes to be in the world, and thus fulfilling all the 
metaphysical requirements of an individual’s qualification by participation. 
 
 III.a. Love is a bond, uniting mortal and divine 
  
Plato begins Socrates’ contribution to the dialogue with a discussion between 
Socrates and Agathon. In this interlude, Erôs is described as lacking beauty and 
                                                
82 I have focussed here on the connection between virtue (ἀρετή) and beauty. The relation of goodness to 
beauty—whether, for example, beautiful things are beautiful because they are also first good, or that beauty 
supervenes upon one’s goodness—is, likely, another matter entirely, and one I hope to investigate in my 
future research. For now, I point the interested reader to Republic 517c, 452e, and 508e-509a, and Lear, 
“Plato on Learning to Love Beauty,” in Blackwell Guide to the Republic, ed. Gerasimos Santas (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). While I am convinced that Plato thinks virtue of soul will manifest as beauty, I am 
less certain the reverse is necessarily true. On this, see Alexander Nehamas, “Beauty of Body, Nobility of Soul: 
The Pursuit of Love in Plato’s Symposium,” in Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles 
Burnyeat, ed. Dominic Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 126, and “‘Only in the 
Contemplation of Beauty is Human Life Worth Living’ (Plato, Symposium, 211d)” (Katz Lecture in the 
Humanities, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 17 November, 2005, http://depts. 
washington.edu/ uwch/media-publications/podcast-page/548). 
83 Charles P. Bigger, Participation: A Platonic Inquiry (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 
1968), 7. 
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goodness.84  When Socrates recites his conversations with Diotima, we find Erôs lacks 
happiness, immortality, and wisdom as well.85  It is Diotima who explains to Socrates 
that not being one thing does not mean it is necessarily its opposite.86  Rather, Erôs is 
between (τι μεταξύ) beauty and ugliness, good and bad, wisdom and ignorance, 
immortality and mortality, god and man, and so on.87  This being between is held to be 
essential to Erôs’ nature as a daimon, and, I will argue, to its being a kind of bond. To 
do this, I will offer a brief overview of the meaning of μεταξύ and its use in Plato and 
the Platonic tradition.  
The compound preposition μεταξύ—from μετά (‘between’ or ‘with’) and σύν/ξύν 
(‘together with’)—is used primarily to mean ‘between’, ‘association’, or ‘to be with’.88  
In Plato’s dialogues, it can refer to some one thing being between two either spatially 
(as in Charmides being seated between Socrates and Critias),89  temporally (as in the 
long time between Socrates’ trial and his death),90  or, in a literary hybrid, narratively (as 
in the transition dialogue between two speeches or between two parts of one speech).91  
The two positions between which Plato tends to use the term are either states or 
opposing kinds. For the former, we get examples of being between being worse and 
better or greater and smaller,92  learning and forgetting as intermediate stages between 
the states of knowledge and ignorance,93  and what exactly one would be when in the 
                                                
84 Symposium, 201a-210c. 
85 Ibid., 201e-202d. 
86 Reminiscent of the Stranger’s discussion with Theaetetus on the difference between contradictory terms 
and contrary terms in Sophist 256b-c. 
87 Symposium, 202a3, 202a9, 202b5, 202d10, 202e1, 204b1, 204b5. Cf. 202e6 and 203e5 where she uses ἐν 
μέσῳ. While Diotima also says Erôs “is never either without resources or wealthy”, but does not state 
explicitly that he is between them, I believe it is safe to infer that this is implied as well. 
88 LSJ, s.v. μετά, ξύν, μεταξύ; Pierre Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque (Paris: 
Editions Klincksieck, 1969), s.v. μεταξύ. 
89 Charmides, 155c4-5. 
90 Phaedo, 58c5. 
91 Republic, 393b7-8, 533c. I think it no surprise, then, that Plato discusses the intermediate nature of erôs in 
such an interlude between Agathon’s speech and the beginning of Socrates’ speech proper, and in another 
interlude between the introduction of Diotima and her own “rather long” speech. 
92 Phaedo, 71a1-2. 
93 Theaetetus, 188a2-3. Note the particular description in Symposium 202a of erôs being analogous to ὀρθὴ 
δόξα; and, on this, see María Angélica Fierro, “Plato’s theory of desire in the Symposium and Republic” (PhD 
diss., University of Durham, 2003), 52-54. 
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process of change from being to destruction.94  Reference to the latter type of 
position—existence between opposing kinds—comes in the Gorgias and Lysis. In the 
Gorgias, Socrates proposes a neutral class of entities, states, and actions that are neither 
good nor bad (sitting, sailing, sticks and stones) and so are in between kinds.95  Μεταξύ 
is also mentioned briefly in the Lysis, again referring to a human’s position in between 
good and bad.96  Socrates there explains that it is the deficiency an intermediate suffers 
that makes him friend to that which he lacks. Here I follow Fierro, contra Frede,97  in 
identifying an active understanding of μεταξύ: it is specifically the lack suffered due to 
being intermediate that propels one to satisfy that lack. Different to Fierro, however, I 
maintain that Socrates is not here specific about the nature of the activity prompted. It 
remains open whether this involves the desire “to obtain and possess…the good”, as 
Fierro concludes, because Socrates simply indicates the desiring one will become “friend 
to that which it desires” and “by some natural bond belonging to each other”.98  
Nevertheless, we can discern in Plato’s own use of μεταξύ not simply the state of being 
intermediate between two entities, states, or places, but intermediary: desiring with an 
orientation to that which it lacks.   
Plato’s use of μεταξύ in the Symposium reiterates its meaning as both spatial and 
active. The primary passage in which Plato sets out this relation is worth quoting in 
length. When Socrates asks Diotima what manner of creature Erôs could be, if not 
mortal or immortal, Plato writes: 
                                                
94 Parmenides, 156e8-157a2. 
95 Gorgias, 467e-468a. The argument of Dorothea Frede, “Out of the cave: what Socrates learned from 
Diotima,” in Nomodeiktes: Greek studies in honour of Martin Oswald, eds. R.M. Rosen and J. Farrell (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 405, regarding this passage—that the activities engaged in by 
those in such a state of being “neither good nor bad” are always morally neutral, is challenged by Fierro, 50, 
who asserts Plato considers at least two other possibilities viable for these intermediates: (1) when such 
activities are undertaken as “good means for attaining” the good, they participate in the good; and (2) “if 
these activities were done for a bad end, they would participate in the bad.” 
96 Lysis, 220d. 
97 Fierro, 51-52; contra Frede, 404-406.  
98 Lysis, 221d-e with Symposium, 212a. It would be an assumption that that which the desirer desires while 
being in between good and bad is necessarily the good. We could be forgiven for assuming this of Plato if we 
take good and bad to be on a scale of increasing perfection—the ascension of which reduces the deficiency in 
a way descending does not—rather than a case of mere opposites, on which reading the intermediate lacks 
bad just as much as he lacks good. 
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ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, ἔφη, μεταξὺ 
θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. 
 
It’s as in the previous cases, she 
said, between mortal and immortal. 
 
τί οὖν, ὦ Διοτίμα; 
 
What is that, Diotima? 
 
δαίμων μέγας, ὦ Σώκρατες: καὶ 
γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι 
θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. 
 
A great daimon, Socrates, for 
everything of the nature of daimons 
is between god and man. 
 
τίνα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον; 
 
With what kind of power? 
 
ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον 
θεοῖς τὰ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων καὶ 
ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν 
τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς 
ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς τῶν 
θυσιῶν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὂν ἀμφοτέρων 
συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ 
αὑτῷ συνδεδέσθαι. διὰ τούτου καὶ 
ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν 
ἱερέων τέχνη τῶν τε περὶ τὰς 
θυσίας καὶ τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδὰς 
καὶ τὴν μαντείαν πᾶσαν καὶ 
γοητείαν. θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ 
μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου πᾶσά 
ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος 
θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους… 
 
Interpreting and ferrying things 
from men to gods and from gods to 
men: the men’s requests and 
sacrifices, the gods’ commands and 
returns for sacrifices; for it is in the 
middle of both and fills up the 
interval between them, so that the 
whole itself is bound together by it. 
It is through this that the whole 
expertise of the diviner works its 
effects, and that of priests, and of 
those concerned with sacrifices, 
initiatory rituals, incantations, and 
the whole of prophecy and magic. 
God and men do not mingle; but 
through this occurs the whole 
intercourse and conversation of 
gods with men…99   
 
Erôs is μεταξύ, between gods and men. That this involves a spatial dimension can be 
inferred from 202e; that it binds “the whole” together can be understood to be, at least 
at the theological level, a bond between the heavenly and the earthly dwelling-places of 
these entities.100  We also learn that Erôs as μεταξύ is not passively intermediate, but 
has the power (δύναμις) of the intermediary, binding (συνδεδέσθαι) the two together. 
                                                
99 Symposium, 202d-203a. 
100 Diotima reveals at 211b her acknowledgement of a heaven and an earth, so it is reasonable to assume she 
would posit the gods in the former and men in the latter. 
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Further, this power as a bond is what enables conversation101  as well as intercourse or 
togetherness102  between the two.  
 
 III.b. Love is a bond between different ontological types 
 
In this section, I will show that love in the Symposium is a bond between different 
ontological types, and not merely two groups of beings residing in different 
cosmological spaces. Diotima presents a standard, if  streamlined,103  ancient theology: 
the whole itself constitutes gods, daimons, and men. Looking solely at the Symposium, 
we can identify gods and men as of two different ontological classes. One key point is in 
the passage quoted above, Diotima’s statement at 203a that “Gods and men do not 
mingle”. What is more interesting is why. To answer this, I will look at three passages 
of Socrates’ speech: the discussions about erôs’ intermediary nature, the two types of 
immortality presented, and Diotima’s remarks at the height of the ascent regarding the 
Form of beauty compared to earthly beauties. 
                                                
101 For daimons possessing the power to communicate between gods and men, see, e.g. Hesiod, Works and 
Days, in The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (London: William Heinemann 
Ltd., 1914), 109, 122, 252. The influence of this passage within and without the Platonic tradition is, I 
maintain, a support for the reading of love as bond. According to Philo, On Dreams, in The Works of Philo, 
trans. C.D. Yonge (London: G.H. Bohn, 1854), I.141 = 586d, daimons are angels of the “divine word” (ὁ 
ἱερὸς λόγος), who convey to and fro (διαγγέλλουσι) “the injunctions of the father to his children, and the 
necessities of the children to the father.” In Plutarch, On the Failure of Oracles, in Plutarch vol. V, trans. Frank 
Cole Babbitt (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1936), 416e-f, cf. 415a, 416c-f, we hear of an interval 
between earth and moon (μεταξὺ γῆς καὶ σελήνης), full of air, the dwelling place of the hermeneutic 
daimons (δαιμόνων γένος), whose interpretive function is said to be so important that if they were to cease 
to exist, not only would man be subject to confusion (ταράττειν), but it would destroy the whole 
communion (κοινωνία) of the universe. Apuleius, On the God of Socrates, in The Works of Apuleius, trans. 
Hudson Gurney (London: Bell & Daldy, 1866), 359, carries on this imagery, describing the daimons as 
residing in the air and being the clouds, in composition “a mixture of both” earthly and heavenly, and if 
bidden, “depressed downwards, as through for the purpose of bringing forth.” 
102 On this point, I disagree with Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 108-
109, that the function or power of daimons “is entirely concerned with communication” (my italics). The 
unity of gods and men achieved through the daimons is indicated in, e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The 
Roman Antiquities IV, trans. Earnest Cary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1943), I.77, and 
Plutarch, supra. 
103 Although John G. Gager, Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 12, is, of course, correct that the ancient world saw the introduction of a dizzying 
multitude of divinities such that “most people were less certain about where to draw the lines between gods, 
daimones, planets, stars…”, the ancient conception, at least, of gods and men as distinct classes is undisputed. 
See, e.g. Osborne, 108-111; Plutarch, supra; Proclus, In Remp., ed. Wilhelm Kroll (Amsterdam: Verlag Adolf 
M. Hakkert, 1965), II. 48.4ff. 
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A significant part of what Diotima teaches Socrates is regarding erôs’ nature as 
being between two contradictory positions, but being himself only contrary to each of 
those. As Osborne asserts, “Gods and men are not treated as links on a chain, but 
rather as polar opposites…[T]he pair god and mortal is treated as logically similar to 
the pairs beautiful and ugly, good and bad, and wise and ignorant that we had earlier 
met in Diotima’s speech as examples of opposites”.104  At 202a, Diotima discusses the 
distinction between knowledge and ignorance by saying of the former “for how could 
knowledge not be able to give an account…how could ignorance be that which hits 
upon what is?” It might be objected here that whilst gods and men could be considered 
different ontological types, beauty and ugliness, knowledge and ignorance are clearly 
not. My claim, however, is not that the same intermediary entity is between each of 
these pairs, but rather, erôs manifests itself in different ways. It is not love that is 
between knowledge and ignorance, but true opinion. Erôs takes on different titles 
depending on which pair it navigates. Each intermediary is represented by the daimon 
class, which I take to be a possible implication behind 203a: “The daimons are many 
and various, and one of them is Erôs.” Nevertheless, why should we consider gods and 
men of different types when beauty and ugliness are not? Each half of the pair is 
opposite in some way to the other, that much is true, but how can we explain that this 
pair is opposite not in definition but in ontological type? For this I turn to the 
Symposium itself, and its explanation of the different modes of being attributed to the 
two classes. 
In the Symposium, Diotima teaches Socrates that gods and men are of two different 
ontological types by reference to their different, and mutually exclusive, methods of 
immortality. Diotima states, “Mortal nature is capable of immortality only in this way, 
the way of generation […] by the fact that that which is departing and growing old 
leaves behind another young thing that is as it was.”105  The gods, however, have “a 
                                                
104 Osborne, 109. 
105 Symposium, 207d, 208a-b. 
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different way […] by being absolutely the same forever.”106  This distinction stems 
logically from Plato’s traditional understanding of the two distinct ways of being: Being 
and partaking.107  Different ways of being forever ought to indicate different ways of 
being simpliciter. 
Third, at the conclusion of Socrates’ speech, Diotima describes the Form of beauty 
itself as not “infected” by any “mortal nonsense” (φλυαρίας θνητῆς) such as 
mixedness, colours, or flesh, but is rather the “divine beauty” (θεῖον καλὸ).108  Her use 
of divine and mortal in this passage concerning the comparison of Forms and particulars 
hints at the parallel I argue Plato draws between the metaphysical and theological 
hierarchy of types, with gods and Forms each of a fundamentally different nature than 
men and particulars. If, then, erôs functions as a bond between gods and men, this bond 
is between two different ontological types.  
 
 III.c. The bond of love unites the two through generation 
 
In order to prepare the way for my hypothesis that the Symposium suggests a 
manner in which the bond of love brings the two—Form and particular—together into 
a unity, it will be of benefit to review the key points of the long-standing objection to 
the mere possibility of a relation or bond between such different ontological types. This 
“radical separation”109  between Forms and particulars, is, for Bigger and others, what 
makes the problem of unity “a very central problem, perhaps the most important” for 
                                                
106 Symposium, 208b, 208a. This is reminiscent of the debate surrounding the possibility of different types of 
participation: that of Forms participating in other Forms, and that of particulars participating in Forms. On 
which, see Silverman, 26, 88-89; Bigger, 96, who says that “[p]articipation is not univocal” with respect to 
transcendental, regulative, and constitutive Forms; F.M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (New York, 
NY: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1957), 256, who asserts that the relation between Forms, even though called 
participation, cannot be the same as the relation between Forms and particulars; and Bruce Thomas Lidsten, 
“Plato on Participation: An Examination of the Relation between Forms and Particulars” (MA diss., 
McMaster University, 1979), 65, who agrees and follows Paul Seligman, Being and Not-Being: An 
Introduction to Plato’s Sophist (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 46, in that as Forms and particulars are 
of different ontological types, that “is enough to ensure that the relations described are different.” 
107 Silverman, “Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/ 
entries/plato-metaphysics/; Silverman [Dialectic], 16. 
108 Symposium, 211e. 
109 Bigger, 48. 
WARE CHAPTER IV: PARTICIPATION IN THE SYMPOSIUM 157 
 
  
Plato’s metaphysics.110  Jowett and Campbell famously claim that Plato “has no idea of 
a unity of opposites or differences”, following perhaps from Aristotle.111  One 
compelling reason for this disavowal of any possible unity is the argument regarding 
what the two could ever hope to share in common such to secure that unity. Made 
prominent by Spinoza in his Ethics, and taken up by Butler, Ryle, and, more recently, 
Thomas et al.,112  this objection asserts that for two things to be in any kind of relation, 
they must share something in common. Different ontological types by definition share 
nothing in common, so there can be no relation, let alone unity, between them. 
Furthermore, even to posit something in common between Forms and particulars 
would be to threaten the Forms’ perfection: if it is of particulars, it must be qualified, 
and no Form can in any way be qualified. 
The objection that entities of different ontological classes do not and cannot mingle 
is, of course, even encapsulated in Plato’s own critical look at the Theory of Forms: the 
Greatest Difficulty argument of the Parmenides. The argument, which is echoed in the 
Cratylus and Sophist,113  begins with Parmenides’ claim that the Forms cannot have any 
direct interaction with the realm of particulars: 
[T]hose absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own 
nature in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the likenesses, or 
whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which 
we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete 
things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative 
only to themselves, not to the ideas, and belong to themselves, not to 
the like-named ideas.114  
 
                                                
110 Bigger, 51. 
111 Benjamin Jowett and Lewis Campbell, Republic: the Greek text (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), 235; 
Aristotle, Politics, B2. 1261aff. Of course, the project of making one from many underlies the entire structure 
of the Kallipolis! (As Republic 423d.) 
112 Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics, in A Spinoza Reader, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), IP3, IP5; Ronald J. Butler, “The Measure and Weight of the Third Man,” Mind, 
New Series, 72:285 (1963): 72-78, esp. 75; Gilbert Ryle, “Plato’s Parmenides,” in Studies in Plato’s 
Metaphysics, ed. R.E. Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 107; Ruth Thomas, Katherine 
Whybrow, and Cassandra Scharber, “A Conceptual Exploration of Participation,” Educational Philosophy 
and Theory 44:6 (2012): 606. 
113 Cratylus, 439c-440e; Sophist, 248a-249e, on which, see McCabe, Plato’s Individuals (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 92-94. 
114 Parmenides, 133c-d. 
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The “fearful consequence” of such radical separation, Parmenides admits, is that the 
gods, who have knowledge of the Forms and thus exist in their realm, (1) would not be 
our masters; and (2) would have no knowledge of human affairs and we no knowledge 
of them or theirs.115  The Parmenides dialogue thus supports the parallel between gods 
and men on the one hand, and Forms and particulars on the other, that I propose 
underlies the metaphysical claim of the Symposium. But it is startling to find that the 
Symposium offers a tailored response to the Greatest Difficulty of the Parmenides! With 
Erôs as intermediary between gods and men, the two realms can be bridged. In 
particular, the very activities Diotima mentions at 202e-203a as now being allowed 
only through love are Parmenides’ own two “fearful consequences”. Through love, the 
gods can (1) pass on orders to humans, thereby putting them into the relation of 
mastering; and (2) hear of and respond with requitals to the prayers and sacrifices of 
mortals, thereby granting them knowledge concerning the happenings of the mortal 
realm such to respond to it. 
If the gap can thus be bridged, it remains to be seen whether staking this victory 
comes at the expense of biting the Spinozan bullet of the two realms having something 
shared in common. Does the relation of unity necessitate sharing some extra thing in 
common? I propose not. The unity of a single instance required for the gap-bridging 
participation Plato intends, I argue, is the coming-together into a whole, such that the 
removal or withdrawal of some part of that whole will disband the state-dependent 
nature of its elements. It is not that multiple things coming together simply become 
one, but that that coming together yields a unity, a new whole whereby there is more 
goodness in the world as result. The unity of the Form of the good and a particular 
good is that they are each and both good—albeit via different methods, for Forms are in 
ways different to how particulars are, as we have seen. In the Republic, Plato presents 
the state as coming into being by the unity of the different classes of citizens. By this 
coming together, the state is one.116  A similar story is offered in the Symposium, only 
instead of different classes of citizens he uses the example of different classes of entities. 
                                                
115 Parmenides, 134c-e. 
116 Republic, 423d, 462b. 
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It is through the unity of the individual parts of the state that the Republic’s ideal state 
is bound together as a one (ὃ ἂν συνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν); and it is through the uniting 
power of erôs that the Symposium’s cosmos is bound together (τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ 
συνδεδέσθαι).117  In the Timaeus, Plato describes the binding power of an intermediary: 
But it is not possible that two things alone should be conjoined without 
a third; for there must needs be some intermediary bond to connect the 
two. And the most beautiful of bonds is that which most perfectly unites 
into one both itself and the things which it binds together… 
 
δύο δὲ μόνω καλῶς συνίστασθαι τρίτου χωρὶς οὐ δυνατόν: δεσμὸν 
γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινα ἀμφοῖν συναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι. δεσμῶν δὲ 
κάλλιστος ὃς ἂν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἓν ποιῇ…118  
 
On Spinoza’s account, the third thing—the bond—becomes that which is shared in 
common. But this is not the only way to understand an intermediary bond. The bond 
that participation must be is not some third new thing shared by the two; but rather, it 
is the mechanism by which a new thing comes into being that now constitutes both 
bound together. This a unity whereby the Form is instantiated in the physical world, 
and the particular is what it is through not only the Form, but the relation of 
participation itself. Now, it is all well and good to suggest that love is this bond and 
that the bond binds the two. The crucial question now is how? How does love so bind? 
The answer, on the interpretation I defend, is by generation: by the creation and 
bringing into being of beauty in the soul.  
“[B]eing together (συνουσία) is a bringing to birth”, Diotima claims.119  It is via this 
bringing to birth that mortal creatures stay the way they are, for any length of time. On 
Diotima’s story, mortals bring to birth not just physically—as in the birth of children, 
the generation of new skin cells, or the growth of bones and hair—but also in terms of 
the soul, one’s character.120  Bringing to birth virtues of the soul can be achieved in “the 
                                                
117 Republic, 462b; Symposium, 202e. Cf. Pseudo-Denys, Divine Names, trans. J. Jones (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette University Press, 1980), 4.15, 713a-b, and 4.12, 709c, who calls erôs a “unifying and combining 
power” and “a power that is one-making and binding”, quoted and discussed in Osborne, 202-214. 
118 Timaeus, 31a-b. 
119 Symposium, 206c. 
120 Ibid., 207e. 
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performance of beautiful deeds (καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα)” inspired by and in 
association with a beautiful beloved.121  The lover is joined to the beloved through love, 
which seeks (has as its object) not the beautiful itself, but engendering. When this 
engendering is realised, and the more beautiful the beauties engendered, this bond is 
made stronger: for “those of this sort maintain a greater association and firmer 
friendship with one another”.122  The bond of love, the being together, is therefore 
precisely this generation. I follow Bigger in holding that participation is not about 
having something in common, but is “a real relation, one whereby at least one relatum 
is through the other”.123  The reason for the being of particular beauty in the lover (one 
relatum) is the generation of beauty that is the object of love. Love is therefore the 
conduit by which new beauty comes to be, fulfilling the metaphysical requirements of 
the participation relation by (1) binding the (2) two diverse ontological types of the 
particular beauty of the lover and the Form of that beauty (3) into a unity. The mortal 
method of participation in beauty—of being beautiful—is generating new beauty. 
 
 
 IV. OBJECTIONS 
 
In this section, I will address two objections which could be raised to this theory. 
First, if the lover comes into the cognitive-emotive relation to beauty thus described, 
and as a result becomes beautiful, why is this becoming beautiful by creating beauty not 
the resemblance relation of particular to Form?124  As described most explicitly in the 
Parmenides, the conception of participation as the resemblance occurring between 
Forms and particulars was posed by the young Socrates: 
I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as 
patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of 
them; their participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and 
                                                
121 Symposium, 209e. 
122 Ibid., 209c. 
123 Bigger, 73, 74. 
124 See Chapter 2, §§I.b, II.c., for further analysis of the resemblance relation of participation. The 
resemblance relation between Form and particular is also indicated in Phaedo 74a-76a, 100c-d; Republic 
472b7-c7, 510aff., 514ff, 597a4-5, 596b6-8; and Timaeus 29c1-2, 48e5-49a1, 50c4-6. I thank Gerasimos 
Santas for pressing me on this point. 
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nothing else. Then if anything resembles the idea, can that idea avoid 
being like the thing which resembles it, in so far as the thing has been 
made to resemble it; or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its 
like?125  
 
We can summarise the resemblance relation as follows: Forms stand to particulars as 
patterns to imitations. Particulars come to participate in the Form by being (or being 
made to be) like them. My account of the generative relation is that the Form stands to 
the particular as ancestor to heir.126  Particulars come to participate in the Form by 
being brought to birth. While it may be true that particulars ‘resemble’ the Forms in 
which they participate, resemblance does not explain how the particular comes to be in 
that relation. Resemblance is an outcome of the relation, not the nature of the relation 
itself.127  Just as the answer to the question, ‘Where do babies come from?’ can plausibly 
be answered with: ‘From their parents’, the more satisfactory answer would include the 
very specific details of conception, pregnancy, and delivery. In fact, the first answer is 
not just unsatisfactory, but wrong: while the parents are necessary conditions for the 
child’s coming into being, their mere existence is simply not sufficient. For the same 
reason, the cause of the particular cannot be the Form alone; the participation of 
particular in the Form is required.128   
Furthermore, I am not convinced that Plato was necessarily committed to the 
resemblance relation at all in the Symposium—at least in the imitative sense of 
resemblance.129  Meinwald calls the resemblance interpretation of participation 
“absurd”,130  taking a strongly non-self-predicating view of Forms. Indeed, the 
resemblance relation is often taken to imply self-predication. As Allen retorts, “[N]ot 
                                                
125 Parmenides, 132d-e. This understanding of participation is taken up by Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s 
Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 211-212, 214. 
126 To say ‘as parent to child’ poses problems, of course, as parents undoubtedly go through changes in the 
process of procreation. What I have in mind here is the kind of abstract familial resemblance underlying such 
claims as ‘She has the MacKinnon cheeks’ or ‘the Hosty nose’, which point to no particular parent as source. 
127 As Anna Marmodoro, “Is Being One Only One? The Uniqueness of Platonic Forms,” Apeiron 41:4 (2008): 
219, asserts, “claiming resemblance…is more a statement than an explanation.”  
128 Note that in, e.g. Phaedo 100c, 101c, Socrates includes participation in his explanation. On this, see 
Lidsten, 13-14, 23. 
129 And, at least not in Socrates’ speech.  
130 Constance Meinwald, “Plato: Forms as perfect exemplars,” in Encyclopædia Britannica Online (2009), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/464109/Plato/281703/Forms-as-perfect-exemplars. 
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even God can scratch Doghood behind the Ears. The view is more than peculiar; it is 
absurd.”131  In the context of the Symposium, I must agree. Diotima claims at the end of 
her speech that the Form of beauty is “not to be compared” to beautiful particulars.132  
Never in the ascent passage does Plato refer to the lover making earthly beauties 
resemble the Form—and how could she, given that she is generating and producing 
beauty well before seeing the Form of beauty to use it as a model, as described in the 
Republic and Timaeus passages cited in support of a resemblance-based participation 
relation? Rather, the terminology employed in the Symposium is almost exclusively 
generation or birth-based, for example, ἀδελφόν, and συγγενής.133   
This is not the very practical ‘imitation’ of Aristotle’s ethics, of blindly imitating the 
good man of society until you get it right. As argued in Chapter 2, the object of love is 
not the Form of beauty, but bringing to birth in beauty. It is precisely because this 
object of love is not the Form that resemblance is not the method of participation. The 
lover does not desire the Form itself—a plausible interpretation of which might be to 
be like it—but generation.  
A second objection to my interpretation of participation as the generative process of 
creating beauty is whether it can account for not only purposeful agents and the moral 
virtues, but as well for artefacts and inanimate natural objects’ being what they are. I 
argue that it does. In the Phaedo, equal sticks are said to strive after Equality itself, but 
fall short.134  Silverman states that the language of lack and striving in these passages is 
metaphorical; Broadie claims that taking this language as anything other than metaphor 
threatens making inanimate objects “too real”; and, recently, Sedley argues that the 
reference to it “should be henceforth abandoned.”135  However, I maintain that this was 
Plato’s way of understanding how the world works. In the Symposium, this idea of 
                                                
131 R.E. Allen, “Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues,” The Philosophical Review 69:2 
(1960): 147. 
132 Symposium, 211d. 
133 Ibid., 210b, 210c. 
134 Phaedo, 75a, 75b. 
135 Silverman, 52; Sarah Broadie (as Sarah Waterlow), “The Third Man’s Contribution to Plato’s 
Paradigmatism,” Mind 91 (1982): 357; Sedley, “Form-Particular Resemblance in Plato’s Phaedo,” Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society 106:1 (2006): 366. 
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particulars striving and aiming for, or to become the same as, their teleological good is 
turned into a desire to give birth, to produce. Plato takes the painter-creator model of 
the Republic and Timaeus even further, beyond creating an external object to creating in 
oneself. What Plato attempts to accomplish in Socrates’ speech is to present a 
naturalistic account of becoming. This account is meant to posit participation as a 
recipe for self-constitution, or self-creation, using the human experience of erôs to 
provide a model for how the metaphysical is attained through a physical process. 
 
 
 V. MORTAL IMMORTALITY IS ACHIEVED THROUGH  
 INDISSOLUBILITY 
 
At the climax of the ascent, Diotima claims that once the lover engenders and 
nurtures true virtue, “it lies within him to become dear to the gods and, if it is possible 
for a human being, immortal as well.”136  How can generating beauty bestow upon the 
lover any serious immortality? In this section, I will argue that the kind of immortality 
granted to the lover who is able to be together with the Form of beauty cannot be 
vicarious or through remembrance, as was the case for the lovers in the lower mysteries. 
Rather, the lover achieves an immortality through the indissolubility which follows from 
sameness or oneness with the Form. After presenting this interpretation of immortality, 
I outline how it might resolve outstanding concerns relating to the Aristotelian 
reception of Plato’s Theory of Forms. 
 
 V.a. The rival theories: External immortalities 
 
The claim that philosophy can offer immortality has not gone over well. Held refers 
to ascensions to godlikeness in both the Symposium and the Theaetetus when he laments, 
“And what mortal can do that? […] Closure and full delineation of truth and reality, 
through rational inquiry, is not possible for mortals.”137  Can erôs fulfil its promise? 
What can Diotima mean that the lover, in contact with the Form of beauty itself, can 
                                                
136 Symposium, 212a. 
137 Dirk t.D. Held, “Eros, Beauty, and the Divine in Plato,” New England Classical Journal 36:3 (2009): 167. 
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inherit immortality? Three interpretations of this immortality—which dominate the 
literature—posit that this immortality is gained externally, that is, in virtue of some 
additional circumstance or party: vicarious immortality by torch-bearers, vicarious 
immortality by remembrance, and immortality by contact.  
By immortality by torch-bearers I refer to that view according to which one obtains 
a vicarious immortality by her ideas, values, methods, or other major missions in life 
‘living on’ through, most often, students who can preserve and keep alive the teacher’s 
passionate fire.138  The idea that one’s most influential teachers attain a form of 
immortality in the generations of students they leave behind is, of course, a beautiful 
and poetic testament to inspiring teaching. Nevertheless, this is not immortality of the 
lover: what is being passed on from generation to generation, and what never dies in 
such cases are her ideas, values, and methods. However much one holds an idea to be 
the truth and worth preserving, there is a fundamental difference between immortality 
of the inventor and immortality of the invention. What the lover in contact with the 
Form of beauty engenders is in her own soul, and so is not left behind in her 
students.139  This view of immortality by the perpetuation of students likely gets its 
impetus from a particular interpretation of what Diotima means by ‘birth in beauty’. 
This obscure phrase is commonly held to mean birth ‘in a beautiful body’, that is, in the 
soul or mind of a student.140  Obdrzalek also finds this vicarious immortality 
problematic, but I disagree with her reason for rejecting it. She argues that this 
imposing ideas on others aligns with the forgetfulness and studying by refreshing one’s 
                                                
138 A.W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 21-35, 43, 49-54; 
Martin Warner, “Love, Self and Plato’s Symposium,” The Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1979): 336; Stanley 
Rosen, Plato’s Symposium, 275-276; Hackforth, 45; Terrence Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 342-343; Rowe, “Socrates and Diotima: Eros, Immortality, and Creativity” 
[“Socrates and Diotima”], Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy XIV, eds. John J. 
Cleary and Gary M. Gurtler (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1998), 257; White, “Virtue in Plato’s 
Symposium” [“Virtue”], Classical Quarterly 54:2 (2004): 373; White [“Beauty”], 75. Sir Kenneth Dover, 
Plato: Symposium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 146-159; and Neumann, 44, 39 take a 
largely negative view of this means of immortality, which, on their interpretations, is indoctrination.   
139 Hence Pender, 85. I would add, though, that there is nothing stopping this lover from leaving behind ideas 
as well as producing virtue in the soul. These ideas are, however, not the lover and it is the potential 
immortality of the lover with which our explanation is concerned. 
140 Rowe [“Socrates and Diotima”], 256, argues that procreation is in the beautiful beloved. 
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memory, which is then contrasted by Plato with “the real thing at 208a7-b4”.141  If this 
is the case, she would need to account for how we humans—in obtaining 
immortality—suddenly jump to the kind of immortality the gods have. 
Related to immortality by torch-bearers is immortality by remembrance, by 
performing such wondrous deeds or exemplifying such greatness of soul so as to secure 
being remembered forever. Living on in the minds of those who remember you played a 
significant role in ancient Greek culture and theology, which accounts for Diotima’s 
explaining the lower levels of erôs in terms of remembrance. For these reasons, it is 
unsurprising that a great many commentators understand this as the only kind of 
immortality available to humans at the height of the ascent.142  Lear, for example, 
asserts, “For it is only by acting in a genuinely beautiful way, in a way that commands 
the admiration of human beings across great reaches of time, that their names will be 
remembered and praised.”143  One significant problem with remembrance as the basis 
for immortality, however, is that it is no doubt possible to be remembered for being 
hideously and notoriously evil. If Plato wants the beholding of true beauty to be the 
best life imaginable, one which leads to the friendship of the gods and the inheritance of 
immortality, it is doubtful this can be just as easily accomplished through performing 
such nefarious deeds that one is remembered forever for vice. To this it can be objected 
that, for Plato’s audience, the prospect of an honourable remembrance was what was 
important—one’s notoriety echoing through eternity could never be desired. However, 
if what we are attempting to ascertain in Plato’s theory is the function by which 
immortality could be thought to be bestowed, simply being held in memory will 
accomplish this, honour not required. So, if Diotima’s invitation to immortality must 
be both functional and moral, immortality by remembrance is not sufficient. 
                                                
141 Suzanne Obdrzalek, “Moral Transformation and the Love of Beauty in Plato’s Symposium,” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 48:4 (2010): 442. 
142 Lear [“Permanent”], 109; Warner, 336; Rowe [“Socrates and Diotima”], 257; White [“Virtue”], 373; 
White [“Beauty”], 75.   
143 Lear [“Permanent”], 109. 
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A third interpretation of the kind of immortality Diotima has in mind is an 
immortality attained through contact with what is already immortal—the Form.144  
Obdrzalek dismisses this possibility as “philosophically unfathomable”,145  and I agree 
that it is not immediately clear what manner of contact alone might be able to bestow 
immortality. The focus is certainly a philosophic endeavour of some kind—the lengthy 
description of the Form of beauty, the language of lessons, and Diotima’s summary of 
an erotic education in 211b-d all resonate with passages elsewhere in the corpus146 —
but it would be a mistake to assume that what is aimed at in the ascent is merely and 
solely an intellectual achievement. The immortality spoken of does not arise after 
cognitive or visual contact with the Form alone, but after the begetting of true virtue. 
Diotima does not say that the lover becomes immortal because of beholding the Form, 
but that beholding the Form enables the lover to bring to birth “because he is grasping 
what is true” and that “once he has given birth to and nurtured true virtue” then he 
might become immortal.147  In 1950, Hackforth admitted that, to his knowledge, none 
of the commentaries acknowledged this point.148  Instead, the focus was almost solely 
on passive contemplation, put forward with such certainty as: “The philosopher, we are 
told, is especially entitled to be called immortal in virtue of his ability to see ideal 
truth”,149  “This (sc. The apprehension of the Idea of Beauty) alone…confers upon him 
immortality”,150  “This ascent which leads to the sight of the beautiful itself…is also the 
way to…immortality,”151  and “in so far as he is a philosopher, a purely rational soul, 
grasping eternal objects, he is immortal”.152  This trend of ignoring the begetting 
requirement and focussing solely on the intellectual achievement as the means of 
immortality continues, with Sheffield claiming “Finally, the [lover in contact with true 
                                                
144 Bury, xliv-xlv; Paul Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 196; Charles 
Kahn, “Plato’s Theory of Desire,” Review of Metaphysics 41 (1987): 94. 
145 Obdrzalek, 442. 
146 For example, the Sun and Line Similes in the Republic. 
147 Symposium, 212a. 
148 Hackforth, 44. 
149 R.K. Gaye, The Platonic Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas (London: C.J. 
Clay and Sons, 1904), 28. 
150 Shorey, 196. 
151 Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, vol. 2 (London: Murray, 1964), 392. 
152 Bury, xlv, n. 3. 
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beauty] recreates himself as ‘godlike’ in the activity of contemplation.”153  While 
contact of some kind must be necessary for the immortality, it is not sufficient: birth is 
required, and birth can only happen in beauty. The benefit of acknowledging this 
begetting part of the equation is that it explains how that immortality is acquired in a 
way that passive contact or gazing alone cannot. 
 
 V.b. The sameness of the Form 
 
I propose, therefore, that these three interpretations of the immortality to which 
Diotima refers do not quite grasp it entirely, and that all fail because they do not 
contend with how she discusses immortality earlier in the speech. Obdrzalek asks,  
In the ascent, the Form is characterized as eternal, perfectly unchanging 
and unaffected—exactly the characteristics which Plato earlier identifies 
with genuine immortality, and which he categorically denies to human 
nature (208a7-b4). Does the philosopher’s soul undergo some radical 
change in kind, such that it becomes capable, now, of true 
immortality?154  
 
This notion of “genuine”, “true”, or “full”155  immortality, however, is puzzling given 
the very passage Obdrzalek cites. Here, Plato makes no reference to any kind of tiered 
or qualified immortality, but rather plainly states that gods and mortals (and, 
presumably, daimons) have different kinds of immortality—defined differently, and 
attained differently. Much as it is irksome to consider different kinds of immortality, it 
must surely be more problematic to consider degrees of immortality, as Obdrzalek et al. 
appear to do. At 207d-208b, Diotima presents these two types of immortality: that by 
which mortals could be immortal, and that by which the gods are immortal. In the one 
realm, “Mortal nature is capable of immortality only in this way, through the process of 
                                                
153 Sheffield, 151. Though Sheffield acknowledges that “generation is the way in which the mortal partakes 
of immortality”, on her reading, this generation “just is” thought or contemplation. 
154 Obdrzalek, 442. 
155 Ibid., 442, 441, n. 71. See also Osborne, 108, “pukka immortality”; Sheffield, 147, “literal immortality”; 
Lloyd Gerson, “A Platonic Reading of Plato’s Symposium,” in Plato’s Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and 
Reception, eds. James H. Lesher, Debra Nails, and Frisbee Sheffield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 50, 65, “real immortality” as opposed to “quasi-immortality possible in reproduction”; Rowe 
[“Socrates and Diotima”], 248, “actual immortality”; Santas, “Plato’s Theory of Eros in the Symposium: 
Abstract,” Noûs 13:1 (1979): 72, “strict or divine immortality…[vs.] human immortality, remaining the 
same in a lesser sense”; and Hackforth, 44, “immortal par excellence”. 
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generation”, bringing into being something new and losing what was had before.156  
While she does say that the lover really is bringing new bits of body and soul into being, 
and in that sense is preserved for some time, Diotima is careful here not to say that the 
lover remains the same. Rather, she says that by this process the lover can be “said to 
be”, “spoken of as”, “called”, and “thought to be” the same.157  Her hesitancy here 
implies that the lover is not in fact the self-same over time. Diotima asserts quite clearly 
that mortal things are the way they are, or have the attributes they do, by generation. 
Whereas, in the other realm, the gods have “a different way” of being immortal: 
“always being absolutely the same forever.”158  Bury makes an interesting distinction on 
this point between temporal immortality and immortality of being, which is worth 
considering as mapped onto the two methods of immortality Diotima presents.159  If the 
mortal’s way of immortality is constant renewal, this accounts for continuity over time. 
The gods however, are also the same over time—which Plato includes in his mention of 
the gods’ “always” (ἀεὶ) being the same.160  The concept of the essential sameness of 
gods and changeableness of man is captured in the illustration of triangles inherited by 
Plato’s second successor at the Academy, Xenocrates, and recorded almost exactly from 
Plutarch to Proclus: 
[T]he equilateral he compared to the nature of the gods, the scalene to 
that of man, and the isosceles to that of the daimons; for the first is 
equal in all its lines, the second unequal in all, and the third is partly 
equal and partly unequal, like the nature of the daimons, which have 
human emotions and godlike power.161  
 
The key difference between the two manners of immortality Plato presents in the 
Symposium is the essential sameness of the divine—sameness over time, yes, but also 
exact sameness barring individual or internal change of any kind.  
                                                
156 Symposium, 207d. 
157 Ibid., 207d4, 207d5, 207d7, 208a3. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980b: “numerous memories of the same 
thing eventually produce the effect of a single experience.” 
158 Symposium, 208a. 
159 Bury, xlv, n. 2.  
160 It is noteworthy that the two mechanisms of immortality are, in fact, diametrically opposed: one is 
achieved through constant change, the other through sameness. 
161 Plutarch, On the Failure of Oracles, 416d. Cf. Xenocrates F 233 Isnardi-Parente = Proclus, In Remp., II. 
48.4ff. 
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If Diotima is right that it might be acceptable to call the kind of preservation 
mortals can get by constantly renewing parts of themselves ‘immortality’, ought mortals 
even dare to dream of obtaining unqualified sameness? Or are they stuck to their lot of 
preservation-immortality without ever being themselves same over any length of time? 
What manner of immortality does the lover who beholds and is together with the true 
Form of beauty stand to gain? In what follows, I argue that the bringing to birth of true 
virtue would, if it were possible, bring the lover the immortality of sameness—unity and 
oneness with the Form. Indissolubility is a kind of perfect unity, and unity with the 
immortal is the most secure immortality mortals may strive to achieve. 
This account does not require a change in the mode of immortality. The mortal way 
of acquiring immortality is always the same, at all levels of the ascent: generation and 
bringing to birth. This is true even at the height of the ascent—as argued above, 
Diotima is clear that generation is still involved and is in fact the necessary condition 
for human immortality. What is different about the lover who can secure the same 
immortality as that of the gods’ is that what this lover generates is true virtue whereas 
the lower lovers generate only “phantom images of virtue”, qualified and transient.162  I 
take Plato’s argument to include the following steps: 
 
1. The Form is true, unqualified, and always the same  
2. What is true, is perfect 
3. The lover generates true virtue  
4. Generating is the mortal way of being and becoming 
∴ The lover becomes perfect 
∴ The lover becomes the same as the Form 
5. Two which are the same are indissoluble 
6. The Form is immortal 
7. The lover has become the same as the Form 
∴ The lover is immortal 
 
To this it may be objected that it is the lover’s beauty or virtue that is immortal, being 
the same as the Form, but not the lover herself as a whole. Yet, perhaps what it means 
to generate true and perfect virtue and beauty of soul in fact encompasses every aspect 
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of the lover’s being: body and soul. If this is what Plato has in mind, it paves the way for 
beauty to have a significant causal role in his teleology, a prospect to be examined in 
more detail in the final chapter of this thesis. That the lover’s immortality stems from 
perfection of soul is espoused by Bury, O’Brien, and Sheffield, though none of these 
commentaries explain how this perfection is achieved beyond passive contemplation.163  
Obdrzalek objects to this line of reasoning because it “requires an unannounced shift in 
the sense of athanatos, from everlasting to perfect.”164  According to my reading, 
however, the perfection of soul is not just a perfection that simply yields immortality. 
Rather, the generation of true, perfect, unqualified beauty of soul means the lover and 
the Form are one.  
Plato’s revolutionary idea is what is implicit in premise 5: Two which are the same 
are indissoluble. What is one is indissoluble. The same is true of two entities if, though 
two, they are always alike. If what is one cannot be dissolved, then neither can 
compounds between whose elements there is no inconsistency. This is echoed in 
Aquinas, “For corruption is found only where there is contrariety.”165  The Forms have 
no essential contrariety. Achieving togetherness with the Form leads, if possible, to 
becoming the same as them, and so secures the immortality of indissolubility.166   
 
                                                
163 Bury, xliv-xlv; Michael J. O’Brien, “Becoming Immortal in Plato’s Symposium,” in Greek Poetry and 
Philosophy, ed. D. E. Gerber (Chico, CA: Scholar’s Press, 1984), 200-201; Sheffield, 151. 
164 Obdrzalek, 443. 
165 “Non enim invenitur corruptio, nisi ubi invenitur contrarietas.” Summa Theologiae (Rome: Textum 
Leoninum, 1888), Ia q.75 a. 6 co. Recall that it was the essential complexity of the body that Socrates held to 
be responsible for change in the Affinity Argument of the Phaedo, on which see Silverman, 56-57. Unlike 
Aquinas, however, Plato holds that generation is “something divine”, 206c. 
166 This I take to be the metaphysical import of the final lines of John Donne’s “The good-morrow”: 
 What ever dies, was not mixt equally; 
 If our two loves be one, or, thou and I 
 Love so alike, that none do slacken, none can die. 
These lines prompted Coleridge, Donne’s greatest critic, to remark, “Too good for mere wit. It contains a 
deep practical truth—this Triplet.” In Metaphysical Lyrics & Poems of the Seventeenth Century: Donne to Butler, 
ed. Sir Herbert J.C. Grierson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), 1, 217. The reality of two individual entities, 
one becoming exactly the same as the other—not only in resemblance, but in activity—and thus securing an 
indissolubility whereby the virtue of their sameness ensures that they act always alike is, of course, the 
foundational premise of the physical phenomenon of Quantum Entanglement. Two which are exactly alike 
will respond with correlated activity, thereby gaining for the instantiation of information the indissolubility 
of a single entity. 
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 VI. INFLUENCE IN THE TRADITION: ARISTOTLE ON 
 PREDICATION, AND THE PRIME MOVER 
 
The interpretation offered in this chapter that the lover participates in the Form 
through the creative and generative activity of love offers insight into two controversial 
aspects of ancient metaphysics recorded in Aristotle: his assorted reformulations of the 
Third Man Argument; and his startling claim in the Metaphysics Λ that the Prime Mover 
moves the universe by being the object of desire. As the contributions of my theory to 
the reception of Plato in Aristotle are merely hypotheses, they will be presented only in 
broad brushstrokes here.  
The first concerns a new response to the so-called Third Man Argument offered by 
Parmenides in Plato’s eponymous dialogue, and referred to at several places in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Sophistic Refutations.167  While there is notable debate on the 
precise formulation of the Third Man Argument,168  I take the significant steps of the 
objection suitable for summary to be the following: if everything that is beautiful is so 
because it participates in the Form of beauty, and if the Form of beauty is itself 
beautiful,169  then the Form must be a member of the set of entities that so participate. 
The Form, however, must be distinct from particulars, therefore a third entity must be 
needed to explain how the beautiful particulars and the Form of beauty are beautiful, 
which leads to an infinite regress damaging to the uniqueness of Forms. Meinwald’s 
groundbreaking solution, developed by Pelletier and Zalta against later objections, was 
that Plato meant for us to recognise the difference between the Form’s being beautiful 
in relation to beautiful particulars, and its being beautiful in relation to itself.170  The 
two ways of immortality presented in the Symposium, however, appear to offer another 
angle to this solution. The Form of beauty itself is beautiful in a different way than 
                                                
167 Parmenides, 132a-133b; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 84.23-85.3, 93.1-7, 990b17 = 1079a13, 1039a2, 1059b8; 
Sophistic Refutations, 178b36 
168 I set aside, for now, the contradictions presented by Vlastos, “The third man argument in the 
Parmenides,” Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 319-349.  
169 As at least implied by Diotima at several places in 210d-211e, especially 210e, “something wonderfully 
beautiful in its nature”. I follow Rowe [Plato], 198 at 211a2-5 ad loc. that this is unproblematic. 
170 Meinwald, “Good-bye to the Third Man,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Francis Jeffry Pelletier and Edward N. Zalta, “How to Say 
Goodbye to the Third Man,” Noûs 34:2 (2002). 
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particular beauties are beautiful: it is beautiful not just “via Being” as opposed to via 
participation as Silverman argues,171  but specifically, by always being the same to itself, a 
kind of internal consistency.  
A second implication of interpreting participation through love is that it sheds light 
on Aristotle’s surprising claim in the Metaphysics Λ that the Prime Mover moves the 
universe by being the object of desire. A key feature of his physics and metaphysics, the 
Prime Mover is Aristotle’s idea of a necessary and first cause in the universe. He 
establishes that if all movement depends on there being a mover, there must be a first 
mover that is the source of all motion in the universe: “for there is something which 
always moves that which is moved, and the ‘prime mover’ is itself unmoved.”172  
Crucially, Aristotle wants this Prime Mover to cause the movement of the universe not 
as a strictly efficient cause—because that would require a change to itself—but as a 
final cause, the end goal of the movement itself.173  Regarding how, exactly, the Prime 
Mover can achieve this effect, Aristotle is infamously reticent.174  In Chapter 7 of the 
Metaphysics Λ, Aristotle observes, “The object of desire (τὸ ὀρεκτὸν) and the object of 
thought move without being moved.”175  Demonstrating that the objects of desire 
include what is best and most beautiful, and hence in itself choice-worthy, he claims 
that the way the Prime Mover causes motion in the universe while remaining unmoved, 
is by attraction: “it causes motion as being an object of love (ὡς ἐρώμενον).”176  While 
                                                
171 Silverman, 111. 
172 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1012b30, and cf. his Physics, 259a. 
173 While the traditional understanding of the Prime Mover is as a final cause, noteworthy objections have 
been made in recent years, e.g. Broadie, “Que fait le premier moteur d’Aristote?”, Revue Philosophique 183:2 
(1993); Lindsay Judson, “Heavenly Motion and the Unmoved Mover,” in Self-Motion from Aristotle to 
Newton, eds. Mary Louise Gill and James Lennox (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Caston, 
“Aristotle’s Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal,” Phronesis 44:3 (1999): 199-227; Enrico Berti, “Unmoved 
mover(s) as efficient cause(s) in Metaphysics Λ 6,” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ: Symposium Aristotelicum, eds. 
Michael Frede and David Charles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 181-206; and Chang, 431, 436-
437, the details of which I cannot go into here, but see Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 74, n. 7. 
174 Osborne, 133. 
175 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072a26 
176 Ibid., 1072b3. On the rare use of erôs in such a context for Aristotle, and its relation to desire, see Kenneth 
Sacks, Understanding Emerson: “The American Scholar” and His Struggle for Self-reliance (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 72-97, esp. 78-80; Leo J. Elders, Aristotle's Theology: A Commentary on Book 
Lambda of the Metaphysics (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Corcum, 1972), 174 ad loc. 1072b3. On the 
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attempts have been made to connect Aristotle’s hypothesis with Plato’s account of erôs 
in the Symposium, my interpretation of love as participation resolves some of the 
outstanding issues in drawing that connection. 
It was a short step for Aristotle to turn the metaphysical Platonic relation of 
becoming through generation into a causal relation of Prime Mover to physical 
movement. In a recent article, Chang argues against Lloyd to claim not only that 
“Plato’s treatment of the Beautiful [in the Symposium] foreshadows Aristotle’s 
understanding of the Unmoved Mover in its nature and function”, but that Aristotle’s 
account of the Prime Mover as cause of particular objects being what they are is “a 
revision of Plato’s notion of the Form of the Beautiful.”177  The radical difference 
between Chang’s interpretation and what I have argued for above is that Chang posits 
the Form of beauty as the object of love. This is a neat and tidy solution, but suffers a 
damaging objection for the connection he draws between Plato and Aristotle. For he 
claims that Aristotle’s major development of and contribution to Plato’s theory was to 
extend the range of objects subject to the efficacy of the Prime Mover to the universe as 
a whole, including inanimate objects.178  This places the Prime Mover in contrast to the 
Form, “whose influence does not extend beyond the world of mortals.”179  At stake here 
is whether the account of participation I find in the Symposium can hold for non-mortal 
participation. By holding the object of love to be generation, rather than the Form of 
beauty, my interpretation accounts for the way in which love moves the lover. Simply 
having the Prime Mover—or, in Plato’s case, the Form—attract the universe does not 
explain what they are doing when they move, in order to move. With love’s object 
generation, the Symposium shows how one moves in becoming increasingly closer to 
true beauty. Even if it is granted that Plato does not offer the relation of love as capable 
of extending to inanimate objects—putting aside the simple solution of creator-product 
efficient cause, where the producer’s love becomes the required love responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                     
import of this account to subsequent theories of motion and cosmology, see Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space, 
and Motion (London: Duckworth, 1988), 219-226. 
177 Chang, 431, 446. 
178 Ibid., 440-441, 446 
179 Ibid., 441. 
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product’s being what it is—this is still not a problem for my theory because the 
language of striving, desiring, and even loving to be is employed by Plato in his 
descriptions of inanimate particulars’ participation elsewhere in the corpus, as discussed 
above. This should satisfy those who would assert Aristotle’s extension here is unique, 
for it is the same line of reasoning Aristotle himself takes to cast the love model over a 
particularly difficult set of inanimate objects: the stars. He writes, “A tradition has been 
handed down by the ancient thinkers of very early times, and bequeathed to posterity in 
the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the 
Divine pervades the whole of nature.”180  By making the heavenly bodies conscious gods, 
he is able to build his account in Chapter 7 that a perception of the objects of love and 
the objects of thought is required to effect movement. Otherwise, Aristotle’s system 
suffers from the threat of inconsistency posed by Aquinas between a supreme first 
principle responsible for all being and movement, and constituents of the world 
unaffected, impervious, or inaccessible to that power.181  If Aristotle can successfully 
account for the Prime Mover being the cause of inanimate objects’ material and formal 
existence through the model of love and striving, so can Plato.  
Chang asserts that “although Plato argues that the Form of the Beautiful is a divine 
thing (θεῖον, Symposium 208b1, 211e3), he does not make it a god (θεὸς) as Aristotle 
does the Unmoved Mover (Metaph. 1072b25, b28-30).”182  Chang says the reason 
Aristotle does this is due to the necessity for Aristotle to ascribe thought to the Prime 
Mover, so that it becomes a conscious being, and so must be anthropomorphised into a 
god. Of course, Plato does associate the Form of beauty with a deity: Καλλονή, 




                                                
180 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1074b1-5. 
181 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a. 70. 3.; Osborne, 132-138. 
182 Chang, 438. 
183 Symposium, 206d. On the goddess, see Hermann Usener, Kleine Schriften, Vol. 4, Arbeiten zur 
Religionsgeschichte (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), 1-92, esp. 90-91. 
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 VII. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have offered an account of participation to be found in the 
Symposium: just as Erôs the daimon navigates the interval between gods and men, 
binding the two together into a unity and enabling the transport of desire and desert 
between them, so the generative emotion of love is the mortal method of participation 
in the Forms, bridging the realms of different ontological type. The Symposium therefore 
offers a complete account of the participation relation that binds mortal and immortal, 
particular and Form. The Form of the beautiful makes all things beautiful through 
participation, and particulars and Forms are bound together in this way to comprise a 
united, teleological system for Plato. Love in response to beautiful particulars motivates 
human action, beginning with the cognitive progress from sensible perception of those 
particulars to knowledge of what makes them beautiful: the Form. In the best cases, the 
experience and knowledge of beauty inspires the generation of new beauty in the soul of 
the lover—an active endeavour which elucidates Plato’s identification of love as being 
of bringing to birth. Plato’s theory of daimonic, philosophic love provides an 
explanation of how inconstant particulars can actively relate to the eternal, immutable 
Forms. Participation in the beautiful, is to become beautiful. One becomes beautiful by 
generating the true virtue of beauty within herself, and thus participates in that holism 
in her becoming uniquely beautiful.  
This is the most immortal of all engendering, and makes one dear to the gods and as 
immortal as a mortal can be. She is dear to the gods to the extent that she is like them, 
and is herself like them to the extent that she, by engendering a productive excellence 
within herself, has effected the Forms’ causal activity. The best, beautiful mortal works 
to bring about as much beauty in the sensible world as possible, by engendering it most 
clearly. The reason the emotional goes hand-in-hand with the metaphysical in this 
dialogue, is because Plato has endeavoured to build a single, naturalistic process of 
becoming that explains both. The process changes only with respect to context, but not 
content. This theory of participation harnesses the motivational capacity of love, which 
identifies the relation as distinctly not a passive one. The entire ascent passage concerns 
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itself with individual movement and change: exploring and learning about the wider 
world in coming to behold the great sea of beauty, and the personal development of 
virtue and beauty of the soul. Such a life, far from proving “a sorry sort of thing”, 184  





                                                
184 Symposium, 211e-212a. 





 CHAPTER V: 
 




Argument: The generation of beauty as a virtue of soul can only happen in beholding the 
beautiful because beauty is our access to knowledge of the true. Accordingly, the theory of 
participation defended in this thesis yields constructive implications for moral education.  
 
 
The Symposium demonstrates that love leads to cognitive pursuit which manifests in 
a desire to generate beauty in the soul. Love can thus be seen to have both educational 
and creative value when engaged in the presence of beauty. But what is it about beauty 
that leads to this education which, in the best cases, results in virtue? The details of the 
ascent passage, as analysed in Chapter 3, make it clear that beauty is a fundamentally 
attractive concept, one that makes the lover curious to know more about it. I have 
argued that this element of love thusly sets in motion a mechanism of self-creation, 
whereby the lover makes herself beautiful. As one comes to learn about the various 
beauties present in the world, she can develop her understanding of the Form of beauty 
itself in the cognitive attainment of realising and beholding the essential one over the 
many beautiful particulars. The question remains, however: why should beauty motivate 
this cognitive and creative activity?  
In her account of the Form of beauty’s role in the creative process, Diotima makes 
the startling claim that generation can only occur “in beauty”.1 In this chapter, I argue 
that the generation of beauty as a virtue of soul can only happen in beholding the 
beautiful because beauty is our access to knowledge of the true. Beauty’s attracting 
nature is the result of its bearing every mark of the Forms in a manner of clarity unique 
                                                
1 Symposium, 206c-d. 
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to it. It is only through beauty that one may access the virtue of soul one can truly 
attain. 
I will first outline the background in the Symposium text in which Diotima describes 
the Form’s role in generation, along with an overview of the Greek term for beauty, 
καλόν, which demonstrates how Plato appropriates this term for his own argument; 
next, this textual and historical background provides support for an explanation of why 
generation can only happen in beholding beauty: beauty is our access to truth. The final 
section of this chapter then turns to an examination of practical implications of this 
argument for a broad conception of the content and context of a moral education that 
engages the emotions. 
 
 
 I. BEAUTY’S ROLE IN GENERATION 
 
 I.a. Beauty, Καλλονή, καλός, and κάλλος  
 
In the prelude to her discussion of the lower and higher mysteries, Diotima makes a 
number of startling claims about the human capacity for generation. Whilst all humans 
are “pregnant” both in body and in soul, and all desire to give birth, she says, there is a 
specific requirement for this giving birth. She asserts of human nature that 
it is incapable of giving birth in ugliness, but only in beauty, for the 
being together (συνουσία) of a man and woman is a bringing to birth. It 
is a divine affair, this engendering and bringing to birth (κύησις καὶ ἡ 
γέννησις), and it is an immortal element in the creature that is mortal. 
It is impossible for this to happen in the unfitting, and the ugly is 
unfitting with everything divine, but the beautiful is fitting (ἁρμόττον). 
So Kallone [Beauty] is the Moira [Fate] and Eileithyia [Clever Midwife] 
for birth.2  
 
                                                
2 Symposium, 206c-d. In an ancient hymn attributed to Olen, sung in Delos, Eileithyia was called the mother 
of Erôs, as described in Pausanias, Description of Greece, vol. III, trans. W.H.S. Jones (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1933), 8.21.3. Moira was a birth-goddess in Homer’s Illiad, trans. A.T. Murray (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1924), XXIV.209. On Kallone, see n. 40 in Chapter 3, §I.a.  
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At the end of this passage, we learn that beauty (personified here as the goddess, 
Kallone) presides over generation. Beauty overseas all creation. I formulate what I take 
to be the steps of this slightly unusual argument below: 
1. The togetherness of a man and woman is a generation 
2. Generation is an immortal element of human nature 
3. Generation is divine 
4. The beautiful is harmonious with the divine 
∴ The beautiful is harmonious with generation 
5. The ugly is not harmonious with the divine 
∴ The ugly is not harmonious with generation 
∴ Human nature can only generate in communion with beauty, never with 
ugliness 
 
A number of crucial premises are, of course, missing from this argument. We can 
nevertheless understand these sweeping statements to conclude that generation is 
something divine, and can only happen in the beautiful because generation can only 
happen in or with what is fitting or harmonious to the divine, and the beautiful is fitting 
to the divine. Is the beautiful the only thing fitting with the divine? What about truth, 
or goodness? To investigate this, I shall first turn to the specific concept we are dealing 
with in these passages of the Symposium: τὸ καλόν. 
The Greek term καλός, as the adjectival form of τὸ καλόν, the beautiful, is 
commonly translated as either “beautiful” or “fine”.3 When applied to a person, the 
term usually carries with it a sense of the visual—as a human characteristic, the familiar 
sense of being perceptibly beautiful, pretty, handsome, or attractive—but this is not the 
extent of its use within the Greek society of Plato’s day. Inanimate objects, sensible 
phenomena, activities, and actions can also be καλός. Artefacts called καλός are praised 
with respect to their efficacy, how well they are made, and how well they perform their 
intended function—that for which they were created.4 Furthermore, whilst “neat and 
                                                
3 Of the most accepted recent translations, Christopher Rowe says ‘beautiful’ is “generally the most 
appropriate translation in Symp.” Plato: Symposium (Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1998), 172 ad loc. 
201c1-2. For the background senses of καλός, and its relation to other moral terms, especially ἀγαθός, see, 
still, Sir Kenneth Dover, Greek Popular Morality at the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), esp. 69-73. 
4 Aryeh Kosman, “Beauty and the Good: Situating the Kalon,” Classical Philology 105:4, Special Issue: Beauty, 
Harmony, and the Good (2010): 342. 
WARE CHAPTER V: THE VIRTUE OF BEAUTY 180 
 
  
well-proportioned”, “fair-cheeked”, or “manly” could be said of a person’s body, to 
describe a person as καλός would be to suggest the bearer of that quality was 
admirable, creditable, or honourable.5 This is reflected in the fact that in later Greek 
usage, κάλλος even replaced ἀγαθός as the general term for ‘good’.6 The opposite of 
καλός—αἰσχρός (ugly)—also demonstrates the moral aspect of beauty Plato’s 
contemporaries would have recognised. To be αἰσχρός is to be disgraceful, shameful, 
even scandalous. Inscriptions in Attic pottery, as well as representations in ancient 
graffiti, describing a person as καλός implied that the person was, yes, beautiful in the 
sense of appearance—that element does not leave the concept—but also in the sense of 
sophistication and even moral uprightness. Calling someone καλός was therefore an 
indication of the promise of good and beautiful behaviour in the future as well as a 
statement regarding their status at the present moment.7 If this association is correct, as 
Nehamas asserts, “to describe people as kaloi is to go beyond the features of their 
appearance and indicate an assessment of their status and actions as well. It is to make a 
forward-looking judgment.”8  
When experiencing something καλός, as Dover suggests, “[f]avourable reactions 
include unspoken thoughts such as ‘I wish I could be like that!’.”9 This sense resonates 
with much of what we have gathered from the Symposium. When the καλός object is an 
external object, there is the judgement that one’s life would be better if this object were 
a part of it, and the sustained desire that the object continue to be present to the 
beholder.  
The desire to be like a καλός person is a claim about more than one’s physical 
appearance, but it is here that the translation ‘beautiful’ runs into difficulty in the 
                                                
5 [Ἀ]στεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 4.3, 1125b6-8); καλλιπάρηος (Homer, Iliad, 
I.143); ἀνδρικός (Republic, 474e). 
6 Dover, 71. 
7 François Lissarague, “Publicity and Performance: Kalos Inscriptions in Attic Vase‐Painting,” in Performance 
Culture and Athenian Democracy, eds. Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), esp. 360, 365. 
8 Alexander Nehamas, “Beauty of Body, Nobility of Soul: The Pursuit of Love in Plato’s Symposium,” in 
Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, ed. Dominic Scott (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 103. 
9 Dover, 70. 
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contemporary aesthetic scholarship. Kosman, for example, laments that the range of 
objects described as καλός within Plato’s dialogues is simply too broad to account for 
the relatively specific content of the English term ‘beautiful’, concluding that it would 
be “misleading” to translate it as such categorically.10  However, I maintain that the very 
content of beautiful beloveds in the Symposium’s ascent passage demonstrates that it is 
precisely this range of beauties—from boys to poetry to the sciences to a friend’s 
character—that all qualify as beautiful. For, as Lear insists, Plato’s underlying point in 
that passage was to build the account that each of these objects do have something 
essential in common: they all participate in the Form of beauty!11  Whether or not 
‘beautiful’ turns out to be the most appropriate translation for the term, it is 
nevertheless clear that Plato intended it to encompass far more than surface-level 
appearance. What is there on the surface, however, held an especial role for Plato, as 
indicated in both the Symposium and, more explicitly, in the Phaedrus.12  Beauty 
manifests a certain claritas, a radiance shining forth from the object that catches the 
senses and prompts further engagement and focus. Beauty, perhaps, is indicative of its 
ability to lead to knowledge. 
  
 I.b. Why is generation only in the beautiful? 
 
What we can discern from Diotima’s description of Kallone is that generation can 
only happen in the beautiful because—at least on the account that I have argued is 
presented in the Symposium—generation is a self-creative, bringing-into-being of new 
beauty and virtue in the lover. It is our human nature to bring to birth, and the best 
realisation of that nature is to bring to birth true virtue.13  One’s virtue is her good, just 
as a knife’s good is to be sharp. By positing love’s activity as the participation relation, 
we can articulate just how moral virtue includes the ordering of affective motivation. 
To be virtuous, one must first become virtuous; to become virtuous, one needs to 
                                                
10 Kosman, 348-349, 351. 
11 Gabriel Richardson Lear, “Response to Kosman,” Classical Philology 105:4, Special Issue: Beauty, Harmony, 
and the Good (2010): 359. 
12 Phaedrus, 250c-e. 
13 Symposium, 206c, 212a-b. 
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produce virtue, or have virtue produced in her; and to produce virtue is, as we have 
seen, a matter of generation. The Form of beauty is necessary for this task. This is a 
teleological generation, and the Symposium’s account of how one ascends to her 
potential. By creating beauty one participates in beauty, and this is the immortal 
activity in which mortals may partake: the power within us to shape our future 
becoming. Erôs, on the other hand, is the quasi-divine element within the mortal, the 
co-worker with human nature to realise the end goal of that human nature. 
If generation is the bringing into being of new beauty, then there are two accounts 
by which generation can only happen in beholding the beautiful: the naïve, and the 
sophisticated. On the naïve account, the generation of new beauty requires beauty 
(whether the Form of beauty, or some other existing beautiful particular) as a pattern to 
look to in that creation. This is, of course, very practical: every artist needs her model. 
Even in the case of conceptual creativity, it is the idea, impetus, or inspiration behind 
the artwork which functions as muse manifested on the canvas. There is one crucial 
way, however, in which this account will not be able to harmonise with the moral 
theory of Socrates’ speech. If the only reason beauty is required for generation is for it 
to function as a model for creation, then surely ugliness or vice could so function as a 
model as well. Diotima’s story of erôs would result in, as it were, children of the night 
and so be the birth in ugliness she expressly denies is possible at 206c-d. Yet ugliness 
and vice very plainly exist in the world, a fact that Socrates clearly acknowledges.14   
The sophisticated account of how generation requires beauty holds that beauty is 
the philosopher-lover’s access to truth and the other moral Forms. The view of the 
lover in the Symposium goes as follows: she sees and is struck by something beautiful, 
and is immediately led to ask questions about it. She wants to know more about it: 
where it comes from, who made it, how it works, what it is like. Curiosity is the natural 
response of the soul to beauty. This curiosity is the mechanism of love: it is love 
working its power to shape and direct the course of one’s life. Generation can then only 
happen in the company of the beautiful because otherwise it would bring about a 
                                                
14 Symposium, 201e, 205e, 206c-d. 
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miscarriage of that development. In the Symposium, Diotima describes what happens 
with ugliness which explains clearly why it could not lead to generation of anything: 
ugliness makes one “shrink up, and turn away”15 . When an object, idea, or person is 
actually ugly—and not simply unusual—one recoils. This is a powerful indifference, 
impelling one in the opposite direction of knowledge of the object: she simply wishes to 
know nothing at all more about it. 
Beauty, precisely because it begs such curiosity, is therefore that element of the 
physical world that brings us access to the true and secure objects of knowledge. The 
view of the Form of beauty as a ‘gateway Form’ to the other Forms has been noted by 
Rist, who asserts, “For unless it is the case not only that Forms exist but that we want 
to know them, then they are of no help in our moral lives—and for Plato also for our 
intellectual lives”.16  Although in the Symposium the only Form mentioned is beauty, at 
least in this dialogue, beauty is all that is needed for the engendering that can make the 
lover “dear to the gods”.17  The received view regarding the Form of beauty’s privileged 
status in the Symposium is the dialogue’s setting: a symposium, at which the beauty on 
offer would be natural as a theme, especially in a discussion on erôs.18  But perhaps 
beauty is Plato’s example of a Form so frequently precisely because it bears all the 
marks of a Form: not only the technical requirements of Forms as satisfied in Diotima’s 
encomium at 210a-211c, but its function as a standard for evaluation, and an aim of 
moral excellence towards which to strive. 
 
 
 II. IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL EDUCATION 
 
I shall turn now to what I view as an opportunity for future development in the 
study of the emotions: what Plato’s discussion of love, beauty, and cognition in the 
Symposium might be able to contribute to our current understanding of the emotions’ 
role in moral development more generally. If love proves to be the mechanism by which 
                                                
15 Symposium, 206d. 
16 John M. Rist, Plato’s Moral Realism: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2012), 69. 
17 Symposium, 212a. 
18 On which, see n. 153 in Chapter 3, §III.a. 
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one shapes herself to realise her nature, then there is much room for building an 
account of how both love and beauty may be utilised proactively in teaching and 
learning. 
 
 II.a. Engaging the emotions in education 
 
Can the emotions be educated? Ought they? The past twenty years has witnessed a 
groundswell of academic interest in the emotions, with considerable attention being 
given to arguing and articulating their philosophical, political, and medical import.19  
Yet the role of emotions in moral education has seen an unfortunately neglectful 
polarisation, with as-yet unresolved tension pitting educating for rationality against 
educating for moral development of the total person. This is, of course, not a new 
debate. Accordingly, this interest has sparked something of a minor Renaissance of and 
academic focus on historical treatments of the emotions, particularly Aristotelian views 
on love and friendship, Stoic applications to psychological health, and pre-Socratic 
discussion of the emotions in the poetry of, for example, Hesiod and Empedocles.20  
Plato is often portrayed as advocating an abandonment of such emotions as love 
and desire, in order for the philosopher to have access to the true objects of knowledge. 
Yet, in the Symposium, he writes that a life without love is not worth living, and that 
love is the best chance the philosopher has at true knowledge of beauty and virtue. In 
                                                
19 Bruce Maxwell and Roland Reichenbach, “Educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis,” Studies in 
Philosophy and Education 26 (2007): 148. 
20 See, for example, the following newly-established research centres and projects: Aix-Marseille-Quebec’s Les 
émotions au Moyen Âge, established in 2006, (http://emma.hypotheses.org/?lang=fr_FR); Berlin’s Languages 
of Emotion Institute, established in 2007, (http://www.loe.fu-berlin.de/); the Max Plank Center for the 
History of Emotions, established in 2008, (http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/research/ history-of-
emotions); the Queen Mary Centre for the History of Emotions, established in 2008, 
(http://www.qmul.ac.uk/emotions/); Oxford’s The Social and Cultural Construction of Emotions: The 
Greek Paradigm project, established in 2009, (http://www.classics.ox.ac.uk/emotions.html); the Australian 
Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions, established in 2011, 
(http://www.historyofemotions.org.au); and Project C2Learn on emotional reasoning at Edinburgh’s 
EIDYN Centre for Epistemology, Mind, and Normativity, established in 2012, (http://eidyn.ppls. 
ed.ac.uk/c2learn); as well as, to name but three recent examples, Martha C. Nussbaum’s Political Emotions: 
Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Elena Carrera’s edited 
volume, Emotions and Health: 1200-1700 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2013); and the forthcoming 
Palgrave Macmillan series: Palgrave Studies in the History of Emotions. 
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what follows, I argue that education by attraction to the beautiful motivates moral 
development through a unique form of self-creation. I will first outline the state of the 
challenge between a solely cognitive basis for education, and one that allows for 
affective or emotional considerations. Next, I will show how Platonic virtue ethics, 
specifically his theory of love in moral development, holds out the most tenable 
prospect for an education of reason and emotion, as the emotive-cum-aesthetic power 
of love carries with it a distinctly creative element: the generation of virtue in the soul. 
Finally, I sketch three practical ways this creative love might be employed in the 
classroom. I conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to impel one to develop 
and shape herself. Beauty incites creation of beauty, and the mechanism for that 
creation is love. 
 
 II.b. Moral education review 
 
The instrumental and utilitarian trends that pervade significant areas of 
contemporary education are typified by the promotion of the value of school as being 
primarily or even solely in the service of economic benefit to state or student. In spite of 
such trends, there remains a sound argument for the view that education ought concern 
itself with a more comprehensive view of human development. Humans are undeniably 
emotional beings, and thus that personal development must take the emotions into 
serious consideration. The challenge is traditionally presented as between a strictly 
cognitive view of education, and one that seeks to shape the character through 
emotional development. A brief analysis of these two general views will provide insight 
into where a virtue ethical framework might be able to contribute a degree of 
reconciliation for moral educational curricula. 
The former view is made prominent by Kohlberg’s cognitivist understanding of moral 
development, which—stemming from Piagetian cognitive theory—takes that 
development to encompass only emotionally disinterested rational capabilities such as 
social cognition, problem solving, and perspective-taking without affect.21  On the 
                                                
21 Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on moral development, vol. I (New York, NY: Harper Row, 1984). Recent 
advocates of his structural-cognitive framework include Jennifer Chalmers and Michael A.R. Townsend, 
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Kolhbergian educational program of study, moral development is seen as largely the 
province of cognitive development, relegating emotion to the sidelines as impeding the 
rationality which is its exclusive focus. On the other hand, two influential anti-
Kolhbergian systems have also arisen in the literature: character education, as best 
exemplified in the works of Lickona and Kilpatrick,22  and the ethics of care defended by 
Noddings, Gilligan, Chodorow, and Slote.23  Proponents of character education “rally 
around the belief that the formation of moral dispositions is a vital part of moral 
education and ascribe to a comprehensive definition of character which views character 
as comprising dispositions of thought, action, and feeling.”24  The ethics of care take the 
emotion of caring to be “ontologically basic to human excellence” and that the aims of 
maintaining and enriching caring relationships must be the anchor of all educational 
                                                                                                                                     
“The effects of training in social perspective taking on socially maladjusted girls,” Child Development 61 
(1990): 178-190; Sigrun Aðalbjarnardóttir, “Promoting children’s social growth in schools: An intervention 
study,” Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 14 (1993): 461-484; Wolfgang Edelstein and Peter Fauser, 
Demokratie lernen und leben: Materialen zur Bildungsplanung und zur Forschungsförderung (Bonn: Bund-
Länder-Kommission für Bildungsplanung und zur Forschungsförderung, 2001); and John Gibbs, Moral 
development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffmann (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003).  
22 Thomas Lickona, Educating for character: how our schools can teach respect and responsibility (New York, 
NY: Bantam Doubleday Dell, 1992); William Kilpatrick, Why Johnny can’t tell right from wrong (New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992). Different but related strands of character education can be identified in the 
work of, e.g., Terrence McLaughlin and J. Mark Halstead, “Education in character, virtue,” in Education in 
morality, eds. Halstead and McLaughlin (London: Routledge, 1999), 132-173; and Jan Steutel and Ben 
Spiecker, “Cultivating sentimental dispositions through Aristotelian habituation,” Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 38:4 (2004): 531-549. 
23 Nel Noddings, Caring: A feminist approach to ethics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984) and 
The Challenge to Care in Schools [Challenge to Care] (New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 1992), esp. 171-
202; Carol Gilligan, In a different voice: psychological theory and women’s development (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1982); Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the 
Sociology of Gender (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978); Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Within sentimentalism, specific trends emerge championing one 
or the other of emotional understanding, emotional expression, emotional regulation, and empathy. See, e.g., 
Jonathan Cohen, ed., Educating minds and hearts: Social and emotional learning and the passage into adolescence 
(New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 1999) and Caring classrooms/intelligent schools: The social emotional 
education of young children (New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 2001); Maurice J. Elias, et al., Promoting 
social and emotional learning: guidelines for educators (Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development, 1997); David C. Grossman, et al., “Effectiveness of a violence prevention 
curriculum among children in elementary school: A randomized controlled trial,” Journal of the American 
Medical Association 277 (1997): 1605-1611; Susan D. McMahon, et al., “Violence Prevention: Program 
effects on urban preschool and kindergarten children,” Applied and Preventive Psychology 9 (2000): 271-281; 
and Carolyn Webster-Stratton, How to promote children’s social and emotional competence (London: Sage, 
1999). 
24 Maxwell and Reichenbach, 158. 
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activities and policies.25  Both of these theories, especially character education, may be 
mistaken for a brand of virtue ethics, but they differ in at least one significant respect 
when it comes to educating for moral development: neither character education nor the 
ethics of care appear to offer a specific mechanism for incorporating reason into their 
praxis. As Carr laments of care ethics, “it seems in itself to be opposed to any very 
principled definition of moral association.”26  
Is there a view of moral educational theory that does not place attentiveness to the 
emotions over and above the development of rational capacities, nor sacrifice them for a 
quasi-Kantian view of education that all but ignores the emotive aspect of ethical 
development? In what follows, I want to focus on the emotion of love and its role in 
educating for virtue. With this as a focus, I hope to show we can find such an 
educational theory in Platonic virtue ethics.  
 
 II.c. Platonic virtue ethics 
 
Virtue ethics can be argued to hold out more over its rival moral theories with 
regard to education since its focus takes into account the human soul as a whole—
specifically including emotions such as love, but also fear, shame, and the more 
contentious feelings of Schadenfreude, pride, anger, and maudlin.27  I identify three 
reasons for virtue ethics to be the primary candidate for a social scientific educational 
theory of moral development. First, virtue ethics is fundamentally about a particular 
ordering of the emotions so as to be compatible with reason. Plato’s discussion of the 
properly ordered soul in his dialogue, the Phaedrus, depicts reason as a charioteer 
harnessing the motivational force of an angry but righteous horse on the one hand, and 
                                                
25 Maxwell and Reichenbach, 155; Noddings [Challenge to Care]. 
26 David Carr, “On the contribution of literature and the arts to the educational cultivation of moral virtue, 
feeling and emotion” [“Literature”], Journal of Moral Education 34:2 (2005): 137-151, esp. 139; and “After 
Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory and Practice of Moral Education,” 
Studies in Philosophy and Education 15 (1996): 353-370. 
27 This thesis focusses on love, but for an account of “nasty emotions” versus “nice emotions”, see Ronald de 
Sousa, “Moral emotions,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2001): 109-126; Aaron Ben Ze’ev, “Are envy, 
anger, and resentment moral emotions?”, Philosophical Explorations 5:2 (2001): 148-154; and Kristján 
Kristjánsson, “Can we teach justified anger?”, Journal of Philosophy of Education 39:4 (2005): 671-689. Cf. 
Republic, 440c. 
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the wily but chaotic and desiderative horse on the other. The account is famously set 
out in an educational context in Book IV of his Republic, where the virtuous individual 
is one whose rational, spirited, and erotic capacities are established “in a relation of 
mastering, and being mastered by, one another that is according to nature.”28  That 
relation is beautifully expressed by Lewis in his short treatise on emotion and morality 
in education, The Abolition of Man, as the condition in which “the head rules the belly 
through the chest.”29  Rather than deny, ignore, or suppress the emotions, or relegate 
them to extra-curricular training, virtue ethics fully acknowledges the potential conflicts 
between reason and emotion and sets out a structure that accounts for their role in the 
virtuous life. The major benefit of this accommodation is that it allows for movement in 
the direction of a possible reconciliation with moral educational theories that focus 
more on training for rationality. 
Second, that virtue ethics is a satisfactorily principled cognitive system ought go 
some way to warning off the threat of emotions taking over and destroying the work of 
reason when faced with a personal moral dilemma. For virtue ethics, especially 
contemporary virtue ethics as set out in Geach and Hursthouse, does hold that some 
actions or activities are absolutely wrong.30  The difference between virtue ethics and 
consequentialist theories here, however, turns on those situations when a morally bad 
act is required in the face of a more damaging alternative. Whereas the consequentialist 
would see the act as morally neutral or even positive in its achievement of the best 
outcome, the virtue ethicist would still be committed to the principle that the act was, 
in fact, wrong.31  
A third reason virtue ethics is our best candidate for an account of moral education 
that facilitates the interaction between reason and emotion is that it affords a positive 
role for reflection in emotive development. Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of the mean’—
according to which the virtuous action is the mean between two extremes of character; 
                                                
28 Phaedrus, 246a-254e; Republic, 427e-444e, esp. 444b-e. 
29 C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2009), 24. 
30 Peter Thomas Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Rosalind Hursthouse, 
On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
31 Carr [“Literature”], 140. 
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for example, cowardice and recklessness—requires cognitive reflection in order to locate 
that mean, or, in the case of his supreme virtue, magnanimity, to be able to identify the 
particular pitch and balance magnanimous action requires in a given situation.32  
That virtue ethics is conducive to emotions in education is perhaps not surprising. 
The vocation-focussed or economically-impactful curricula referenced above share a 
common trajectory with deontological and utilitarian ethical systems in their emphases 
on satisfying objective lists or calculating consequences and benefits. If the underlying 
strength of virtue ethics is its ability to account for the entire human complex—messy 
emotions and all—a virtue ethical pedagogy of moral development would, at least in 
theory, be primed to avoid those perhaps negative priorities. My interpretation of the 
Symposium demonstrates how Plato’s virtue ethical system puts love at the heart of not 
only cognitive motivation, but moral development in tandem.  
 
 II.d. Curriculum: Beauty in the classroom 
 
This idea of creative thinking led by love, I argue, was a key feature of Plato’s 
educational theory and derives from insightful analysis of the human powers of 
motivation. You cannot navigate with merely a highly polished rudder—you must start 
with the motor before navigation even begins. Once we have engaged the emotions, 
then we can deliver the directional standards of a particular curriculum. 
The hypothesis we are presented with in the Symposium is that every contact with 
beauty (from perceptual and sense-based contact, to emotional and cognitive contact) 
gives rise to erotic desire to generate in beauty. This generation, as I have argued above, 
manifests in an assimilation with beauty itself. Love unites the Form with the particular 
lover, binding them together, and thus enabling the production of any and all particular 
beauty. If Plato is right about this, his message to posterity is that teachers should teach 
by beauty, and by engaging the emotions. Philosophy, the love of wisdom, has a 
responsibility not to sit alone in the study or retreat to the ivory tower—building 
edifices of purely rational construction—but to connect with the world of art and 
                                                
32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a26-b28, with 1106a36-b7, 1122a18-1125a17. 
WARE CHAPTER V: THE VIRTUE OF BEAUTY 190 
 
  
culture to generate the virtue that those in pursuit of it have come to love, and to 
know.  
Kristjánsson divides moral education of emotion projects into three inter-related 
areas of inquiry: (1) are emotions appropriate objects of education; (2) ought, and if so, 
how, can emotions be shaped within education; and (3) what specific activities or 
techniques can teachers employ in the classroom.33  As the above discussion has 
emphasised, the debate on educating the emotions tends to focus on the first two 
questions—understandably, of course, as we are philosophers. Precious little, however, 
is available to educators seeking practical, straight-to-the-classroom application of the 
results of all this research. Indeed, Maxwell and Reichenbach even go so far as to say 
that “not a single intervention programme or identifiable body of educational practices 
or strategies grounded in a major theoretical perspective in contemporary social 
psychology exists which specifically and explicitly targets moral emotions.”34  In what 
follows, I would like to outline, briefly, some of the positive ways the virtue of love 
love—being the internal motivation to seek not only knowledge of the attracting 
object, but the activity of shaping oneself and generating in the soul—may be 
encouraged in the contemporary classroom.  
First, educators can engage the emotion of love through bringing beauty into the 
classroom. The “vast, open sea of beauty”, to appropriate Plato’s description of the 
lover’s vision, is diverse and limitless.35  Depending on the level of schooling, a range of 
examples in art and literature (conceived broadly to include as well drama, music, 
dance, design, and more) can be creatively incorporated into lessons with the specific 
aim of grabbing the emotions, which in turn compel further investigation (in the 
classroom, in extra-curricular activities, and in personal free pursuit), and indicate 
future lines of discussion. There exist in the literature a number of compelling 
arguments that engaging the emotions of, for example, compassion, sympathy, and 
empathy—through materials and stories—is the “sine qua non of the ability to 
                                                
33 Kristjánsson, 671-689. 
34 Maxwell and Reichenbach, 148. 
35 Symposium, 210d. 
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formulate moral assessments.”36  Educating through love and attraction to the beautiful, 
however, offers a uniquely powerful capacity to harness the motivational aspects of the 
emotion. For it is the initial pangs of love, read as the desire to know, which first 
present as curiosity and develop into a commitment to finding out more, and a passion 
for the subject that may shape the course of a life. Bringing beauty into the classroom—
all classrooms, not just the art studio—can launch this motivation in new and exciting 
ways.  
The beauty of great literature and compelling art has a further especial role to play 
in developing imagination, particularly in the consideration of multiple perspectives that 
arouse emotion. Such subjects are often exceptionally concerned in depicting or 
commenting on the complex interplay of human emotions in moral situations. Indeed, 
Wordsworth defined poetry as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.”37  By 
presenting material that prompts an emotional response, students can be inwardly led 
to appreciate certain aspects of a case they may not otherwise have acknowledged.  I 
should emphasise here that bringing beauty into the classroom ought go beyond art 
appreciation courses as one among other (subtly more ‘serious’, ‘academic’) subjects. 
The beauty of art and literature should instead be seen as a powerful impetus to moral 
development and so afforded a place in any and all subjects deemed appropriate by the 
educator. 
What engaging the emotions can contribute to educational and cognitive 
development is what Schwarz and Clore term “affect as information”.38  According to 
this theory, internal emotional experiences supply individuals with information about 
their external environment. This information can then be harnessed in creative ways as 
                                                
36 Maxwell and Reichenbach, 154, my italics; Max Scheler, The nature of sympathy, trans. Peter Heath 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954); Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, altruism and morality (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Arne Johan Vetlesen, Perception, empathy, and judgment: An inquiry into the 
preconditions of moral performance (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994). 
37 David Nichol Smith, Wordsworth: Poetry and Prose (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), 171. 
38 Norbert Schwarz, “Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions of affective states,” 
in Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior Vol. 2, eds. E. Tory Higgins and 
Richard M. Sorrentino (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 1990); Norbert Schwarz and Gerald L. Clore, 
“Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45:3 (1983). 
WARE CHAPTER V: THE VIRTUE OF BEAUTY 192 
 
  
it influences the individual’s evaluations, decisions, concerns, and further courses of 
action. Educators can consider how facilitating students’ attending to their emotional 
response to material may enhance the learning experience and understanding of course 
content. Take, for example, the following classroom exercises: 
 Upon the presentation of visual illusions such as Adelson’s Checkershadow 
Illusion, below, the mind is primed to accept that the squares marked A and 
B are of different colours.  
 
 
In fact, they are the same colour, and this can be confirmed by the educator 
using the proof image:   
 




When the illusion is experienced for the first time, students often respond 
with a range of emotions including bafflement, awe, amusement, and 
incredulity—the latter of which leads naturally to further questioning and 
explanation. In my undergraduate philosophy classes, I use this illusion to 
introduce Descartes’ radical doubt: how much can we trust our senses if 
they can be so wildly taken in by illusion? The emotional response, 
however, can be harnessed for motivating the intellectual virtues of curiosity 
and care towards a host of subjects. For example, such virtues can serve to 
widen appreciation for suspending judgement on controversial figures in a 
History class until the motivations for actions can be carefully considered; 
or for precision and caution in a Science lab. 
 
 Literature, poetry, and other story-telling media can also stimulate the 
emotions to enhance achievement outside of English and Literature classes. 
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle is often featured in American History class 
readings lists, but its ability to generate powerful emotions of shock and 
disgust at the conditions of the meat-packing industry in the early 20th-
century can function to initiate discussions and projects across the 
educational spectrum. Despair at the working conditions the novel presents 
is a unique way to contribute to lessons on trade unions and class poverty in 
Economics; and revulsion at unsanitary factory farming practices can initiate 
a personal dimension to considerations of vegetarianism and veganism in a 
Physical Education or Health class, or of animal welfare and organic farming 
in Government and Business classes.  
 
What is important to focus on in such exercises is that the students attend consciously 
to their emotions in response to the subject matter of the lesson: drawing out what it is 
the experienced emotion tracks, and considering that aspect of the content as 
information which can be explored further in discussions or assignments. 
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Second, educators can use Gadfly questions to engage the emotions in response to an 
apparent wrong. Socrates’ reference to himself, in the Apology, as a gadfly who bites the 
sluggish horse in order to arouse that horse to action is put into practice by his acting 
the rogue street philosopher, constantly questioning his contemporaries in such a way 
that they would feel compelled either to defend their premises or realise further thought 
and refinement of those premises was needed.39  Plato acknowledges that children 
possess the ability to love the beautiful, and blame and hate the ugly, even before they 
are capable of rational speech.40  By pressing intuitively controversial points, challenging 
assumptions, or playing advocatus diaboli, educators can stir up instinctive defences of 
what is, or is at least thought to be, true. 
Gadfly questions can be directed towards the course content and students’ answers 
to questions, in addition to their emotional responses to that course content. 
Facilitators may take cues from Socrates’ own method as to what kinds of questioning 
best get at the heart of the interlocutor’s statements, probing responses to ferret out 
analytic distinctions as well as to elicit commitment to a view by proposing a radical 
alternative. The use of the Socratic Method in education has long been championed for 
its ability to aid students in clarifying and justifying their thoughts on the topic under 
question.41  Of specific relevance to our topic of engaging the emotions in education, is 
to direct gadfly questions towards the students’ own emotional responses to material 
(and perhaps especially towards unexpected emotional responses), which can be 
indicators of a further question or line of reasoning. Examples of such gadfly questions 
towards emotions may include: 
 
 Do you think all parties (or characters) involved in the event felt the same way in 
response? Why or why not? 
 
                                                
39 Apology, 30e. 
40 Republic, 401e-402a. 
41 Pete Boghossian, “How Socratic Pedagogy Works,” Informal Logic 23:2, Teaching Supplement #8 (2003); 
Richard Garlikov, “The Socratic Method: Teaching by Asking Instead of by Telling,” last modified 2001, 
http://www.garlikov.com/Soc_Meth.html; James L. Golden, “Plato Revisited: A Theory of Discourse for All 
Seasons,” in Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse, eds. Robert J. Connors, Lisa Ede, and Andrea 
Lunsford (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984); and Robert D. Whipple, Socratic Method 
and Writing Instruction (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997). 
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 Why do you think you like X more than Y? 
 
 Is there a difference between our society and the society under discussion that 
might make the situation look different to you? 
 
 What element of the lesson would you be most (or least) likely to remember 
tomorrow? 
 
 What element of the lesson makes you the most surprised (or angry, or curious)? 
Why? 
 
The task in employing gadfly questions specifically, within the broader teaching style of 
the Socratic Method, is to harness the motivational power of the emotions and direct it 
towards identifying new ways of thinking about course content. By attending to their 
emotions in this reflective manner, students can link their own affective responses to 
the subject of a lesson and find in that link a personal reason to defend and articulate 
their thoughts. 
A third practical application of Plato’s theory of love’s virtue is to use beauty as a 
tool for cognitive appraisal and reflection. Art and literature can present vastly different 
beauties, which the student can then evaluate in relation to other beauties presented in 
the course, and in relation to other types of beauties she experiences in her wider world. 
This is the very basis of Plato’s metaphysical theory of Forms, according to which one 
learns about, for example, abstract, absolute beauty by reflecting on what each of these 
particular beauties perceived and experienced have in common. Identifying what is 
essential to each of: a beautiful work of art; a beautiful scientific equation; a beautiful 
soul; and a beautifully accomplished action or performance is at once, then, a cognitive-
emotional-aesthetic (not to mention interdisciplinary) exercise. Encouraging students 
to ask, and reflect on, what it is they think that makes each of the different beauties 
they encounter beautiful can culminate in synthesisation assignments which aim at 
articulating and defending an account of what the terms beauty, art, or justice actually 
can mean. Methods for employing this concept in the classroom could include the 
following exercises: 
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 Having students each curate an ongoing journal focussing on a key concept 
of the course (e.g., citizenship, tragedy, respect, or abuses of power). 
Journals can be written in a notebook or—to introduce technology where 
appropriate to the level of the course—created online, as on a Tumblr 
microblog or Pinterest board. Students add examples of the concept they 
identify in art, current affairs, or the media and are asked to reflect on each 
entry asking what it is they think makes the particular example fall under 
the concept heading: what it is that makes the piece of work beautiful, or 
the court ruling unjust. The task here is to allow the emotions first to locate 
the particular examples, which can then become the subject of appraisal and 
reflection. This reflection aims at developing creative or lateral thinking, 
which draws connections between disparate instances of a concept. 
 
 Incorporating music created in a particular culture or era into a World 
Civilisations, History, or Foreign Language class. This can be done at 
intervals throughout the term, with students instructed to choose a song or 
music style they liked best at the end; or as a one-off project for a particular 
time period. Students are to reason about what in the period might have 
inspired or influenced the artists. Rather than making this a research 
exercise, it can be done as in-class writing, to facilitate lateral thinking 
between their emotional response to the music and the historical-cultural 
facts presented in the course content. 
 
My aim in highlighting this third kind of exercise is to draw attention to the 
particularly creative impetus beauty in art can have on the emotions, which—when 
attended to with cognitive reflection—can draw the mind to identify causal 
relationships between material previously unnoticed. The development of the ability to 
draw such relationships is a key feature of the kind of lateral and creative thinking 
which marks original thought.   
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I may at this point anticipate the objection regarding Plato’s infamous ‘banishment’ 
of the poets from his ideal city in Republic Book X, on the basis that they morally 
corrupt an audience. To argue that this demonstrates a rejection of art as an 
educational tool, however, would be to miss the point. A significant part of Plato’s 
critique was that certain works of art present falsehood as truth, with the effect that the 
student may come to think justice involves what is actually unjust, thereby obscuring 
what being just ‘looks like.’ However, the fact that Plato’s dialogues are positively 
littered with myths, similes, dramatic characters, and other poetic devices, coupled with 
the fact that the Symposium dialogue itself lists the work of Homer and Hesiod as 
highly-praised creations of beauty, reveals that Plato openly acknowledged the positive 
benefit of poetry.42  
The above exercises may already be carried out in the classroom for a host of other 
reasons, for example, to integrate technology, to make connections to other classes, or 
to practice writing across the curriculum. What I wish to emphasise here is that they 
can also be used as starting points to hook students with the aim of facilitating a 
uniquely powerful and generative connection between student and subject. It may, 
however, be argued that these three types of classroom exercises take beauty in art for 
moral purposes in such a way that places the theory squarely in that instrumental view 
of education lamented above: merely substituting moral or emotional development for 
economic benefit as an educational aim. I argue against this. The Platonic virtue ethics 
set out above holds as a fundamental tenet that it is because the lover values the 
beautiful for its own sake that she strives to become like it by creating beauty in herself. 
The lover in the Symposium does not perceive beauty and focus only on the many 
benefits she can gain by attaining it, but rather self-creation is an emotive-creative 
response of the soul to the beauty present to her. Love in relation to the beautiful leads to 




                                                
42 Symposium, 209a-e. 
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 III. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
Curiosity is ultimately driven by desire: the desire to know. Accordingly, we can 
find in Plato’s theory of love an understanding of how education in the beautiful—a 
generative process led by love—results in the lover becoming virtuous through the self-
creation of beauty and virtue in the soul. This theory connects Plato’s ordering agents 
of the universe (the Forms) with that which orders individual persons. That the world is 
a world of the good and beautiful—that it is this world—must be the reason why, on 
Diotima’s account, generation and the beautiful are so fundamentally connected. It is 
an education by attraction. We can take away from Plato’s Symposium dialogue the 
following hypothesis: if education is to be truly transformative—making us into 
responsible citizens, rational problem-solvers, creative thinkers—it must begin with 
honing love, employing those mechanisms which attract and which motivate a 
commitment to discovering more. What’s exciting, and challenging, is that you never 

















Participation is the name for Plato’s enigmatic relation that holds between 
immutable, unqualified Forms, and variable, qualified particulars. One of the 
longstanding problems with interpreting participation is the claim that Plato gave it a 
name but never attempted to explain it. I have aimed to challenge that complacency by 
proposing a solution for how exactly participation works. That solution is found in 
Socrates’ speech on Erôs in the Symposium. Just as Erôs, the daimon, navigates the 
interval between gods and men, binding the whole together, so does the emotive 
relation of love bind together Form and particular. The generative activity of love is 
what motivates the lover to come to learn about beauty itself, and—in the best cases—
to bring into being new beauty as a virtue of the soul. 
To set up this account of participation, I first reviewed the nature of the Forms and 
the nature of the participation relation as described in varying levels of detail in the 
Platonic corpus.  
I then provided an analysis of love as presented in Socrates’ speech, demonstrating 
two essential features that enable love to function as participation. First, love is 
distinctly cognitive: the love one experiences when beholding a beautiful beloved leads 
her to come to know that beauty better, a commitment to finding out more which 
leads outwards in ever-widening circles of beauty. From this experience of multiple 
beauties, the lover can learn about the nature of the Form of beauty itself through the 
characteristic Platonic account of Forms as the one cause over many particulars. 
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Second, I argued that the object of love in the Symposium is neither beautiful 
particulars nor the Form of beauty, but the generation of beauty: love’s object is 
bringing to birth in beauty. The erôs of the Symposium can be seen as an aesthetic and 
intellectual attraction that aims not at satisfaction but self-creation. 
Next, I argued that the generative relation of love fulfils the function of the Form’s 
causal relation to particular beauty: participation. Love, as Diotima states, is a bond 
between two ontological types—Form and particular—and, through our generation, 
brings the two together such that the latter is what it is through the former. The 
emotive-turn-to-cognitive relation of erôs is the clearest picture Plato paints of how 
possession of properties can be explained through participation in Forms. 
Finally, I examined what it is about beauty that enables this generative activity. 
Beauty prompts cognitive achievement by shining out through the perceptible world, to 
motivate the lover to learn more about that world. In the best cases, this activity results 
in a self-transformation and the further creation of beauty. I closed the thesis with a 
forward look to the implications of this theory of emotive participation for moral 
education.  
Love binds Form and particular by its being the mechanism for change that results 
in a new characterisation of the individual. What is unusual here is just how much the 
process includes the Form. We are led to ask, is Plato’s theory of attraction to the 
beautiful an attempt, perhaps, to explain the formal and efficient causes in one? In a 
dialogue whose topic is such a distinctly physical and human one, building a naturalistic 
account of causal motivation is fitting. Whether Beauty might trump the Good as the 
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What Good is Love? 
 
Lauren Ware   
 
Abstract: 
The role of emotions in mental life is the subject of longstanding controversy, spanning the history of 
ethics, moral psychology, and educational theory. This paper defends an account of love’s cognitive 
power. My starting point is Plato’s dialogue, the Symposium, in which we find the surprising claim that 
love aims at engendering moral virtue. I argue that this understanding affords love a crucial place in 
educational curricula, as engaging the emotions can motivate both cognitive achievement and moral 
development. I first outline the state of the challenge between dominant rival theories regarding 
emotions in learning. Next, I demonstrate how Platonic virtue ethics offers the most tenable prospect for 
an education of reason and emotion. Third, I sketch three practical ways educators might constructively 
engage emotions in the classroom. I conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to motivate the 
creative and lateral thinking which leads to moral development. 
Introduction 
 
ove can get us into all kinds of trouble—love of power, love of ourselves, love of what’s harmful, not to 
mention unrequited love and limerence. Furthermore, the emotions in general are often taken to be at 
odds with reason, getting in the way of making informed decisions, and love is no exception to such 
criticism. This paper sets out to discuss whether love can ever fulfil its promise to make life better, by investigating 
a controversial suggestion of Platonic virtue ethics that it is love which really ought to be at the heart of creative 
thinking and moral decision-making. 
 
Can the emotions be educated? Ought they? The past twenty years has witnessed a groundswell of academic 
interest in the emotions, with considerable attention being given to arguing and articulating their philosophical, 
political, and medical import.1 Yet the role of emotions in moral education has seen an unfortunately neglectful 
polarisation, with as-yet unresolved tension pitting educating for rationality against educating for moral 
development of the total person. This is, of course, not a new debate. Accordingly, this interest has sparked 
something of a minor Renaissance of and academic focus on historical treatments of the emotions, particularly 
Aristotelian views on love and friendship, Stoic applications to psychological health, and pre-Socratic discussion 
of the emotions in the poetry of, for example, Hesiod and Empedocles.2 
 
Plato is often portrayed as advocating an abandonment of such emotions as love and desire, in order for the 
philosopher to have access to the true objects of knowledge. Yet, in his dialogue, the Symposium, he writes that a 
life without love is not worth living, and that love is the best chance the philosopher has at true knowledge of 
beauty and virtue. In this paper, I argue that education by attraction to the beautiful motivates moral 
development through a unique form of self-creation. I will first outline the state of the challenge between a solely 
cognitive basis for education, and one that allows for affective or emotional considerations. Next, I will show how 
Platonic virtue ethics, specifically his theory of love in moral development, holds out the most tenable prospect 
for an education of reason and emotion, as the power of love carries with it a distinctly creative element: the 
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generation of virtue in the soul. Finally, I sketch three practical ways this creative love might be employed in the 
classroom. I conclude that love’s virtue is its peerless power to impel one to develop and shape herself. Beauty 
incites creation of beauty, and the mechanism for that creation is love. 
 
Emotions in Education 
 
The instrumental and utilitarian trends that pervade significant areas of contemporary education are typified 
by the promotion of the value of school as being primarily or even solely in the service of economic benefit to 
state or student. In spite of such trends, there remains a sound argument for the view that education ought 
concern itself with a more comprehensive view of human development. Humans are undeniably emotional 
beings, and thus that personal development must take the emotions into serious consideration. The challenge is 
traditionally presented as between a strictly cognitive view of education, and one that seeks to shape the character 
through emotional development. A brief analysis of these two general views will provide insight into where a 
virtue ethical framework might be able to contribute a degree of reconciliation for moral educational curricula. 
 
The former view is made prominent by Kohlberg’s cognitivist understanding of moral development, which—
stemming from Piagetian cognitive theory—takes that development to encompass only emotionally disinterested 
rational capabilities such as social cognition, problem solving, and perspective-taking without affect.3 On the 
Kolhbergian educational program of study, moral development is seen as largely the province of cognitive 
development, relegating emotion to the sidelines as impeding the rationality which is its exclusive focus. On the 
other hand, two influential anti-Kolhbergian systems have also arisen in the literature: character education, as best 
exemplified in the works of Lickona and Kilpatrick,4 and the ethics of care defended by Noddings, Gilligan, 
Chodorow, and Slote.5 Proponents of character education “rally around the belief that the formation of moral 
dispositions is a vital part of moral education and ascribe to a comprehensive definition of character which views 
character as comprising dispositions of thought, action, and feeling.”6 The ethics of care take the emotion of 
caring to be “ontologically basic to human excellence” and that the aims of maintaining and enriching caring 
relationships must be the anchor of all educational activities and policies.7 Both of these theories, especially 
character education, may be mistaken for a brand of virtue ethics, but they differ in at least one significant respect 
when it comes to educating for moral development: neither character education nor the ethics of care appear to 
offer a specific mechanism for incorporating reason into their praxis. As Carr laments of care ethics, “it seems in 
itself to be opposed to any very principled definition of moral association.”8 
 
Is there a view of moral educational theory that does not place attentiveness to the emotions over and above 
the development of rational capacities, nor sacrifice them for a quasi-Kantian view of education which all but 
ignores the emotive aspect of ethical development? In what follows, I want to focus on the emotion of love and its 
role in educating for virtue. With this as a focus, I hope to show we can find such an educational theory in 
Platonic virtue ethics, which I will set out in section two.  
 
Virtue ethics can be argued to hold out more over its adversary moral theories since its focus takes into 
account the human soul as a whole—specifically including emotions such as love, but also fear, shame, and the 
more contentious feelings of Schadenfreude, pride, anger, and maudlin.9 I identify three reasons for virtue ethics 
to be the primary candidate for a social scientific educational theory of moral development. First, virtue ethics is 
fundamentally about a particular ordering of the emotions so as to be compatible with reason. Plato’s discussion 
of the properly ordered soul in his dialogue, the Phaedrus, depicts reason as a charioteer harnessing the 
motivational force of an angry but righteous horse on the one hand, and the wily but chaotic and desiderative 




horse on the other. The account is famously set out in an educational context in Book IV of his Republic, where 
the virtuous individual is one whose rational, spirited, and erotic capacities are established “in a relation of 
mastering, and being mastered by, one another that is according to nature.”10 That relation is artfully expressed by 
Lewis in his short treatise on emotion and morality in education, The Abolition of Man, as the condition in which 
“the head rules the belly through the chest.”11 Rather than deny, ignore, or suppress the emotions, or relegate 
them to extra-curricular training, virtue ethics fully acknowledges the potential conflicts between reason and 
emotion and sets out a structure which accounts for their role in the virtuous life. The major benefit of this 
accommodation is that it allows for movement in the direction of a possible reconciliation with moral educational 
theories which focus more on training for rationality. 
 
Second, that virtue ethics is a satisfactorily principled cognitive system ought to go some way in warning off 
the threat of emotions taking over and destroying the work of reason when faced with a personal moral dilemma. 
For virtue ethics, especially contemporary virtue ethics as set out in Geach and Hursthouse, does hold that some 
actions or activities are absolutely wrong.12 The difference between virtue ethics and consequentialist theories 
here, however, turns on those situations when an ostensibly morally bad act is required in the face of a more 
damaging alternative. Whereas the consequentialist would see the act as morally neutral or even positive in its 
achievement of the best outcome, the virtue ethicist would still be committed to the principle that the act itself 
was, in fact, wrong.13 
 
A third reason virtue ethics is our best candidate for an account of moral education that facilitates the 
interaction between reason and emotion is that it affords a positive role for reflection in emotive development. 
Aristotle’s “doctrine of the mean”—according to which the virtuous action is the mean between two extremes of 
character; for example, cowardice and recklessness—requires cognitive reflection in order to locate that mean, or, 
in the case of his supreme virtue, magnanimity, to be able to identify the particular pitch and balance 
magnanimous action requires in a given situation.14 
 
That virtue ethics is conducive to emotions in education is perhaps not surprising. The vocation-focussed or 
economically-impactful curricula referenced at the beginning of this section share a common trajectory with 
deontological or utilitarian ethical systems in their emphases on satisfying objective lists or calculating 
consequences and benefits. If the underlying strength of virtue ethics is its ability to account for the entire human 
complex—messy emotions and all—a virtue ethical pedagogy of moral development would, at least in theory, be 
primed to avoid those perhaps negative priorities. In the next section, I focus specifically on how one particular 
virtue ethical system puts love at the heart of not only cognitive motivation, but moral development in tandem.  
 
Love’s Virtue in Platonic Ethics 
 
It was the dinner party that went down in history. Decades afterwards, the eager curious desperately gossiped 
to get a taste of what brought together the beautiful and powerful in one night of intoxicating conversation: Love. 
In the Symposium, Socrates shocks his interlocutors by proclaiming that Erôs, “god of love”, is, in fact, not a god at 
all. Rather, Love is a dæmon, intermediary between gods and men. As he describes the activity and purpose of the 
dæmon class, it begins to become clear the importance that Plato attributes to this emotion. He writes: 
 
For Erôs is in the middle of both gods and men and fills up the interval so that the whole cosmos itself 
has been bound together by it. For a god does not mingle with a human being; but through Erôs occurs 
the whole connection and conversation of gods with men.15 





     Love’s power is to bind together the ethical absolutes of virtue, and what approximates it in the individual 
person. How can love bind together such different realms, the human and the divine? As I interpret Plato, love 
does this by having as its object the creation of beauty and virtue. Love quickens the curiosity we have about the 
beautiful objects and art forms we encounter in the world, which inspire us and move us to come to know them 
better, and to learn about what beauty itself really is.  
 
1. Love is oriented to knowledge 
 
Stendhal’s famous maxim that beauty is “the promise of happiness” could well be said to be true of the sort of 
beauty Plato has in mind in the Symposium: we can define Plato’s love as a belief about the beloved that one’s life 
would be better if that beloved were a part of it.16 The beauty one experiences in the world constantly beckons her 
forward to get to know it more intimately. It is sometimes difficult to tell, however, in what way an attachment to 
the object will impact her. It is for this reason that she is led to study and come to know the object, so as to know 
whether time spent with it will leave her better or worse. Plato here presents a compelling view regarding the 
interrelation of all beautiful things in the world and their role in the philosophic life. As one becomes attracted to 
a beautiful particular, and pursues it with natural curiosity to learn more about it—Where does it come from? Why 
does it work the way it does? What makes it different to others of its kind?—she will find herself pursuing other 
beautiful particulars in ever-expanding circles of beauty. As one is beckoned forward by beauty to come to know 
one work or object, she will find she must learn about another, its context, its language, its history, and other 
similar beauties. As Nehamas asserts,  
 
To love something is always in part to try to understand what makes it beautiful, what drew me—and, as 
long as I love it—continues to draw me toward it. To understand what it is and to see how it will affect 
me and to see what it will be able to give me. The more I try to understand a particular object, the more I 
need to learn about the world in general. The deep and the broad are just facets of one another.17 
 
This is the account of love and beauty we find in the famous “ascent passage” of the Symposium (209e-212a). In 
this passage, the lover is depicted as being led from one beauty by a desire to know more about it, to come to see 
the beauty in other similar things, and the culture and laws which allow such beauty to flourish, and finally to 
glimpse that absolute beauty that is the source of all beauty experienced in the world: the beholding of which 
turns out to be the best life imaginable. 
 
Yet the lover’s interest in what is beautiful does not stop there—with a solely cognitive achievement. Instead, 
the lover aims to come to behold the beautiful as closely as she can, which leads her to create beauty, both in 
herself and in the wider world. Whilst love leads the lover to come to know and experience greater and wider 
realms of beauty in the world, the activity of love is further constituted by the creation of beauty. 
 
2. Love’s object is moral self-creation  
 
The framing characteristic of love, Socrates asserts, is that it is “of something”—just as a father is father of a 
child so too love is of something, and it “desires that something”.18 Plato’s focus on the object of love reveals the 
complex relational quality essential to it. For love to have an object is simply part of its grounding logic, and the 
identification of this object is thus fundamental to any attempt to define and understand love. In contemporary 
moral psychology, this object of love serves as the “intentional object” which is said to be “‘about’ objects and 




states of affairs quite external to the agent.”19 My account of love’s object in the Symposium, however, locates this 
object within the individual as her own moral development.  
 
It is commonly claimed in the scholarly literature that the object of love, in the Symposium dialogue, is 
beauty.20 However, I argue against this view and assert that love’s object is the creative activity of “bringing to birth 
in beauty”—to translate precisely the Platonic text. For Plato writes at line 206e that this object of love is decidedly 
not beauty, but rather the creative process of generating beauty, both in the individual and in the wider world. 
What we witness in Socrates’ speech is Plato challenging the received wisdom of his day. Upon seeing beauty in 
the world, the lover is led to make herself more like that beauty. In so doing, she brings into being further beauty 
by making herself more beautiful. Thus, love is not purely relational, as emotional intentionality is standardly 
analysed, but teleological—seeking its end. The highest form of love, for Plato, is an instrument of creation. He sees 
in the human soul a self-generation principle: a compass of self-design, externally triggered by beauty. Crucially, 
however, instead of turning to point towards beauty, the compass turns to point to itself, to design and craft itself. 
Time spent in pursuit of beauty provides a way for the lover to become beautiful: shaped by the course of her life. 
Plato thus establishes that the lover will have an inwardly-directed motivation to find ways to achieve this end. 
 
Is the cognitive nature of love Plato has in mind here strong enough to ground such generative activity? I 
argue that as love regarding the beautiful has led to knowledge, so does knowing about the beautiful lead to 
assimilation. Such a tendency finds comparison in the Republic, where training in dialectic leads the young 
philosopher-kings to becoming morally virtuous and hence to being able to lead well and produce a good city. In 
the Symposium, cognition and contemplation of the beautiful similarly lead to association and assimilation, and 
hence to being able to produce beauty on earth.  
 
In the course of his educational exposition in Book VII of the Republic, Socrates reveals how an understanding 
of the truth is more than a displacement of ignorance for knowledge, but is intimately tied to bringing about a 
moral change in the student. The study of dialectic enables one “to attain to each thing itself that is…[to] grasp the 
reason for the being of each thing”,21 with the result that one will be able to separate decisively the Form of 
absolute goodness from the many particular instances which bear a relation to it. Thus grounded in truth, the 
philosophers will be in the best position to produce good things—in themselves and in the city. Socrates asserts, 
“Once they see the good itself, they must be compelled, each in his own turn, to use it as a pattern for ordering 
the city, private men, and themselves for the rest of their lives.”22 These ruling men are pronounced thoroughly 
beautiful,23 and can become “authors of the greatest good” by bringing into being the “well-governed city”.24 But is 
witnessing the Forms, in whatever way mortals might be able to do, enough to initiate moral change? I argue it is. 
 
The method by which the philosopher-king shapes and creates the beautiful city and beautiful citizens 
(including herself) is described by Socrates as that of the inspired artist: 
 
I suppose that in filling out their work they would look away frequently in both directions, towards the 
just, beautiful, and moderate by nature and everything of the sort, and again, towards what is in human 
beings; and thus, mixing and blending the practices as ingredients…taking hints from exactly the 
phenomenon in human beings which Homer too called god-like and the image of god…And I suppose 
they would rub out one thing and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as dear to 
the gods as they admit of being.25 
This concept is repeated in Plato’s Timaeus dialogue as well, where Socrates asserts: 





Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a 
cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and 
fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made 
beautiful and virtuous…26  
Time spent in contemplation of the Forms of beauty and goodness provides a way for the philosopher to 
become like them, through imitation and assimilation. Socrates concludes, “Then it is the philosopher, keeping 
company with the divine and the orderly who himself becomes orderly and divine, in the measure permitted to 
man.”27 What we have here is an account that considering the Form, and comparing it to what is in humans, 
compels one to change and rub things out in the attempt to make what is only qualifiedly virtuous more like the 
unqualifiedly virtuous. There is good in the philosopher, because of her knowledge of and assimilation with the 
Form, and as a result of this togetherness, she is the best able to produce good things in the city and in the 
individual citizen. The object of love is therefore its greatest virtue: impelling the lover to shape herself in the 
image of virtue, and bringing about new virtue in the soul.  
 
Beauty in the Classroom 
 
This idea of creative thinking led by love, I argue, was a key feature of Plato’s educational theory and derives 
from insightful analysis of the human powers of motivation. You cannot navigate with merely a highly polished 
rudder—you must start with the motor before navigation even begins. Once we have engaged the emotions, then 
we can deliver the directional standards of a particular curriculum. 
 
The hypothesis we are presented with in the Symposium is that every contact with beauty (from perceptual and 
sense-based contact, to emotional and cognitive contact) gives rise to erotic desire to generate in beauty. This 
generation, as I have argued above, manifests in an assimilation with beauty itself. Love unites the Form with the 
particular lover, binding them together, thus enabling the production of any and all particular beauty. If Plato is 
right about this, his message to posterity is that teachers should teach by beauty, and by engaging the emotions. 
Philosophy, the love of wisdom, has a responsibility not to sit alone in the study or retreat to the ivory tower—
building edifices of purely rational construction—but to connect with the world of art and culture to generate the 
virtue that those in pursuit of it have come to love and to know.  
 
Kristjánsson divides moral education of emotion projects into three inter-related areas of inquiry: (1) are 
emotions appropriate objects of education; (2) ought, and if so, how, can emotions be shaped within education; 
and (3) what specific activities or techniques can teachers employ in the classroom?28 As the above discussion has 
emphasised, the debate on educating the emotions tends to focus on the first two questions—understandably, of 
course, as we are philosophers. Precious little, however, is available to educators seeking practical, straight-to-the-
classroom application of the results of all this research. Indeed, Maxwell and Reichenbach even go so far as to say 
that “not a single intervention programme or identifiable body of educational practices or strategies grounded in a 
major theoretical perspective in contemporary social psychology exists which specifically and explicitly targets 
moral emotions.”29 In what follows, I would like to outline, briefly, some of the positive ways the virtue of love—
being the internal motivation to seek not only knowledge of the attracting object, but the activity of shaping 
oneself and generating virtue in the soul—may be encouraged in the contemporary classroom.  
 
First, educators can engage the emotion of love through bringing beauty into the classroom. The “vast, open sea of 
beauty”, to appropriate Plato’s description of the lover’s vision, is diverse and limitless.30 Depending on the level 




of schooling, a range of examples in art and literature (conceived broadly to include as well drama, music, dance, 
design, and more) can be creatively incorporated into lessons with the specific aim of grabbing the emotions, 
which in turn compel further investigation (in the classroom, in extra-curricular activities, and in personal free 
pursuit), and indicate future lines of discussion. There exist in the literature a number of compelling arguments 
that engaging the emotions of, for example, compassion, sympathy, and empathy—through materials and stories—
is the “sine qua non of the ability to formulate moral assessments”.31 Educating through love and attraction to the 
beautiful, however, offers a uniquely powerful capacity to harness the motivational aspects of the emotion. For it is 
the initial pangs of love, read as the desire to know, which first present as curiosity and develop into a 
commitment to finding out more, and a passion for the subject. Bringing beauty into the classroom—all 
classrooms, not just the art studio—can launch this motivation in new and exciting ways.  
 
The beauty of great literature and compelling art has a further special role to play in developing imagination, 
particularly in the consideration of multiple perspectives which arouse emotion. Such subjects are often 
exceptionally concerned in depicting or commenting on the complex interplay of human emotions in moral 
situations. Indeed, Wordsworth defined poetry as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.”32 By 
presenting material that prompts an emotional response, students can be inwardly led to appreciate certain 
aspects of a case they may not otherwise have acknowledged.  I should emphasise here that bringing beauty into 
the classroom ought to go beyond art appreciation courses as one among other (subtly more “serious”, 
“academic”) subjects. The beauty of art and literature should instead be seen as a powerful impetus to moral 
development and so afforded a place in any and all subjects. 
 
What engaging the emotions can contribute to educational and cognitive development is what Schwartz and 
Clore term “affect as information”.33 According to this theory, internal emotional experiences supply individuals 
with information about their external environment. This information can then be harnessed in creative ways as it 
influences the individual’s evaluations, decisions, concerns, and further courses of action. Educators can consider 
how facilitating students’ attending to their emotional response to material may enhance the learning experience 
and understanding of course content. Take, for example, the following classroom exercises: 
 
 Upon the presentation of visual illusions such as Adelson’s Checkershadow Illusion, below, the mind 
is primed to accept that the squares marked A and B are of different colours.  
 





In fact, they are the same colour, and this can be confirmed by the educator using the proof image:   
 
 
When the illusion is experienced for the first time, students often respond with a range of emotions 
including bafflement, awe, amusement, and incredulity—the latter of which leads naturally to further 
questioning and explanation. In my undergraduate philosophy classes, I use this illusion to introduce 
Descartes’ radical doubt: how much can we trust our senses if they can be so wildly taken in by 
illusion? The emotional response, however, can be harnessed for motivating the intellectual virtues of 
curiosity and care towards a host of subjects. For example, such virtues can serve to widen appreciation 
for suspending judgement on controversial figures in a History class until the motivations for actions 
can be carefully considered; or for precision and caution in a Science lab. 
 
 Literature, poetry, and other story-telling media can also stimulate the emotions to enhance 
achievement outside of English and Literature classes. Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle is often featured in 
American History class readings lists, but its ability to generate powerful emotions of shock and disgust 
at the conditions of the meat-packing industry in the early 20th-century can function to initiate 
discussions and projects across the educational spectrum. Despair at the working conditions the novel 
presents is a unique way to contribute to lessons on trade unions and class poverty in Economics; and 
revulsion at unsanitary factory farming practices can initiate a personal dimension to considerations of 
vegetarianism and veganism in a Physical Education or Health class, or of animal welfare and organic 
farming in Government and Business classes.  
 
What is important to focus on in such exercises is that the students attend consciously to their emotions in 
response to the subject matter of the lesson: drawing out what it is the experienced emotion tracks, and 
considering that aspect of the content as information which can be explored further in discussions or assignments. 
 
Second, educators can use Gadfly questions to engage the emotions in response to an apparent wrong. In the 
Apology, Socrates refers to himself as a gadfly which bites the sluggish horse in order to arouse him to action: he 
put this into practice by acting the rogue street philosopher, constantly questioning his contemporaries in such a 
way that they would feel compelled either to defend their premises or realise further thought and refinement of 




those premises was needed.34 Plato acknowledges that children possess the ability to love the beautiful, and blame 
and hate the ugly, even before they are capable of rational speech.35 By pressing intuitively controversial points, 
challenging assumptions, or playing advocatus diaboli, educators can stir up instinctive defences of what is, or is at 
least thought to be, true. 
 
Gadfly questions can be directed towards the course content and students’ answers to questions, in addition 
to their emotional responses to that course content. Facilitators may take cues from Socrates’ own method as to 
what kinds of questioning best get at the heart of the interlocutor’s statements, probing responses to ferret out 
analytic distinctions as well as to elicit commitment to a view by proposing a radical alternative. The use of the 
Socratic Method in education has long been championed for its ability to aid students in clarifying and justifying 
their thoughts on the topic under question.36 Of specific relevance to our topic of engaging the emotions in 
education, is to direct gadfly questions towards the students’ own emotional responses to material (and perhaps 
especially towards unexpected emotional responses), which can be indicators of a further question or line of 
reasoning. Examples of such gadfly questions towards emotions may include: 
 
 Do you think all parties (or characters) involved in the event felt the same way in response? Why or why not? 
 
 Why do you think you like X more than Y? 
 
 Is there a difference between our society and the society under discussion that might make the situation look 
different to you? 
 
 What element of the lesson would you be most (or least) likely to remember? 
 
 What element of the lesson makes you the most surprised (or angry, or curious)? Why? 
 
The task in employing gadfly questions specifically, within the broader teaching style of the Socratic Method, 
is to harness the motivational power of the emotions and direct it towards identifying new ways of thinking about 
course content. By attending to their emotions in this reflective manner, students can link their own affective 
responses to the subject of a lesson and find in that link a personal reason to defend and articulate their thoughts. 
 
A third practical application of Plato’s theory of love’s virtue is to use beauty as a tool for cognitive appraisal and 
reflection. Art and literature can present vastly different beauties, which the student can then evaluate in relation 
to other beauties presented in the course, and in relation to other types of beauties she experiences in her wider 
world. This is the basis of Plato’s metaphysical theory of Forms, according to which one learns about, for example, 
abstract, absolute beauty by reflecting on what each of these particular beauties perceived and experienced have in 
common. Identifying what is essential to each of a beautiful work of art, a beautiful scientific equation, a beautiful 
soul, and a beautifully accomplished action or performance is at once, then, a cognitive-emotional-aesthetic (not 
to mention interdisciplinary) exercise. Encouraging students to ask, and reflect on, what it is they think that 
makes each of the different beauties they encounter beautiful can culminate in synthesisation assignments which 
aim at articulating and defending an account of what the terms beauty, art, or justice actually can mean. Methods 
for employing this concept in the classroom could include the following exercises: 
 
 Having students each curate an ongoing journal focusing on a key concept of the course (e.g., 
citizenship, tragedy, respect, or abuses of power). Journals can be written in a notebook or—to 




introduce technology where appropriate to the level of the course—created online, as on a Tumblr 
microblog or Pinterest board. Students add examples of the concept they identify in art, current 
affairs, or the media and are asked to reflect on each entry asking what it is they think makes the 
particular example fall under the concept heading: what it is that makes the piece of work beautiful, or 
the court ruling unjust. The task here is to allow the emotions first to locate the particular examples, 
which can then become the subject of appraisal and reflection. This reflection aims at developing 
creative or lateral thinking, which draws connections between disparate instances of a concept. 
 
 Incorporating music created in a particular culture or era into a World Civilisations, History, or 
Foreign Language class. This can be done at intervals throughout the term, with students instructed to 
choose a song or music style they liked best at the end; or as a one-off project for a particular time 
period. Students are to reason about what in the period might have inspired or influenced the artists. 
Rather than making this a research exercise, it can be done as in-class writing, to facilitate lateral 
thinking between their emotional response to the music and the historical-cultural facts presented in 
the course content. 
 
My aim in highlighting this third kind of exercise is to draw attention to the particularly creative impetus 
beauty in art can have on the emotions, which—when attended to with cognitive reflection—can draw the mind to 
identify causal relationships between material previously unnoticed. The development of the ability to draw such 
relationships is a key feature of the kind of lateral and creative thinking which marks original thought.   
 
 I may at this point anticipate the objection regarding Plato’s infamous “banishment” of the poets from the 
ideal city in Book X of his Republic, on the basis that they morally corrupt an audience. To argue that this 
demonstrates a rejection of art as an educational tool, however, would be to miss the point. A significant part of 
Plato’s critique was that certain works of art present falsehood as truth, with the effect that the student may come 
to think justice involves what is actually unjust, thereby obscuring what being just “looks like.” However, the fact 
that Plato’s dialogues are positively littered with myths, similes, dramatic characters, and other poetic devices, 
coupled with the fact that the Symposium dialogue itself lists the work of Homer and Hesiod as highly praised 
creations of beauty, reveals that Plato openly acknowledged the positive benefit of poetry.37 
 
The above exercises may already be carried out in the classroom for a host of other reasons, for example to 
integrate technology, to make connections to other classes, or to practice writing across the curriculum. What I 
wish to emphasise here is that they can also be used as starting points to hook students with the aim of facilitating 
a uniquely powerful and generative connection between student and subject. It may, however, be argued that 
these three types of classroom exercises take beauty in art for moral purposes in such a way which places the 
theory squarely in that instrumental view of education lamented above: merely substituting moral or emotional 
development for economic benefit as an educational aim. I argue against this. The Platonic virtue ethics set out in 
section two holds as a fundamental tenet that it is because the lover values the beautiful for its own sake that she 
strives to become like it by creating beauty in herself. The lover in the Symposium does not perceive beauty and 
think of all the great benefit she can gain by attaining it, but rather self-creation is an emotive-creative response of 











Curiosity is ultimately driven by desire: the desire to know. Accordingly, we can find in Plato’s theory of love 
an understanding of how education in the beautiful—a generative process led by love—results in the lover 
becoming virtuous through the self-creation of beauty and virtue in the soul. This theory connects Plato’s ordering 
agents of the universe (the conceptual ideas of absolute goodness and beauty) with that which orders individual 
persons. It is an education by attraction. We can take away from Plato’s Symposium dialogue the following 
hypothesis: if education is to be truly transformative—making us into responsible citizens, rational problem-solvers, 
creative thinkers—it must begin with honing desire, employing those mechanisms which attract and which motivate 
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